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ABSTRACT 
On September 14, 2001, Congress passed the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF). Over the past 13 years, the AUMF has served as the primary legal 
foundation for the use of force against terrorist organizations and other counterterrorist 
operations. Since its passage, threats facing the United States have evolved and new 
groups have emerged. Yet, Congress has failed to reexamine the statute. 
This thesis examines whether the AUMF serves as the proper foundation for 
addressing current terrorist threats or whether an alternative legal tool is more 
appropriate. To conduct this examination, it details and applies a methodology, or 
analytical framework, for assessing the status quo application of the AUMF and its 
potential alternatives. This thesis evaluates and ascertains the best among proposed 
courses of actions for the future of the AUMF by analyzing the evolution of terrorist 
threats, constitutional concerns, the consequences of altering the legal structure upon 
which national counterterrorism strategies rely, international legality, and precedent. 
Ultimately, this thesis recommends that Congress both sunset the AUMF and implement 
a tailored approach to force authorization, one that balances constitutional protections and 
security, while providing a foundation for crafting future force authorizations. 
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The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is the primary legal 
foundation for the use of force against terrorist organizations. It provides the president 
with the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force against the nations, 
organizations, and persons whom the president determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the 9/11 attacks. The political and judicial branches have interpreted 
the AUMF as extending to forces “associated with” al Qa’ida (AQ) and the Taliban. 
Despite the broad reach of the AUMF, its continued applicability to today’s 
terrorist threats is questionable. Since its passage over 13 years ago, the threat landscape 
has evolved. United States (U.S.) forces have degraded AQ and removed the Taliban 
from power in Afghanistan. Political officials and legal experts question whether the 
AUMF provides adequate legal authority to fight contemporary versions of AQ that did 
not exist on September 11, 2001. In addition, the decentralization of AQ has made it 
difficult to determine which groups have connections to AQ sufficient to bring them 
within the AUMF’s targeting authority.  
Two primary camps have emerged as offering the most reported on options for 
addressing “next-generation terrorist threats,” and both agree that the 2001 AUMF is 
obsolete.1 Yet, neither camp offering models for new counterterrorism frameworks 
addresses how these proposals will both mitigate specific threats posed by groups or 
individuals that do not fall within the AUMF and provide a sustained approach to 
preserving constitutional principles. Development of an analytical framework to identify 
and prioritize counterterrorism goals while addressing constitutional concerns will assist 
Congress in evaluating the AUMF and its alternatives.  
1 Robert Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A A National Security and Law Essay–
A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats,” Jean Perkins Task Force on National 
Security and Law, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2013, 1, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/ 
files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf; Greg Miller and Karen 
DeYoung, “Administration Debates Stretching 9/11 Law to Go After New Al-Qaeda Offshoots,” 
Washington Post, March 6, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-
06/world/37500569_1_qaeda-drone-strikes-obama-administration. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To address this issue at its most comprehensive level, the primary question posed 
by this thesis is “does the 2001 AUMF provide the most appropriate and beneficial legal 
authority for the United States to mitigate emerging terrorist threats, and if not, what 
alternative should be implemented?” In analyzing this overarching inquiry, the following 
questions are also addressed. 
• How has the terrorist threat landscape evolved since the passage of the 
AUMF? 
• How can U.S. lawmakers create the most appropriate and beneficial legal 
architecture for addressing terrorist threats while navigating humanitarian 
legal standards required for armed, non-state actors in conflict? 
• What criteria may be used to assess the AUMF and its alternatives, and 
how should they be prioritized? 
C. METHOD 
Congressional members did not have much time to reflect on the AUMF before 
they approved it in 2001. Congress debated the AUMF only three days after the 9/11 
attacks and immediately prior to being rushed to a memorial service for the victims of the 
attacks. Senators considered the AUMF in the face of a national crisis. The circumstances 
surrounding AUMF passage forestalled extensive deliberation regarding the full extent of 
potential repercussions pertinent to the passage of the AUMF. Now, Congress is afforded 
the luxury of time and hindsight for thoughtful analysis of the U.S. government’s use of 
force moving forward.  
The modes of analysis used for this thesis are policy analysis, policy options 
analysis, and legal analysis. The object of study is the law itself. However, law and policy 
intertwine, as laws are often enacted to effectuate policy and deter contrary action. Thus, 
the heart of this research focuses on policy, but this focus, in turn, requires an 
examination of how to build a legal framework that supports this policy.  
The AUMF has weathered criticism on a variety of grounds. Noteworthy critiques 
focus on the AUMF’s erosion of constitutional protections preserving the balance of 
powers between the executive and legislative branches and due process protections. In 
 xviii 
addition, questions have arisen regarding the international legality of counterterrorism 
actions conducted under AUMF authority. As such, this thesis develops criteria to apply 
to the status quo AUMF and proposed alternatives. The criteria by which these 
alternatives will be judged include 1) domestic legality, 2) security, 3) international 
legality, and 4) precedent.  
D. OPTIONS 
Ultimately, this thesis evaluates and seeks to ascertain the best among a number 
of leading proposed courses of actions for the future of the AUMF. The current policy of 
relying on the AUMF as the legal authority upon which counterterrorism measures rely 
needs to be examined. In addition to analyzing the status quo, several alternatives are 
available. The first is the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach, which involves a 
congressional delegation of force authorization authority to the executive branch via a 
robust administrative process. The second approach, the Title II Approach, calls for the 
repeal or sunset of the AUMF and promotes reliance on the president’s constitutional 
authority to defend the country from imminent threats. The third approach, or the 
Tailored Approach, proposes an AUMF sunset, consideration of narrowly tailored force 
authorizations to counter current threats, and revisions of the War Powers Resolution. 
E. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
The Tailored Approach proves most successful in satisfying the criteria. The 
primary goal of this thesis, however, is to convince congressional decision makers to 
consider and apply the criteria developed in this thesis to the AUMF discussion. Analysis 
of the repeal of or amendment to the AUMF deserves more in-depth analysis than it has 
thus far received, and the above criteria should play a central role in establishing a 
framework for comprehensive analysis aimed at predicting potential consequences of the 
modification of the AUMF. By examining each approach from the perspective of whether 
it is likely to preserve domestic legality, security, international legality, and promote 
positive precedent, lawmakers will have a framework with which to determine the most 
advantageous approach for mitigating terrorist threats while preserving democratic 
principles. 
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So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in 
efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate. And I will 
not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic 
effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like 
all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our 
democracy demands. 
–President Barack Obama1 
President Barack Obama made this statement during a speech at the National 
Defense University on May 23, 2012. During his speech, President Obama acknowledged 
that this nation had been at war for well over a decade. He described the evolution of 
counterterrorism measures and the compromises made in the interest of security. 
Nonetheless, as of the date of publication, the United States still relies upon the authority 
granted via the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) for a variety of 
counterterrorism measures, such as the use of military and special operations force, drone 
strikes, targeted killings of U.S. citizens abroad, warrantless surveillance, and the 
preventive detention of suspected terrorists for the duration of hostilities.  
This thesis first focuses on whether the AUMF serves as the proper foundation for 
addressing current terrorist threats or whether an alternative legal tool is more 
appropriate. To conduct this analysis, it details and applies a methodology, or analytical 
framework, for assessing the status quo application of the AUMF, the possible repeal of 
the AUMF, and potential alternatives to the AUMF. In assessing the AUMF and possible 
changes to it, it is necessary to consider the evolution of terrorist threats, constitutional 
concerns, the consequences of altering the legal structure upon which national 
counterterrorism strategies rely, international legality, and precedent. Ultimately, this 
thesis evaluates and seeks to ascertain the best among a number of leading proposed 
courses of actions for the future of the AUMF. 
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University” (speech, Washington, 
DC, May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university; Spencer Ackerman, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill to End Terror War Authority,” 
Wired, May 23, 2013, http://www.wired.com/dangerrom/2013/05/schiff-aumf. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The AUMF serves as the legal justification for U.S. counterterrorism policy and 
provides the architecture upon which other counterterrorism measures rely.2 Nonetheless, 
reliance on the AUMF has resulted in the war on terror arguably being waged within an 
ambiguous legal structure. Representative Adam Schiff, a member of the House 
Intelligence Committee, claims this architecture is “ill-suited to the nature of the threats 
we face now” and is “straining at the edges to justify the use of force outside the war 
theater.”3  
As the primary legal foundation for the use of force against terrorist 
organizations, the AUMF provides the president with the authority to “[u]se all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”4 As the foundation for U.S. 
counterterrorism, the AUMF should be assessed in relation to current and prospective 
threats to determine whether it is still the most viable legal mechanism to accomplish 
counterterrorism objectives.  
The Bush and Obama administrations, as well as the legislative and judicial 
branches, have interpreted the AUMF as extending to “co-belligerents” and groups 
“associated with” al Qa’ida (AQ) and the Taliban.5 Since the passage of the AUMF over 
13 years ago, however, the United States has removed the Taliban from power in 
2 Chesney, Robert, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew C. Waxman, and Benjamin Wittes. “A National Security 
and Law Essay–A A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation 
Terrorist Threats,” Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University, 2013, 1, 4, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-
Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf.  
3 Ackerman, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill.”  
4 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 1; Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf; Jack Goldsmith, “What to Do About Growing What to Do 
About Growing Extra-AUMF Threats?” Hoover Institution, Stanford University, January 23, 2013, 
http://www.advancingafreesociety.org/the-briefing/what-to-do-about-growing-extra-aumf-threats; Jennifer 
Daskal and Stephen I. Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” draft working paper, Lawfare (May 2013): 1, 
http://lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/After-the-AUMF-Final.pdf. 
5 Goldsmith, “What to Do About Growing Extra-AUMF Threats?”; Chesney et al., “A National 
Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework.” 
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Afghanistan and degraded AQ, which makes continued military involvement in 
Afghanistan questionable.6 AQ’s fragmentation has made it difficult to determine which 
groups qualify as its associates.7 Representative Buck McKeon asserted that the AUMF 
does not provide legal authority to fight contemporary versions of AQ in Yemen and East 
Africa.8 Groups, such as al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Jabhat al-
Nusrah, may not qualify as appropriate targets under the AUMF because they have no 
direct links to AQ, and their connections to its affiliates are uncertain.9 In this manner, 
the AUMF is already lacking. 
In addition, shifting organizational commitments have made the AUMF’s 
application to current terrorist organizations questionable. Groups that were at one time 
connected to AQ are now independently organized and operated. Organizations that were 
once autonomous of AQ, such as al Shabaab, have now established formal ties to the 
group. Moreover, the United States has considered using force against groups with 
unclear affiliations. For instance, some armed groups fighting in Syria do not have clearly 
identifiable organizational links; they may work in connection with AQ affiliates, may be 
sympathetic to AQ’s goals, or may operate completely independent from AQ.10 
To further complicate matters, new threats to U.S. interests have emerged that 
have no direct link to AQ or its affiliates.11 Many terrorist threats originate from “self-
radicalized individuals and groups” that are not covered by the AUMF.12 Thus, the 
United States is faced with the question of whether the 2001 AUMF provides adequate 
6 Jennifer Daskal and Stephen I. Vladeck, “Don’t Expand the War on Terror,” New York Times, May 
15, 2013; Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 1–2; George 
Zornick, “Will Obama Have an Afghanistan Problem in 2014?,” Washington Post, December 30, 2013; 
Tim Craig and Karen DeYoung, “Karzai Tells Susan Rice of More Demands for Accord Extending U.S. 
Troop Presence,” Washington Post, November 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security-adviser-susan-rice-visits-afghanistan-amid-tension-over-troop-accord/2013/11/25/fd0f8460-55dd-
11e3-835d-e7173847c7cc_story.html. 
7 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 4. 
8 Ackerman, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill.” 
9 Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.”  
10 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 1, 4. 
11 Ibid.; Goldsmith, “What to Do About Growing Extra-AUMF Threats?” 
12 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 1; Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
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authority to counter new terrorist threats. If not, policymakers are confronted with the 
question of when and how to authorize the use of force against these emerging groups 
and evolving threats.13  
In addition, the AUMF as applied supports a range of counterterrorism measures. 
For instance, the executive branch has relied on it to authorize warrantless electronic 
surveillance of citizens, pursue targeted killings of terrorists who are also U.S. citizens, 
and detain terrorist suspects for the duration of hostilities.14 Obviously then, operations 
under the AUMF intersect with legal authority stemming from this nation’s constitution 
and judicial precedent, or for short, domestic legal authority. Thus, without the AUMF, 
domestic legal authority for continuing such operations will be undermined. 
Further considerations are not limited to the domestic legal sphere. Legal experts 
have debated the legality of counterterrorism measures according to international law.15 
The AUMF created the foundation for utilizing elements of the laws of war in the global 
fight against AQ, including preventative detention of enemy combatants and their trial for 
humanitarian violations.16 However, the AUMF authorizes the use of force against non-
state actors. The application of laws of war to non-state actors in the context of 
international armed conflicts remains an unsettled and controversial issue.17 Questions 
13 Goldsmith, “What to Do About Growing Extra-AUMF Threats?” 
14 Ackerman, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill”; David S. Kris, “Law Enforcement As a 
Counterterrorism Tool,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5, no. 1 (June 2011): 1, 37, 40, 55, 
64; Robert Chesney, “Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of 
Counterterrorism,” University of Texas School of Law, Public Law Research Paper no. 227 (August 2012): 
9, 33, 46; John B. Bellinger III and Vijay M. Padmanabhan, “Detention Operations in Contemporary 
Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law,” The American Journal of 
International Law 105, no. 2 (April 2011): 218–19; Samuel Issacharaoff and Richard H. Pildes, “Targeted 
Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility,” New York University Law Review 8, no. 5 (November 
2013): 1536, 1543, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129860; David Levine, “A Time for Presidential Power? War 
Time and the Constrained Executive,” Michigan Law Review 111, no. 6 (April 2013): 1203; Deborah N. 
Pearlstein, “Detention Debates,” Michigan Law Review 110, no. 6 (2012): 1051–52; Robert Chesney, 
“Does the Armed-Conflict Model Matter in Practice Anymore?,” Lawfareblog, May 24, 2013, 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/does-the-armed-conflict-model-matter-in-practice-anymore. 
15 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” 
Harvard Law Review 118, no. 7 (May 2005): 2047, 2089–90. 
16 David W. Glazier, “A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantanamo 
Military Commissions,” 12 Lewis & Clark Law Review (Spring 2008): 147.  
17 Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen, “International Law and Armed Non-State 
Actors in Afghanistan,” International Review of the Red Cross 93, no. 881 (March 2011), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-881-bellal-giacca-casey-maslen.pdf. 
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remain regarding the following: the concept of “enemy combatant” as applied to terrorist 
threats, humanitarian protections to which armed, non-state actors may be entitled, and 
the circumstances under which preemptive state action may be taken against non-state 
actors within another sovereign territory.  
As the clarity of what constitutes peace, war, and a battlefield have blurred in the 
context of hostilities against terrorist threats, so has the understanding of a state’s 
authority to use lethal force to protect its citizens.18 This situation will continue to be an 
issue as the United States pursues armed groups in sovereign territories without declaring 
war on a state.19 Terrorist threats have challenged notions of war being waged on a 
battlefield against state actors, complicating the analysis of force authorization, as force 
may be used against non-state actors who cannot easily be identified as combatants. 
Confusion regarding when and how force may be used against non-state actors 
could come to a head in the context of international courts that may assert jurisdiction 
over such actions. The United States has refused to acquiesce to the jurisdictional 
authority of several international legal forums. Nonetheless, the United States is subject 
to customary international law and is a signatory on numerous treaties that contain 
provisions implicated by the use of force. Consequently, U.S. force could be reviewed 
and members of the military indicted by international courts. So that the United States 
can provide the best defense possible to its actions and those that order and perform them, 
the nation must justify its use of force by crafting legal determinations that are well 
founded in international authority.  
Further, the type of force most effective for countering threats has arguably 
evolved. Of course, the 2001 AUMF authorized military force, and in effect, served as an 
example or extension of Congress exercising its war powers. Despite the focus on the use 
of military force in countering terrorism threats, however, uses of different degrees of 
force have met with varying levels of success. Thus, any new proposal for revising, 
18 The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force: Hearing Before the Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 1 (2013) (statement of 




                                                 
repealing, or replacing the AUMF must account for and potentially accommodate varying 
types of U.S. force.  
Identifying and addressing threats that arguably do not fall within the 2001 
AUMF poses a homeland security issue because the AUMF serves as the legal 
justification for a variety of U.S. counterterrorism policies. Examination of this topic is 
warranted because of its potential impact on U.S. counterterrorism strategies, the balance 
of power between the legislative and executive branches of government, the utilization of 
preemptive force, international and domestic notions of using force against non-state 
actors, and the potential for review by international courts.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As the above problem statement indicates, examination of the 2001 AUMF will 
result in a variety of considerations, as it involves a “known” though not fully understood 
problem and an “unknown” solution.20 To address this issue at its most comprehensive 
level, the primary question posed by this thesis is: Does the 2001 Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (AUMF) provide the most appropriate and beneficial legal authority for 
the United States to mitigate emerging terrorist threats, and if not, what alternative should 
be implemented? In analyzing this overarching inquiry, the following questions are also 
addressed. 
• How has the terrorist threat landscape evolved since the passage of the 
AUMF? 
• How can U.S. lawmakers create the most appropriate and beneficial legal 
architecture for addressing terrorist threats while navigating humanitarian 
legal standards required for armed, non-state actors in conflict? 
• What criteria may be used to assess the AUMF and its alternatives, and 
how should they be prioritized? 
 
20 Lauren Wollman, “NS2013 What is Inquiry?” (online lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, Summer 2012). 
 6 
                                                 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The AUMF mandate is examined to determine whether it is the proper foundation 
for addressing current threats or whether another tool is more appropriate. To conduct 
this examination, a growing collection of literature relevant to AUMF authority must be 
examined. This literature review focuses on: 1) common areas of literary focus that relate 
to the AUMF, 2) new and developing literature that provides substantive review of 
AUMF application, and 3) necessary additional areas of study. The resources discussed in 
this review are relied upon to develop criteria that may be applied to evaluate the AUMF 
and alternatives. 
1. Literature Focus 
Available AUMF literature analyzes the framework for the AUMF and discusses 
its history, scope, and purpose.21 For instance, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
has issued memoranda describing actions taken under AUMF authority and related 
counterterrorism measures.22 Nonetheless, in most academic articles, the AUMF is not 
the focus of substantive research, perhaps because only recently has attention centered on 
its continued application to terrorist groups whose associations with AQ are arguable. 
Rather, it is cited in support of discussions pertinent to other counterterrorism measures. 
Although these resources do not focus discussion on the AUMF, they are still relevant to 
the question of continuing force authorization, as each of these counterterrorism measures 
will be impacted by changes to the AUMF.  
21 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2047, 2049; Goldsmith, “What to Do 
About Growing Extra-AUMF Threats?”; Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand”; Jennifer Elsea and 
Matthew Weed, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical 
Background and Legal Implications (CRS Report No. RL31133) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf, [also available for other years].  
22 Matthew Weed, The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Background in Brief (CRS 
Memorandum from Matthew Weed to the Honorable Barbara Lee) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/aumf-071013.pdf; Jennifer Elsea, Michael John 
Garcia, and Thomas J. Nicola, Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations (CRS Report No. 
R41989) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41989. 
pdf; Jennifer Elsea, Detention of U.S. Persons as Enemy Belligerents (CRS Report No. R42337) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42337.pdf; 
Michael John Garcia et al., Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues (CRS Report No. 
R40139) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/ 
R40139.pdf.  
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For example, the AUMF is cited as part of an ongoing discussion regarding the 
executive and legislative exercise of powers.23 In some journal articles, the AUMF is 
analyzed against the backdrop of the “Steel Seizure Case,” a Supreme Court decision 
known for its presidential powers theories.24 The AUMF has also been cited in support of 
the legality of targeted killings, or drone attacks.25 It is also analyzed in relation to the 
use of military commissions to try individuals apprehended under AUMF authority, for 
treating these individuals as enemy combatants, and for detaining them for the duration of 
hostilities.26 
These counterterrorism measures will be impacted if the AUMF is repealed.27 For 
instance, the AUMF is often cited in discussions regarding detention authority.28 
Terrorists may be held under the AUMF until the end of hostilities.29 Thus, without 
AUMF authority, authority will no longer exist to detain combatants. Further, status-
based targeting under the AUMF, on the basis of membership in an enemy force, will 
cease.30  
23 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2072–78; David Abramowitz, “The 
President, the Congress and Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force 
Against International Terrorism,” Harvard International Law Journal 43, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 79; Major 
Dana M. Hollywood, “Redemption Deferred: Military Commissions in the War on Terror and the Charge 
of Providing Material Support for Terrorism,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 36, 
rev. 1 (Winter 2013).  
24 Andrew D. Cohen, “The AUMF and the Steel Seizure Case: Does Congress Need to Revisit the 
Issue?,” (June 7, 2013): 2–3, SSRN: http//ssrn.com/abstract=2276261 or http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.227 
6261, citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Graham Cronogue, “A New 
AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 
22, no. 3 (April 2012): 391. 
25 John O. Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy,” (speech, 
Wilson Center in Washington, DC, April 30, 2012), wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-
counterrorism-strategy; Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 5.  
26 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2055, 2071; Glazier, “Self-Inflicted,” 147; 
David W. Glazier, “Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda within the Law of War,” William and Mary 
Law Review 51 (2009): 960, 988. 
27 Chesney, “Does the Armed-Conflict.” 
28 Kris, “Law Enforcement,” 9, 33, 46.  
29 Ibid., 64. Bellinger III and Padmanabhan, “Detention Operations,” 218–19 (April 2011); 
Issacharaoff and Pildes, “Targeted Warfare,”15, 22; Levine “Presidential Power,” 1203; Pearlstein, 
“Detention Debates,” 1051–52. 
30 Chesney, “Does the Armed-Conflict.”  
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Other journal articles relevant to the analysis of the AUMF do not explicitly 
mention the AUMF. Nevertheless, they provide information on related issues, such as the 
use of preemptive force against non-state actors in the Bush administration’s National 
Security Strategy after the attacks of 9/11.31 This strategy emphasized that the United 
States “must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities of today’s 
adversaries.”32 Articles also discussing the term “imminent” in relation to the president’s 
authority to engage military action in defending this nation relates to executive power 
considerations and the analysis of potential AUMF alternatives.33 
While many of these publications analyze the AUMF or related issues in the 
context of counterterrorism measures, they do not propose ideas for how to address 
threats that have evolved, which arguably fall outside of the AUMF.  
2. Developing Research and Proposals Regarding Continued Utilization 
of the AUMF  
Congress has taken an interest in the continued operation of the AUMF in the face 
of evolving threats and terrorist organizations, and it has recently held hearings on the 
matter.34 U.S. officials and administration legal experts are concerned that the AUMF is 
being “[s]tretched to its legal breaking point, just as new threats are emerging . . . .”35 As 
Senator John McCain stated, “None of us, not one who voted for the AUMF, could have 
envisioned we were about to give future Presidents the authority to fight terrorism as far 
flung as Yemen and Somalia.”36 Consequently, arguments regarding how best to address 
this issue have recently developed in several journals.  
31 Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, “The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Washington 
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 89–90.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. 
35 Miller and DeYoung, “Administration Debates.”  
36 The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. 
 9 
                                                 
Two primary camps have emerged as offering the most reported on options for 
addressing “next-generation terrorist threats,” and both agree that the AUMF is 
obsolete.37 The first proposal suggests a new approach that utilizes a congressional 
delegation of authority to authorize force to the executive branch via an administrative 
process. The second approach asserts that a new authorization of force is not likely 
necessary. In addition, a third proposal set forth in a Duke University law review article 
has garnered some reference in the AUMF discussion. 
The leading proposal originates from Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew 
C. Waxman, and Benjamin Wittes of Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.38 It 
argues that Congress should delegate broad authority to the executive branch to create a 
list of terrorist groups against which the United States may utilize force.39 Under this 
approach, Congress would offer statutory criteria for executive use of force and require 
the executive branch to identify particular groups covered by that force authorization 
through a “robust” administrative process.40 This model would be based on the State 
Department’s foreign terrorist organization designation process.41  
Proponents argue that this model is a stable alternative to the current AUMF, as it 
offers flexibility, yet includes constraints to support its legitimacy.42 This proposal is 
criticized, however, for providing too much authority to the executive branch, arguing 
that this would provide the executive branch with the power to both declare and wage 
war, which were powers the founding fathers intentionally separated to provide checks 
and balances on the use of force.43 
Jennifer Daskal and Stephen I. Vladeck articulate the alternative view. Daskal is a 
human rights lawyer and Department of Justice appointee who served on an Obama 
37 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 1. Miller and 
DeYoung, “Administration Debates.” 
38 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 2; Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
39 Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
40 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 10. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 7–8.  
43 Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
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administration task force reviewing the status of Guantanamo detainees, and Vladeck was 
part of the legal team that challenged the Bush administration’s use of military tribunals 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. They utilize a perspective expressed by Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary and former Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh 
Johnson, who stated that war should “[b]e regarded as a finite, extraordinary and 
unnatural state of affairs.”44 They argue that Congress should reject an open-ended war 
by repealing the AUMF.45 In contrast to the Hoover Institution’s model, supporters argue 
that law enforcement techniques and intelligence gathering mechanisms have improved 
over the past decade and should be utilized as the first line of defense against terrorist 
threats.46 They assert that this position does not restrict the use of military force because 
the president can utilize force in self-defense, without congressional approval, if other 
means will not stop an attack.47  
While both proposals have effectively begun the discussion of viable legal 
alternatives to support future counterterrorism policy, the proponents of the second 
proposal have offered more detailed examples and authority to support their position. For 
instance, the Hoover Institution literature states that locals should not be entrusted with 
the responsibility for addressing terrorism threats because they are “unwilling” or 
“incapable” of taking on this responsibility. However, they fail to cite authority 
supporting this claim.48 The proponents of the alternative model, however, cite statistics 
supporting their assertion that local jurisdictions have successfully thwarted terrorist 
attacks.49 Literature supporting the second option also addresses unintended 
consequences of extending force authorization, such as diminished information sharing 
with allies and broad use of force by other countries against organizations they broadly 
44 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 3.  
45 Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
46 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 3.  
47 Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
48 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 5. 
49 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 3.  
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define as terrorist.50 The Hoover Institution literature, as currently drafted, does not 
address these counterarguments. 
In addition to the two main categories of proponents, a law student from Duke 
University published an article that has been cited by others in AUMF discussions. His 
article attempts to articulate an alternative to the AUMF by utilizing concepts from both 
domestic and international law related to combatants, state-actors, and self-defense.51 His 
proposal most closely resembles ideas proposed by Benjamin Wittes of the Hoover 
Institution. However, the article fails to address the repercussions of his proposed 
approach, such as the potential end to legal support for certain counterterrorism measures. 
The article also repeatedly assumes the validity of certain assertions related to terrorist 
threats without citing support.52 
Finally, CRS reports and media articles have recently focused on the proposed 
authorization to use military force in Syria and evolving security concerns in Iraq. Such 
articles, as well as commentary from Congress and the executive branch, have renewed 
discussions regarding the president’s authority as Commander in Chief and congressional 
war powers.53 Observation of the continuing debate and discussion regarding the 
potential use of force in Syria and Iraq will likely affect the analysis of AUMF 
alternatives.  
3. International Standards 
States have created rules to limit the effects of armed conflict through 
mechanisms, such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions, Protocols, and customary 
50 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 15–16.  
51 Cronogue, “A New AUMF.” 
52 Ibid.  
53 Proposed Authorization to Use Military Force in Syria, Hearing Before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 113th Congress, 1 (2013) (statement of John Kerry), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214028.htm; Christopher M. Blanchard and Jeremy M. 
Sharp, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R43021) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43201.pdf; Transcript, 
“Should U.S. Trust Russia on Syria?” Crossfire (aired September 10, 2013), http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/1309/10/cfr.01.html.  
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international law.54 These mechanisms aim to restrict certain warfare methods and 
protect noncombatants.55 Nonetheless, the application of humanitarian law standards to 
non-state actors in the context of international armed conflicts remains an unsettled and 
controversial issue.56 In analyzing such standards, it seems the main issues that will need 
to be addressed are the application of the concept of “enemy combatant” to current 
terrorist threats, the protections afforded to armed, non-state actors, and the utilization of 
preemptive state action against non-state actors within another sovereign territory.  
Numerous articles and court cases discuss the concept of “enemy combatant.” 
Further, available literature debates theories regarding which humanitarian laws apply to 
armed, non-state actors in international conflicts.57 Nonetheless, this literature arguably 
falls short of proposing workable standards for applying international humanitarian law 
to armed, non-state actors within other states.  
Self-determination is enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter (UN Charter) 
and international covenants, as well as upheld by legal decisions.58 While a state’s right 
to self-defense has been suggested as the appropriate response to terrorist attacks, this 
expectation has arguably changed since states want to take a proactive approach to 
protecting their populations from terrorist threats before attacks occur.59 As the line 
between peacetime and war has blurred, so has the understanding of a state’s authority to 
54 “War and International Humanitarian Law,” International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed 
August 28, 2014, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/index.jsp.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Bellal, Giacca, and Casey-Maslen, “International Law and Armed Non-State Actors.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 42/159, “Measures to Prevent International 
Terrorism,” December 7, 1987, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r159.htm; “United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter),” United Nations Humans Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights,  June 26, 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), March 23, 1976, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion (July 9, 
2004). 
59 Resolution 1368, “Security Council Condemns, ‘In Strongest Terms’, Terrorist Attacks on United 
States,” United Nations Security Council, September 12, 2001, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
2001/SC7143.doc.htm (SC Res. 1368); Resolution 1373, “Reaffirming Condemnation of Terrorist 
Attacks,” United Nations Security Council, September 28, 2001, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/special 
meetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20%282001%2
9.pdf (SC Res. 1373).  
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use lethal force to protect its citizens.60 This topic will continue to be an issue as the 
United States pursues armed groups in other territories without declaring war on a state, 
or engages in hostilities on an identifiable battleground.61 Establishing standards for 
addressing the engagement of armed, non-state actors in international conflicts will 
improve consistency in the application of humanitarian concepts, and eventually, reduce 
the impact of such conflicts on civilians.  
4. Additional Research Questions That Need to Be Addressed 
Additional research and literature is needed to further detail these developing 
proposals. Specifically, the concepts of self-defense, imminent threat, and the application 
of proposed approaches to associated forces or threats should be addressed. Related to 
these concepts are international legal considerations relative to preemptive state action, or 
the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, and the use of force against non-state actors.62 
In addition, an analytical framework should be developed and applied to the AUMF and 
potential alternatives. 
Much of the well-developed AUMF research, as well as the currently developing 
models for post-AUMF action, reference utilization of force for “self-defense.”63 They 
state that the president has “unchallenged” authority to prevent imminent threats to the 
country.64 However, the ideas of “self-defense” and what constitutes an “imminent 
threat” are not well defined in this literature. Related to both concepts are international 
legal considerations relative to preemptive state action, or the doctrine of anticipatory 
self-defense, and the use of force against non-state actors.65 U.S. policy in this arena will 
60 The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Arend, “Preemptive Use of Military Force,” 89–90; Weed, The 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force.  
63 Chesney, “Does the Armed-Conflict.” 
64 Abramowitz, “The President,” 78.  
65 Arend, “ Preemptive Use of Military Force,” 89–90; Weed, The 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. 
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not only have an impact on domestic legal interpretations pertaining to legislative and 
executive powers, but potentially to the development of international law as well.66  
In addition, resources, including articles and journals, mention so-called 
“associated forces” in conjunction with the AUMF and the utilization of presidential 
powers, yet most do not define this term.67 Current literature fails to explain the process 
whereby a group is determined to be an “associated” force, likely because the 
government lacks transparency in its application of this concept.68 These sources discuss 
the fragmentation of AQ, and note the difficulty in determining what groups are 
sufficiently tied to AQ to fall within the AUMF.69 They also suggest that current terrorist 
threats originate primarily from “self-radicalized individuals and groups” not covered by 
the AUMF.70 Yet, neither camp offering models for new counterterrorism frameworks 
addresses how these proposals will provide a sustained approach to mitigate specific 
threats posed by groups or individuals that do not fall within the AUMF, while preserving 
constitutional principles. Development of an analytical framework to identify and 
prioritize counterterrorism goals and evaluate proposal effectiveness will assist in 
framing such analyses. 
Finally, CRS reports and media articles have recently focused on the proposed 
authorization to use military force in Syria. Such articles, as well as commentary from 
Congress and the executive branch, have renewed discussion regarding the president’s 
authority as Commander in Chief and congressional war powers.71 A deteriorating 
security situation in Iraq involving a former AQ affiliate has also impacted AUMF 
66 Arend, “Preemptive Use of Military Force,” 89–102. 
67 Cohen, “The AUMF and the Steel Seizure Case,” 2–3, citing Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin 
Wittes, “Speaking the Law,” Hoover Institution, Stanford University (2013), 
http://www.hoover.org/taskforces/national-security/speaking-the-law; Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t 
Expand.”  
68 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 7.  
69 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 4. 
70 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 1; Daskal and Vladeck, “Don’t Expand.” 
71 Kerry, Proposed Authorization; Sharp and Blanchard, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria; 
Transcript, “Should U.S. Trust Russia on Syria?”  
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considerations. The considered use of force in both regions will likely factor into the 
consideration of AUMF alternatives.  
5. Conclusion 
President Obama has commented on the AUMF’s mandate, by saying, “[I] will 
not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle 
terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end.”72 While most 
of the available literature pertaining to the AUMF does not focus on the AUMF itself, it 
is cited as a legal underpinning of other counterterrorism measures. Nonetheless, national 
security experts are beginning to research and develop options specifically relevant to 
new counterterrorism justifications that address evolving terrorist threats. With additional 
focus on the development of an analytical framework to prioritize counterterrorism 
objectives, the effectiveness of these proposals may be more efficiently analyzed.  
To develop this framework and analyze these proposals, gaps in current research 
need to be filled. While several camps have proposed AUMF alternatives, none of them 
has offered a mechanism for weighing the impacts of AUMF modification. A sound 
mechanism requires a detailed examination and analysis of a wide variety of AUMF 
impacts, as well as a study of how these impacts relate to one another, rather than 
piecemeal critiques of the statute. In addition, current proposals focus on AUMF 
alternatives, but they neglect to identify considerations for securing a long-lasting 
approach to force authorization that preserves constitutional principles while protecting 
security. Without a deeper foundational change to force authorization approaches, any 
reprieve from issues offered by such an alternative will be temporary at best and 
superficial at worst.  
 
72 Ackerman, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill.” 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Sample 
Addressing this inquiry requires the study of policy options. The object of study is 
the law itself. However, law and policy intertwine, as laws are often enacted to effectuate 
policy and deter contrary action. Thus, the heart of this research focuses on policy, which, 
in turn, requires an examination of how to build a legal framework that supports this 
policy.  
2. Sample Selection  
Focus on this subject emerged from an interest in the evolving international 
humanitarian law standards applicable to conflicts focused on combating terrorist actors, 
who may operate independent of states. When a Naval Postgraduate School alumnus 
suggested focusing on the 2001 AUMF, it seemed a thesis on this topic would require 
consideration of a variety of legal and policy concerns, both domestic and international. 
Studying this sample provides an opportunity to address not only issues crucial to the 
U.S.’ continued use of force to combat terrorist threats, but also to offer actionable policy 
solutions.  
3. Data Sources 
Most of the data for this thesis originates from literature relevant to the AUMF. 
Numerous academic and law review articles provide a basis for both AUMF criticism and 
alternative approaches. Cases focusing on counterterrorism measures are also examined. 
Some cases, like Hedges v. Obama and Parhat v. Gates, highlight the scope of AUMF 
authority. Others, including Padilla v. Hanft, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, illustrate the executive branch’s reliance on AUMF authority for enemy 
combatant designations, due process concerns, and constitutional checks and balances 
and issues. Finally, domestic and international law addressing use of force issues are 
utilized.  
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4. Type and Mode of Analysis 
The modes of analysis used for this thesis are policy analysis, policy options 
analysis, and legal analysis. Policy analysis is necessary because to understand the 
implications of altering the AUMF fully, the strengths and weaknesses of current policy 
need to be fully understood to permit variables that may influence policy outcomes to be 
identified. As the legislative and executive branches continue to develop counterterrorism 
strategies to address evolving threats, policy options for continued authority for such 
counterterrorism measures should be considered. Consequently, this thesis evaluates 
alternative policy options in terms of their potential ability to improve on the status quo, 
achieve counterterrorism security objectives, and withstand legal scrutiny. As all these 
policy options have a basis in legal authority to execute government action, legal analysis 
is utilized to analyze these options.  
This process involves synthesizing information regarding the 2001 AUMF and 
current counterterrorism policies supported by its authority. This information is analyzed 
and contributes to the proposal of several policy alternatives. These alternatives, as well 
as the status quo, are evaluated through a qualitative cost-benefit analysis focusing on 
domestic legality, security, international legality, and precedent. Finally, as applicable, a 
recommendation regarding potential AUMF modification is made based on the 
evaluation of alternatives in relation to their predicted impacts.  
5. Policy Options Analysis–The Status Quo 
The current policy of relying on the AUMF as the legal authority upon which 
counterterrorism measures rely needs to be examined. This examination requires the 
identification of current terrorist threats to the United States. Identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of applying the AUMF to such threats will clarify the potential consequences 
of implementing alternative options.  
6. Alternatives 
In addition to analyzing the status quo, several alternatives are available to the 
continued use of the AUMF: 1) repealing the AUMF, 2) congressional delegation of war 
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making authority to the executive branch, and 3) new authorizations for the use of 
military force. 
The first policy alternative involves repealing the AUMF. Under this option, 
Congress would not issue a new authorization of force. Instead, the United States would 
rely on the executive branch’s authority to use force in self-defense to combat imminent 
threats. Law enforcement mechanisms that have been arguably bolstered since 9/11 
would be utilized as the first line of defense against threats. The parameters of what 
constitutes an “imminent” threat are explored to deduce how the executive branch might 
interpret such authority to support counterterrorism measures. 
The second policy alternative would not involve a repeal of the AUMF; the 
AUMF would remain in effect, and Congress would delegate broad authority to the 
executive branch to create a list of terrorist groups against which the United States could 
utilize force.73 Under this approach, Congress would offer statutory criteria for the 
executive use of force and require the executive branch to identify particular groups 
covered by that force authorization through a “robust” administrative process. This option 
may offer flexibility in preserving security. It would, however, provide the executive 
branch with the power to both declare and wage war, powers the founding fathers 
separated between the executive and legislative branches.  
The third policy alternative would involve retaining the AUMF, while proposing 
that Congress pass new force authorization(s) applicable to groups posing current threats 
to the United States. By preserving the AUMF, this option would prevent adverse 
consequences to those counterterrorism measures that require continuing authority. By 
also requiring Congress specifically to authorize the use of force against those groups that 
present a threat to the United States but are not “associates” of AQ, checks and balances 
between the executive and congressional branches may be better preserved and 
consideration of force authorizations would arguably be subject to public scrutiny. 
73 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framewcork,” 10. 
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7. Criteria  
The criteria by which these alternatives are judged include: 1) domestic legality, 
2) security, 3) international legality, and 4) precedent.  
The first two criteria are arguably related, as they involve authority and how such 
authority relates to security. The primary criterion that is applied to policy alternatives is 
domestic legality, or how well the approach preserves constitutional principles. The 
primary constitutional principles implicated by force authorizations are checks and 
balances and due process protections. AUMF alternatives could impact the current 
understanding of checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches. 
Application of this criterion requires the analysis of constitutional separation of powers 
principles. In addition, the AUMF implicates due process concerns because of its use in 
justifying detention and lethal force. Cases arising out of preventive detention challenges 
are useful in this section, as they contain arguments from the executive branch regarding 
war powers authority, as well as due process standards. Open-source information 
disclosed by the executive branch regarding its legal authorities for conducting certain 
counterterrorism measures is also analyzed. Through this research, the legal architecture 
of the status quo and alternatives are analyzed with respect to the ability to achieve 
counterterrorism related objectives while withstanding legal scrutiny.  
The second criterion focuses on security effects, or how the option enables the 
U.S. government to mitigate threats. This consideration encompasses the impact each 
alternative has on counterterrorism measures that arguably require AUMF authority. The 
text of the AUMF is applied to evolving terrorist threats, to determine if the status quo 
has potential weaknesses. This criterion facilitates the overlay of the current threat 
analysis with the legal analysis, as changing legal authority may arguably have 
unintended consequences for continuing certain counterterrorism measures. 
The third criterion focuses on respect for international legality. U.S. policy 
involving action against non-state actors and the utilization of preemptive force is at 
times at odds with international law and receives a less than warm reception. 
International legal considerations involving the concepts of “enemy combatant,” 
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protections afforded to armed, non-state actors, and the utilization of preemptive state 
action against non-state actors within another sovereign territory are arguably at issue. 
Finally, the fourth criterion focuses on precedent considerations. Congress’s 
future approach to force authorizations will set precedent in several respects. Namely, it 
will influence the type of force used by the U.S. government abroad, government 
transparency, and future opportunities to reassess force authorization policy. By utilizing 
this criterion, Congress can seek to promote positive precedent in these areas.  
8. Output 
This thesis provides a comprehensive resource for understanding the effects of 
AUMF modification. It also provides a recommended course of action. Regardless of 
whether policy makers choose to pursue this recommendation, at a minimum, the thesis 
serves as a reference that may aid in the decision-making process. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
The chief objective of this thesis is to compare the AUMF and alternatives by 
applying several criteria to each, ultimately providing a recommended approach to U.S. 
policymakers. Thus, much of the thesis focuses on providing a context for the problem 
and criteria; this context assists in validating their development, application, and 
prioritization. This process not only serves to support the ultimate thesis 
recommendation, but to provide policymakers with a well-reasoned method to evaluate 
this AUMF and its future.  
An evaluation of the terrorist threats the United States faces comprises Chapter II, 
which also examines how terrorist threats have evolved since the AUMF was passed 
shortly after 9/11. The necessity and challenges of identifying AQ “associates” is 
discussed because of this term’s importance to AUMF authority. Without a thorough 
appreciation of the terrorist threats faced by the United States, it arguably is not possible 
to understand why or what kind of force authorization is needed.  
In Chapter IV, the international laws of war and challenges in applying them to 
terrorist threats, are investigated, with a focus on issues of preemptive use of force, use of 
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force against non-state actors, and classification of enemy combatants. This chapter offers 
context for analyzing the AUMF and alternatives within the framework of international 
law, which is useful in understanding the international precedent criterion section in 
Chapter VI.  
Whereas the first five chapters of this thesis provide information and analysis 
necessary for addressing the research questions posed, Chapter VI describes the criteria 
by which the AUMF and alternatives are evaluated. This method, which is meant to 
advance a meaningful comparative analysis of the AUMF and alternatives, incorporates 
the following criteria: domestic legality, security, international legality, and precedent. 
Defining these criteria and their prioritization according to consequence is necessary for a 
fundamental understanding of the approaches presented. 
In Chapter VII, the criteria discussed in Chapter VI are applied to the status quo 
and three alternatives. The first alternative is to repeal, or sunset the AUMF and issue a 
congressional delegation of authority to the executive branch to add force authorizations 
through an administrative process. The second alternative is to repeal the AUMF and 
issue no new authorization to use military force, and instead rely on the executive 
branch’s self-defense authority to prevent imminent attacks. The third alternative is a 
tailored approach that entails sunsetting the AUMF, statutory modifications, and creating 
new congressional authorizations to use force specific to emerging threats, if necessary.  
The thesis concludes with Chapter VIII, which recommends that Congress pursue 
the Tailored Approach. Although the Tailored Approach is the ultimate recommendation 
based on the criteria and methodology developed in this thesis, the greatest priority of 
this thesis is two-fold, to promote congressional consideration of the status of the AUMF 
and alternatives, and to advocate a method of evaluation that considers domestic legality, 
security, international legality, and precedent. It has been 13 years since Congress passed 
the AUMF; it is time that Congress examines its continued application.  
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II. OVERCOMING INSECURITY: CONSIDERATIONS 
CENTRAL TO EVALUATING THE AUMF AND ALTERNATIVES 
BASED ON U.S. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The threat landscape has evolved since Congress enacted the AUMF. This makes 
sense, considering the immense counterterrorism pressure that the United States and its 
allied forces have exerted upon AQ, its affiliates, and the Taliban since 2001.74 Although 
threats faced by the United States have evolved, the legal architecture used to address 
these threats has remained static, which begs the following question. Should the AUMF 
be changed to adapt to the changing threat landscape? 
Determining the security implications of altering the AUMF requires accurate 
information on the evolving threat environment. This chapter summarizes dynamic 
threats relevant to whether or not the AUMF should be repealed or modified. This 
information is utilized in the “security criterion” section of Chapter VI. Although it 
would be advantageous for policymakers to analyze a broad scope of threats when 
reevaluating the AUMF, both this chapter and the security criterion section are limited to 
a discussion of threats originating from AQ, its affiliates, the Taliban, and the groups 
these organizations inspire. Since the AUMF does not concern itself so much with state 
actors or geographic boundaries as it does with terrorist organizations, threats from state 
actors, such as China, North Korea, and Iran, are not addressed in this thesis.  
In addition to understanding how the threat environment has evolved since the 
AUMF’s passage, Congress must identify counterterrorism measures supported by 
AUMF authority so that it may predict the security consequences of any AUMF 
modification. This identification is extraordinarily important because the executive 
branch has relied upon AUMF authority to conduct a variety of counterterrorism 
measures. Consequently, repealing or amending the AUMF may adversely affect the 
74 Seth G. Jones, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” 
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RAND National Defense Institute, 2014, 9, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR637/RAND_RR637.pdf. 
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executive branch’s ability to continue using these measures. Should the AUMF be 
repealed or amended, Congress must preserve a mechanism with which to address the 
constantly changing threat environment. Thus, Congress must identify defense strategy 
goals, determine what counterterrorism measures are needed to achieve these goals, and 
tailor an approach to force authorization to address those needs. This information is 
utilized in Chapter VI to craft a criterion that focuses on the security implications of any 
AUMF modification. 
B. 13 YEARS LATER: A THREAT EVOLVED 
As for me here in Yemen, whenever I move around with Explosives 
around my waist, I wish I am in America. 
–Sheikh Ibrahim Ar-Rabaysh 
The above quote, which concludes a poem titled “Mujahid’s Wish,” published in 
the Spring 2013 issue of AQ’s Inspire magazine,75 highlights the wish of one terrorist, 
and by extension, the challenge that the United States faces in crafting counterterrorism 
policy. Many threats originate from non-state actors, and their competencies are 
uncertain. For example, disagreement occurs about the strength, capabilities, and 
configuration of AQ, its affiliates, and others who share its aspirations. As Senator 
Feingold queried during the actual debates that would lead to the existence of the AUMF, 
“Our fight against a faceless, shadow enemy also raises another difficult dilemma, for 
how will we know when we have defeated this enemy?”76 
Congress must constantly adapt to and understand the ever-evolving threat 
landscape if and when it reexamines the AUMF. Congress must 1) recognize how threats 
have evolved since 2001, 2) identify current threats and determine how the AUMF 
applies to them, and 3) determine how to prioritize action against threats to help Congress 
 
75 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 82. 
76 Congressional Record, “Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Cong.,” 1, 147, no. 120 (September 
14, 2001), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2001-09-14/pdf/CREC-2001-09-14-senate.pdf. 
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determine whether the AUMF needs to be altered to authorize force against additional 
groups or individuals.  
1. AUMF Authority and Dynamic Threats 
Threats still exist. While the known perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks have been 
apprehended or killed, the United States was reminded in late 2013 that terrorist groups 
still target U.S. persons and interests, and these threats may originate from groups that 
did not have direct links to those attacks. On August 2, the State Department issued a 
worldwide travel alert warning citizens of potential terrorist attacks by AQ and affiliated 
groups against Americans and U.S. allies in the regions of the Middle East, South Asia, 
North Africa, and beyond.77 Representative Peter King indicated that the focus of the 
alert centered on a terrorist group operating primarily out of Yemen, al Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).78 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General 
Martin Dempsey, described the threat as precise and said that the government was 
reacting to a significant threat stream.79 Twenty-one U.S. embassies and consulates were 
temporarily closed.80  
On April 10, 2014, the Department of State expressed its continued concern 
regarding the threat of “[t]errorist attacks, demonstrations, and other violent actions 
against U.S. citizens and interests overseas,” emphasizing that kidnappings and hostage 
events targeting U.S. citizens have grown “[i]ncreasingly prevalent as al Qa’ida and its 
affiliates have increased attempts to finance their operations through kidnapping for 
ransom operations.”81 It focused this alert on the activities of AQAP and al Qa’ida in the 
77 Nicole Gaouette and David Lerman, “Terrorism Threats Cited as U.S. Issues New Travel Alert,” 




81 “Worldwide Caution,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, April 10, 2014, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/worldwide-caution.html. 
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Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).82 It continues, stating that AQ and affiliates continue to plan 
terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in multiple regions outside of U.S. borders.83 
Although the AUMF specifically authorizes conflict against those who committed 
and aided the September 11 attacks, it has been interpreted to extend to members of AQ, 
the Taliban, their supporters, and associated forces.84 In 60 words, the AUMF authorizes 
the use of force against: 
… [n]ations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations, or persons.85 
Today, the threat landscape consists not only of those groups that directly contributed to 
the 9/11 attacks, but other less affiliated organizations. 
According to the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the “[t]errorist threat to our 
Nation’s interests persists and has evolved greatly since 2001.”86 The Obama 
administration has sought to draw down forces in Afghanistan.87 Many of those AQ 
leaders who planned and perpetrated the 9/11 attacks have been captured or killed, and 
core AQ and its leadership have been “severely degraded.”88 These actions have 
disrupted coordination and funding streams and have degraded AQ’s ability to execute 




84 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 1. 
85 AUMF. 
86 “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” Department of Defense, 8, March 4, 2014, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.  
87 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 1. 
88 “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, 6, 
April 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf.  
89 Ibid., 303; James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” 
Prepared by the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Statement for the Record, 4, January 29, 2014, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20 
Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf.  
 26 
                                                 
affiliates operating more independently from core AQ, with varying focus on objectives 
affecting local, regional, and other interests.90 In addition, new terrorist groups have 
emerged whose connections to AQ are unclear or non-existent.91 For instance, one of the 
most dangerous groups, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is a former AQ 
affiliate, but it has since cut ties with AQ. In sum, the threat situation has transitioned to a 
more diverse variety of groups.92  
This transition is only part of the dynamic threat landscape. The landscape 
continues to evolve in other ways. Tension endures in parts of the Middle East in which 
the Sunni-Shi’a divide continues to widen and regional conflicts continue to escalate.93 In 
Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, traditional power structures have been upended to the 
point at which terrorist organizations have increased their influence due to internal 
strife.94 This disruption has resulted in “safe havens” in which terrorist groups have 
proliferated because they can operate unobstructed due to inadequate governance, 
political will, or both.95 Simply put, threats facing the United States and its allies are 
complicated, uncertain, unpredictable, and dynamic, as unrest in certain regions provides 
environments conducive to the proliferation of sectarian conflicts and extremist groups.96  
2. Categorizing Current Threats 
Congressional leaders must identify current threats relative to the continued 
application of the AUMF when analyzing the AUMF discussion. For the purposes of 
analyzing the evolution of terrorist threats facing the United States, these groups can be 
divided into four categories: 1) core AQ, 2) the Afghan Taliban, 3) AQ affiliates, 4) other 
groups inspired by AQ.97 While Congress and academics may estimate the current threats 
90 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6.  
91 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 2. 
92 “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” 4.  
93 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” 5. 
94 Ibid., III, 5. 
95 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 236; Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 54. 
96 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” III, 3.  
97 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 10. 
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these groups pose, the executive branch will possess the most up-to-date threat 
information by function of its authority to direct the military and wage war. The 
executive branch needs to be frank with lawmakers about threats to U.S. persons and 
interests so that lawmakers can craft appropriate legal authority. Although most are not 
privy to the most up-to-date threat information, much of which is presumably classified, 
open source information still paints a picture of the evolving threat that is useful in 
considering AUMF modifications.  
The first category of threats facing the United States originates from what is 
commonly referred to as “core” AQ, and the AUMF provides adequate authority to 
mitigate threats originating from this group. Disagreement occurs between government 
officials and media sources regarding how to define core AQ. Some define core AQ as 
AQ network members who were active before the 9/11 attacks.98 Most Obama 
administration officials, however, advise that the small group of AQ leaders in Pakistan 
constitutes AQ’s core. Ayman al-Zawahiri leads core AQ.99 While counterterrorism 
measures have weakened AQ’s core, instability and weak governance in regions of the 
Middle East and North Africa have enabled AQ affiliates to propagate. Core AQ retains 
some influence over these affiliates, most of which have emerged within the past 
decade.100  
The second category of threats includes AQ affiliates. Some debate occurs 
regarding whether AQ affiliates qualify as “associated forces” under the AUMF, and the 
executive branch’s distinction between these labels is unclear. Nonetheless, the political 
branches and courts have arguably interpreted AUMF authority as extending to AQ 
affiliates. These groups become branches of AQ by swearing allegiance to the 
 
 
98 Katherine Zimmerman, “A New Definition for al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, January 31, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-definition-for-al-qaeda/2014/01/31/31283002-83a7-11e3-
9dd4-e7278db80d86_story.html. 
99 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,”10. 
100 Ibid.; “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” 8; “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6. 
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organization, which is officially recognized by AQ leaders.101 Aggressive AQ affiliate 
groups have emerged in Yemen (AQAP), Syria (Jabhat al-Nusrah), Algeria (AQIM), and 
Somalia (al Shabaab).102 Between 2007 and 2013, a significant increase in attacks by 
such groups occurred, most of which were perpetrated by ISIL,103 which has since 
disaffiliated from AQ.104 ISIL has since eclipsed core AQ and its affiliates as one of the 
most dangerous terrorist groups in existence. AQIM is a violent extremist group in Mali, 
but French and allied African forces successfully disrupted its regional operations in 
2013.105 Al-Shabaab in East Africa poses a regional threat by targeting attacks in 
Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya.106 Almost all the attacks in 2013 were perpetrated against 
local or regional targets.107 Dr. Seth G. Jones, director of the International Security and 
Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, and expert in counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism, has completed extensive research and analysis on the relationships 
between these groups and the potential threats they pose to U.S. persons and interests. In 
an article published in early 2014 titled “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida 
and Other Salafi Jihadists,” he uses Figure 1 to illustrate the regional connections of core 
AQ and its affiliates. 
101 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 10. 
102 Ibid.; “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6.  
103 ISIL is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State (IS). 
104 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” x, 34. 
105 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 12–13. 
106 Ibid., 9. 
107 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” x. 
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Figure 1.  Map Depicting Regional Influence of Core AQ and Its Affiliates108  
Although most AQ affiliates prioritize regional maneuvers, threats to U.S. persons 
and interests endure.109 AQAP, for instance, operates primarily in Yemen, but it has 
attempted to attack the United States directly three times.110 In December 2009, AQAP 
tried to blow up an airplane traveling to Detroit, and in 2010, it plotted to use bombs to 
destroy U.S. bound aircraft.111 AQAP’s ties to core AQ are strong, as demonstrated by 
Nasir Wahishi, AQAP’s leader, designation as Zawahiri’s deputy in 2013. AQAP 
reportedly conducted about one hundred attacks in Yemen in 2013, and according to the 
Department of State and Director of National Intelligence, the organization continues to 
pose a threat to U.S. citizens, interests, and possibly, the U.S. homeland.112  
108 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 11. 
109 “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” 4. 
110 Ibid.; Zimmerman, “A New Definition for al-Qaeda.” 
111 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 7–8. 
112 Ibid., 8; “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” 4. 
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While core AQ and AQAP have significant ties, the lack of control of AQ 
leadership over affiliates has called into question the AUMF’s application to some AQ 
affiliates because of the statute’s nexus to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. AQ 
leadership has failed to maintain cohesion amongst other AQ affiliates, with guidance 
issued by Zawahiri consistently defied.113 AQ has failed to deter groups willing to 
perpetrate hideous violence that even AQ deems unacceptable to its mission, and 
divisions between core AQ and such affiliates may result in an inability to target these 
groups under AUMF authority.114 Core AQ’s inability to manage affiliates became 
apparent when Zawahiri failed to resolve a clash between ISIL and the Jabhat al-Nusrah 
in Syria.115 ISIL was expelled from AQ in February 2014, and ISIS is arguably now at its 
strongest.116  
The third category of organizations includes groups that have seemingly 
established relationships with AQ or share its ideology but are not formal AQ 
affiliates.117 While arguments may be asserted that these groups fall within AUMF 
authority, targeting these groups is not a legally sound option due to their uncertain ties to 
core AQ. Most of these groups focus on regional operations; some may pose threats to 
U.S. interests in those regions. For instance, Answar al-Shari’a operates in Tunisia and 
Libya, and focuses on local operations, the Jamal Network operates in Egypt, and al-
Mulathamun operates in the Sahel.118 In addition, Boko Haram (BH) conducted a number 
of attacks in 2013 in Nigeria and reportedly crossed borders into Chad, Cameroon, and 
Niger to conduct operations.119 It trained with AQIM,120 but its indiscriminate killing and 
kidnapping is arguably inconsistent with AQ’s current push to avoid such actions for fear 
113 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6. 
114 Adam Nossiter and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Abduction of Girls an Act Not Even Al Qaeda Can 
Condone,” New York Times, May 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/africa/abduction-of-
girls-an-act-not-even-al-qaeda-can-condone.html?_r=0. 
115 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6; Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 8. 
116 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6. 
117 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 11. 
118 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 9. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 39. 
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of alienating possible followers.121 Finally, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) focuses 
primarily on regional operations, but it has also shown an interest in attacking the U.S. 
homeland. This group was implicated in the attempted bombing of Times Square in 
2010.122 
Many organizations arguably share similar ideologies to AQ, but they do not have 
direct ties to core AQ; targeting these groups under current AUMF authority would also 
be problematic. Significant differences exist between these groups. In particular, they 
disagree about whether to target the United States or its allies.123 Consequently, threats 
from these groups vary, with some retaining their focus on local operations and others 
remaining intent on attacking U.S. interests.124 Thus, while some groups may present 
threats to U.S. interests, many do not intend to target the United States or its allies.125  
Since ISIL has been disavowed by AQ,126 ISIL now falls within this third 
category. Consequently, the AUMF does not authorize force against ISIL.127 Yet, this 
group appears to pose more of a threat to the United States than most, if not all, AQ 
affiliates. ISIL has an incredible reputation for brutality, and it is the primary group 
fighting the Syrian and Iraqi governments.128 ISIL has expanded its control into large 
portions of northern Iraq and eastern Syria.129 The map in Figure 2, published by the 
BBC News, illustrates the permeation of ISIL control throughout the region.  
121 Nossiter and Kirkpatrick, “Act Not Even Al Qaeda Can Condone.”  
122 Zimmerman, “A New Definition for al-Qaeda.” 
123 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 9. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 26. 
126 While ISIL has disaffiliated with AQ, recent media reports indicate that AQAP may have 
expressed support for ISIL. See Kristina Wong, “Al Qaeda in Yemen Declares Support for Isis,” The Hill, 
August 19, 2014, thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/215480-al-qaeda-in-yemen-declares-support-for-isis.  
127 As will be discussed in Chapter VII, the Obama administration would disagree with this assertion. 
See Steven Dennis, “Here’s Obama’s Legal Justification for ISIS War,” Rollcall, Posted at 3:55 p.m. 
September 11, 2014, http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/heres-the-administrations-legal-justification-for-
isis-isil-war/?dcz=. 
128 “Syria Iraq: The Islamic State Militant Group,” BBC World News, August 2, 2014, 
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 Figure 2.  ISIL Strongholds in Syrian Rebel-Held and Contested Areas130 
The final category, the Afghan Taliban, was included in the AUMF because it 
provided AQ a safe harbor in Afghanistan before and subsequent to the 9/11 attacks.131 
As noted above, core AQ now primarily operates out of Pakistan. The United States and 
coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and the United States 
has endeavored to draw down its forces in that country.132 Considering these changes in 
the threat landscape over the past 13 years, Congress should reassess whether AUMF 
authority is necessary to support continued U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.  
3. Prioritizing Threats 
In analyzing the AUMF discussion, policymakers need to evaluate terrorist threats 
to the United States in a way that considers risk and probability, to preserve security 
without placing the nation on a perpetual war footing. This analysis should be continuous 
and dynamic, considering the non-static nature of terrorist threats. Dr. Jones has 
130 “The Islamic State Militant Group.”  
131 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 3. 
132 Ibid.  
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described one approach to conducting such an analysis, and his assertions are based on 
the seemingly most comprehensive open source information compiled. He proposes an 
approach that implicitly acknowledges defense strategy and threat prioritization based on 
risk, and it may be incorporated into congressional consideration of terrorist threats and 
associated force authorizations. It focuses on organizational intent to conduct attacks on 
U.S. persons or interests and the capability to do so successfully. With intent and 
capability as the cornerstones of this analysis, Dr. Jones divides current threats into three 
categories: 1) groups posing a high threat to the United States because they are actively 
plotting against the U.S. homeland and have the capability to execute an attack, 2) 
organizations presenting an intermediate threat because they plot attacks against U.S. 
facilities and citizens abroad, and 3) groups exhibiting a low threat because they do not 
focus on U.S. targets, although they may focus on local or regional institutions.133  
While it would behoove lawmakers to consult with the executive branch 
regarding classified threat information when it considers continued AUMF application, 
the information and classifications provided by Dr. Jones are useful for considering the 
evolving terrorist threat environment for the purposes of developing a methodology as 
part of the AUMF discussion. Applying this method, even with open source information, 
AQAP falls within the highest threat category because of its capabilities and intent to 
target the United States and its interests overseas.134 This conclusion is in harmony with 
the Director of National Intelligence’s 2013 Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat 
Assessment; AQAP is the only group described in this assessment as having the intent 
and ability to perpetrate attacks on the U.S. homeland.135 AQAP has successfully placed 
bombs on aircraft bound for the United States, and it has forced heightened airport and 
133 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 40. 
134 Ibid., 40. 
135 Jennifer Daskal and Stephen I. Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” Harvard National Security Journal 5, 
no. 1, (January 2014): 128, citing James Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community,” Prepared by the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Statement for the Record, 3–4, March 12, 2013, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130 
312/clapper.pdf. 
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embassy security alerts worldwide.136 According to Dr. Jones, core AQ falls within a 
high threat category because of its desire to attack the U.S. homeland, although its current 
ability to perpetrate such an attack is doubtful.137  
Although no longer affiliated with AQ, ISIL falls within this high threat category. 
ISIL conquered several cities in Syria and Iraq, but it was ISIL’s military success in 
taking over Mosul in June 2014 that solidified the group’s regional preeminence. It 
controls approximately 35,000 square miles of territory across Iraq and Syria, and it 
utilizes U.S. military equipment that it took from the Iraqi army.138 After taking over 
several Syrian military bases, on August 24, 2014, media outlets reported that the group 
seized Tabqa airbase, a key Syrian government airbase in Raqqa province.139 The 
downfall of this base will seriously impede the Syrian government’s ability to counter 
ISIL via air power in northern Syria.140 Not only has the group taken over military assets; 
it is flush with cash. It is estimated that ISIL now has cash and assets worth around $2 
billion.  
ISIL’s execution of American journalist James Foley, which it publicized in a 
video titled “A Message to America,”141 marked an escalation in hostilities. ISIL released 
a video titled “second message to America” that shows the killing of American journalist 
Steven Sotloff.142 The group has also called for attacks on U.S. interests via social 
media.143 U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has warned that ISIL has an “apocalyptic, 
136 Shashank Joshi, “Islamic State: Biggest Threat to United States?” BBC News, August 22, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28896348. 
137 Jones, “A Persistent Threat,” 40–41. 
138 Joshi, “Islamic State.”  
139 “Syrian Conflict.”  
140 Ibid.  
141 Rukmini Callimachi, “Militant Group Says It Killed American Journalist in Syria,” The New York 
Times, August 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/middleeast/isis-james-foley-syria-
execution.html. 
142 Chelsea J. Carter and Ashley Fantz, “ISIS Video Shows Beheading of American Journalist Steven 




                                                 
end-of-days strategic vision” and poses “an imminent threat to every interest we 
have.”144 The group’s “apocalyptic” ideology makes deterrence unlikely.145  
While the intent of ISIL to target U.S. interests is apparent, it is unclear whether 
the group has the capability to attack the U.S. homeland. Some government officials and 
counterterrorism experts have questioned the group’s ability to conduct a major attack 
against the U.S. homeland.146 As the Pentagon press secretary, Rear Adm. John Kirby 
commented, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not believe that ISIL has “the 
capability right now to conduct a major attack on the U.S. homeland.”147 While the U.S. 
intelligence community must paint a clearer picture of the group’s capabilities, due to its 
intent to harm the United States, its resources, and its recent rise to dominate broad 
territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL falls within the high threat category at this time.  
Groups arguably fall within the intermediate threat category when they intend to 
target and are capable of targeting U.S. interests overseas. Such groups include Ansar al-
Sharia Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia Libya, AQIM, al Shabaab, and Jabhat al-Nusrah.148  
While core AQ remains a concern from a U.S. security perspective, AQAP has 
evolved to be one of the most intent and capable groups targeting the United States. In 
addition, ISIL’s actions and resources demand immediate Congressional attention. Other 
groups may evolve to pose more of a threat to the United States if their capabilities 
improve. Consequently, congressional analysis of AUMF options from a security 
perspective should consider these shifting terrorist threats in the context of intent and 
capability.  
144 Joshi, “Islamic State.” 
145 Ibid. 
146 Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper, “U.S. Officials and Experts at Odds on Threat Posed by Isis, 
The New York Times, August 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/us/politics/us-isnt-sure-just-
how-much-to-fear-isis.html. 
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4. The Threat Environment Has Evolved Since 9/11 
Little doubt exists that the threat landscape has evolved since the inception of the 
AUMF, as is evident in the current state of AQ and its progeny. AQ has become a 
decentralized organization with dispersed affiliates, and it serves as an inspiration for 
other groups. Core AQ and some of its affiliates arguably pose threats to the United 
States and its interests.149 Moreover, not all these groups threaten the United States, as 
many focus on regional operations. Consequently, policymakers should determine how to 
address such threats based not on static and antiquated views of a 9/11 threat landscape, 
but with a methodology that prioritizes current risk analysis.  
C. COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES SUPPORTED BY AUMF 
AUTHORITY 
Should Congress alter the AUMF, current counterterrorism operations will likely 
be impacted. To understand how AUMF changes may impact security, Congress must 
identify which measures the executive branch supports with AUMF authority and 
determine, in conjunction with the executive branch, whether these measures are still 
needed to accomplish U.S. defense strategy goals. This section focuses on several 
counterterrorism measures recently utilized by the U.S. government under AUMF 
authority. Such measures include but are not limited to actions directed at AQ’s 
associated forces, the military detention of enemy combatants, the government’s use of 
military force in Afghanistan, and targeted killings, which are often executed via drone 
strikes.  
1. Overview of Executive Branch Reliance on AUMF Authority 
As of 2013, administration representatives indicated that the AUMF was 
conducive to accomplishing defense objectives. In fact, Major General Michael Nagata, 
Deputy Director for Special Operations/Counterterrorism, J-37, Joint Staff, and Brigadier 
General Richard Gross, Legal Counsel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed in a 
2013 Senate Hearing that the AUMF has proven satisfactory to counter enemy forces and 
149 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” 8; “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 6. 
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that changes may inhibit necessary operations.150 Both the Bush and Obama 
administrations have relied on AUMF authority to support diverse counterterrorism 
measures conducted across the globe. According to a 2013 CRS memorandum, there 
were 30 publicly disclosed occurrences of executive reliance on the AUMF to take 
military or related action.151 The following CRS table, Table 1, lists these occurrences. 
Certain measures listed refer to a categorization of AUMF use, rather than individual 
incidents. For instance, the entry for October 9, 2001 references action against “al Qaeda; 
other terrorist organizations,” which implies that multiple actions were authorized on that 
date. 
150 Micah Zenko, “The AUMF and America’s Forever War,” Micah Zenko’s Blog on Politics, Power, 
and Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2013, 
http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/05/19/the-aumf-and-americas-forever-war/. 
151 Weed, The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 3. 
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Table 1.   Executive Branch Reliance on the AUMF152  
Although telling to a degree, the descriptions of counterterrorism measures 
authorized by AUMF authority on this list remain vague. Based on court cases, media 
152 Weed, The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 3. 
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accounts, academic articles, and government documents, counterterrorism measures may 
be more specifically identified.  
2. Action Against Associated Forces 
The AUMF had been interpreted to provide the executive branch with the 
authority to take action against AQ’s associated forces. Congress’s understanding of what 
constitutes an associated force will help it determine whether it needs to adjust the 
AUMF’s scope to include or exclude certain groups on which counterterrorism action 
may be taken. Unfortunately, determining what groups constitute AQ associated forces is 
anything but straightforward. First of all, the AUMF’s 9/11 nexus is an important 
congressional limitation on its scope.153 Second, as described in the previous section, AQ 
has decentralized, and some groups that currently pose threats to U.S. interests did not 
exist on September 11, 2001.  
Therefore, what kind of a relationship do groups need to have with AQ or the 
Taliban to be targeted under the AUMF?154 To answer this question, Congress should 
consider the possible root of confusion regarding the definition of associate forces. 
Interpretations regarding appropriate definitions vary and stem from sources as disparate 
as the executive branch, public officials, the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 
(2012 NDAA), and legal experts. Although AQ does not “give out t-shirts or membership 
cards,”155 formal loyalty oaths between AQ and other groups have been made public and 
are telling of affiliation. Self-described affiliations certainly contribute to a determination 
that a group is an associated force.156  
Challenges in labeling groups “associated forces” originate, in part, from applying 
both international and domestic notions of traditional warfare to terrorist threats. 
Traditional warfare implicates two or more state parties. For example, in World War II, 
the United States was at war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, as well as their “co-
153 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2055. 




                                                 
belligerents.”157 The United States declared war against all of these parties, including co-
belligerents Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.158  
Application of the “co-belligerent” designation in the context of terrorist groups is 
more convoluted because the United States is not at war with state actors. Unlike in 
WWII, when war was declared against co-belligerents, the executive branch today 
refuses to disclose which groups constitute co-belligerents. Nevertheless, the executive 
branch has applied this idea of being at war with “co-belligerents” to the armed conflict 
against those nations, organizations, and persons that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks.159 A 
U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ) white paper justifying targeted killings describes 
AQ associated forces as including groups that qualify as co-belligerents under 
international laws of war,160 and Obama administration officials maintain that the AUMF 
provides domestic authority to target these forces in whatever countries they operate in, 
including Somalia, Libya, and Syria.161  
The Obama administration defines associated forces as 1) organized armed groups 
that are 2) co-belligerents with AQ in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.162 Congress effectively ratified this interpretation concerning detention 
authority via the 2012 NDAA.163 Holding views sympathetic to AQ will not alone 
qualify a group as an associated force.164 Groups with no direct affiliation with AQ or the 
Taliban do not fall within the executive branch’s definition of associated forces, and 
157 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 122.  
158 “Official Declarations of War by Congress,” U.S. Senate: Art & History, accessed July 28, 2014, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm. 
159 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 122. 
160 U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ) White Paper, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force,” draft 
November 8, 2011, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf, 
citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74–75 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
161 Zenko, “America’s Forever War.”  
162 When speaking at a senate hearing about the AUMF in 2013 on behalf of the Obama 
administration, Robert Taylor, former Acting Defense General Counsel, stated that a group is an 
“associated force” if it is satisfies these two requirements. Zenko, “America’s Forever War”; Daskal and 
Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 123. 
163 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 123. 
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therefore, they cannot be targeted under the AUMF. For instance, groups that share 
ideological similarities with AQ but do not engage in hostilities against the United States 
would not qualify as an associated force. In addition, individuals inspired by AQ who are 
not members of an organized, armed group—such as the perpetrators of the Boston 
Marathon bombings—do not meet the executive branch’s definition of an associated 
force.165  
While lawmakers and the public may deduce that certain entities and individuals 
do not meet the executive branch’s definition of associated forces, the administration’s 
criteria perpetuate uncertainty regarding which groups are covered by the AUMF. The 
executive branch refuses to disclose which terrorist organizations qualify as associated 
forces by citing security reasons.166 Obama administration officials have made 
statements suggesting that the executive branch maintains a list of covered groups, but it 
is unclear whether action is being taken against these groups under the AUMF because 
they qualify as part of AQ or its associated forces or whether these groups are being 
pursued under separate legal authority, the reasoning behind which has not been publicly 
disclosed.167  
Confusion only increases the harder we look. For instance, it is unclear whether 
the executive branch considers all or parts of AQIM, al Shabaab, or the Jabhat al-Nusrah 
to be AQ associated forces subject to the AUMF.168 An exchange between State 
Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki and members of the press at a briefing about the 
Bengazhi attack investigation illustrates this confusion: 
QUESTION: But Jen, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Bin Qumu, he has ties 
to bin Ladin, he trained with him in camps in Pakistan in 1993. Doesn’t 
that give him ties to al-Qaida? 
MS. PSAKI: Well again, Lucas, there’s no indication at this point that core 
al-Qaida was involved or planned these attacks, and these are not official 
affiliates of al-Qaida, so – 
165 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 124. 
166 Ibid., 123. 
167 Ibid., 124. 
168 Ibid. 
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QUESTION: If you’re an alumnus of al-Qaida, doesn’t that give you ties 
to al-Qaida? I mean, I’m just curious what it takes to have – 
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) 
QUESTION: What does it take to have ties to al-Qaida? Is it an email? Is 
it a certificate of completed training? I’m just curious what it takes to have 
ties to al-Qaida. 
MS. PSAKI: They don’t give out t-shirts or membership cards, as you 
know . . . . 
[…] 
QUESTION: But, you see, you’re making a statement that there’s no 
indication that they are official affiliates. What is an official affiliate of—I 
mean, how does one—how do you—who is an official affiliate of core al-
Qaida in the administration’s view? What group is?  
[…] 
QUESTION: And I’m just wondering—I mean, I don’t think it’s an 
irrelevant question as to what makes one an official affiliate – 
MS. PSAKI: I don’t have any – 
QUESTION: -- as opposed to an unofficial or a wanna-be affiliate. 
MS. PSAKI: I don’t have any criteria to outline for you. 
QUESTION: Well, then how – 
MS. PSAKI: I’m happy to check with our counterterrorism team and see if 
that’s – 
QUESTION: Okay, because if you don’t have – 
MS. PSAKI: -- something that’s publicly available. 
QUESTION: Okay, because if you don’t have criteria for what an official 
affiliate is, then I’m not sure how you can say that one isn’t an official 
affiliate.169 
169 Jen Psaki, “Daily Press Briefing—January 8, 2014,” Department of State, January 8, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/219481.htm. 
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Some members of Congress have disagreed with the administration’s AUMF 
interpretation. Senator Durbin explains, “None of us, not one who voted for [the AUMF], 
could have envisioned . . . that we were about to give future presidents the authority to 
fight terrorism as far flung as Yemen and Somalia. I don’t think any of us envisioned that 
possibility.”170 Senator McCain echoed this by asserting that AUMF authority “[h]as 
grown way out of proportions. . . .”171 Other members of Congress have expressed 
similar sentiments. In 2013, Senator King asserted that the executive branch has 
effectively revised the constitution because Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 provides 
Congress the power to declare war, and the AUMF is a limited delegation of authority.172 
In arguing this point, he specifically points out that the term “associated forces” is not in 
the AUMF.173 Congress’s intent in delegating authority to the president via the AUMF is 
important because the president’s wartime authority is strongest when the sitting 
president acts in accordance with congressional authorization. 
Despite these criticisms, Congress effectively ratified the executive’s 
interpretation of the AUMF in the 2012 NDAA, at least in relation to detention authority. 
The 2nd Circuit recently examined the scope of AUMF authority and the 2012 NDAA’s 
impact on it in Hedges v. Obama. The court explains that the NDAA did not expand the 
president’s scope of authority under the AUMF, but it clarifies the executive’s authority 
in several respects.174 First, the NDAA confirms that the AUMF applies to organizations 
and persons responsible for the 9/11 attacks, as well as those who substantially supported 
AQ, the Taliban, and associated forces.175 Second, the 2012 NDAA reiterates that the 
170 One Congresswoman, Representative Barbara Lee did know, and she expressed her views on 
September 14, 2001: “[W]e must be careful not to embark on an open-ended war with neither an exit 
strategy nor a focused target.” Glenn Greenwald, “Barbara Lee and Dick Durbin’s ‘Nobody-Could-Have-
Known’ Defense,” The Guardian, May 17, 2013. 
171 Zenko, “America’s Forever War.” 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 
(December 31, 2011), section 1021(d). 
175 Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant 
Detainees: Major Court Rulings (CRS Report No. R41156) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2014), 37, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41156.pdf. 
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president may use all necessary and appropriate force against these groups, pursuant to 
the AUMF. Further, the 2012 NDAA defines “covered persons” as individuals “who 
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks.” In sum, the 2012 NDAA 
settles that the president may utilize force pursuant to the AUMF against those persons 
who are a part of or substantially support the Taliban, AQ, or associated forces engaged 
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.176  
Parallels exist between this 2012 NDAA language and domestic criminal laws. 
For instance, individuals can be held liable for being an accomplice to a crime in the 
domestic criminal justice system. An accomplice is an individual who actively aids in the 
commission of a crime, and this individual faces the same criminal responsibility as the 
principal perpetrator. Criminal liability also applies to those who assist a criminal in 
evading arrest and to co-conspirators who agree to perpetrate a crime and act in 
furtherance of such a plan. Despite these parallels, however, due process protections that 
apply in the domestic legal context—and assist in determining whether an individual has 
actually assisted in the commission of a crime—are often greatly diminished in 
proceedings involving persons apprehended under the AUMF or 2012 NDAA. These due 
process implications are discussed in the next chapter. 
In addition to decisions relevant to NDAA language interpretation, other courts 
specifically interpret the AUMF as providing authority for executive action against AQ 
associates, those with a sufficiently close relationship to organizations that clearly fall 
within the AUMF because of their direct involvement in the 9/11 attacks.177 Reasoning 
from court opinions that have more specifically considered what qualifies as an 
associated force may also be utilized in outlining the parameters regarding what groups 
the president can target under the AUMF. Parhat v. Gates serves as one such reference. 
In December 2001, Huzaifa Parhat, an ethnic Uighur, was captured in Pakistan.178 Parhat 
176 2012 NDAA. 
177 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2055. 
178 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 26. 
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fled his home in China to escape Chinese government policies.179 He was not a member 
of AQ or the Taliban, and he did not participate in hostilities against the United States or 
its allies.180 He was detained as an “enemy combatant” at Guantanamo based on his 
alleged affiliation with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uighur 
independence group.181  
The government alleged that ETIM was “associated” with both AQ and the 
Taliban, and that ETIM had been engaging in hostilities against the United States.182 To 
support this claim, the government presented four classified documents describing ETIM 
activities and its ties to the Taliban and AQ.183 The D.C. circuit held that these 
documents lacked indicia of reliability.”184 Parhat prevailed on his claim that the 
government’s evidence was insufficient to support the determination that he was an 
enemy combatant. In essence, the evidence presented did not sustain the conclusion that 
Parhat was a member of an associated force.185  
Despite the broad discretion afforded the executive branch, determining precisely 
which groups fall within AUMF authority is a daunting task. As Michael Sheehan, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, stated 
in 2013, “when a group aligns itself with al-Qaida and al-Qaida has an express intent to 
attack Americans, home and abroad, but then do not take the next step to be involved in 
that co-belligerency then we have a judgment to make.”186  
179 Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
180 Ibid., 835–36.  
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3. Enemy Combatant Designation and Detentions 
A primary consideration in evaluating the AUMF issue is the impact AUMF 
modification may have on the government’s authority to designate individuals as enemy 
combatants and detain them. The Non-Detention Act requires that no citizen be 
imprisoned or detained by the United States, unless pursuant to an act of Congress.187 
The AUMF provides the necessary congressional authorization. Courts have interpreted 
the AUMF as providing the executive branch with the authority to detain members of 
AQ, the Taliban, and affiliated groups, as well as those who provide sufficient support to 
such entities in their fight against the United States.188 Case law also indicates that the 
executive branch can detain persons captured on U.S. soil who had been “armed and 
present in a combat zone in Afghanistan as part of Taliban forces during the conflict there 
with the United States.” These individuals may be detained under AUMF authority for 
the duration of the armed conflict.189 Consequently, Congress needs to plan for the loss 
of this authority, should it decide to repeal or modify the AUMF.190  
Courts have held that the AUMF provides authority to take action against persons 
who are “part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban” and “those who 
purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition 
partners.”191 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held in Hamdi that the AUMF 
authorized the president to detain “enemy combatants” for the duration of hostilities, 
even if these combatants were U.S. citizens. The DOD and the Navy both define an 
“enemy combatant” as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida 
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
187 Non-Detention Act, Pub. L. 92–128, 62 Stat. 847, amended by 85 Stat. 347 (1971). 
188 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 2. 
189 Ibid., citing Padilla v. Hanft.  
190 The USA Patriot Act may provide an alternative source of detention authority, but that is 
altogether another discussion and will not be considered in this analysis. Stephen I. Vladeck examines such 
authority in “Detention After the AUMF.” Stephen I. Vladeck, “Detention After the AUMF,” Fordham 
Law Review 82 (2014): 2189–2207.  
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coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has 
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”192 
In Hamdi, five justices determined that the detention of individuals who fought in 
Afghanistan against U.S. forces is a fundamental and accepted incident to war, and 
consequently, qualifies as “necessary and appropriate force” under the AUMF.193 The 
court determined that the president has authority under the AUMF to capture such 
persons and detain them without charge for the duration of the conflict.194 The court 
based its reasoning, in part, on the president’s need to prevent enemy combatants from 
returning to the battlefield.195  
Since the basis of legal authority for Guantanamo detentions is the AUMF and 
associated laws of war based on armed conflict, the release of detainees will be required 
when hostilities cease. The authority for military detention prior to federal prosecution 
may also be eliminated if the AUMF is repealed.196 Congress needs to plan for the 
possible loss of this authority, specifically with regard to detainees. Should it then rely on 
alternative authorities, such as the USA Patriot Act? In this severe scenario, Congress 
must determine potential procedures and mechanisms for the release of detainees.  
4. Forces in Afghanistan 
In 2001, President George W. Bush notified Congress that he was deploying U.S. 
military forces to Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban and eliminate AQ resources in the 
country, pursuant to AUMF authority.197 The Taliban governed Afghanistan, and it had 
supported and harbored AQ within the country.198 After 13 years, U.S. ground forces are 
192 Parhat v. Gates, 837–38, citing DOD Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 
7, 2004) and Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures at 2 (July 29, 2004) (Navy 
Memorandum).  
193 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2013).  
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still present in Afghanistan, and the AUMF remains the principal legal authority 
supporting military operations in that country.199 Should U.S. forces leave the country, 
the relevance of the AUMF will be weakened. 
This scenario is not a far-flung possibility. Since Congress passed the AUMF, the 
Taliban regime has been removed from power in Afghanistan.200 The DOD has 
expressed that it intends to transition from operations in Afghanistan and it has begun a 
drawdown of U.S. ground forces.201 The withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan was 
scheduled for the end of 2014, although this schedule has recently come into question due 
to instability in the country and throughout the region.202 U.S. policymakers will have to 
consider whether it is still necessary to utilize U.S. military forces in Afghanistan to 
protect U.S. persons and interests. Congress must retain the AUMF so long as it wants to 
keep U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.  
5. Targeted Killings 
The executive branch has relied on the AUMF to authorize targeted killings of 
senior leaders of AQ and associated forces, irrespective of whether these leaders are 
within Afghanistan and without regard to their citizenship. The Obama administration 
relies on the AUMF as the principal authority supporting targeted killing operations in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.203 It also effectuates drone strikes on U.S. citizens who 
are deemed members of AQ or its associated forces using AUMF authority. These 
operations and the Obama administration’s reluctance to release legal reasoning 
supporting them have stirred public controversy.204 
The AUMF plays an integral part in the authorization of targeted killings; such 
operations are undertaken pursuant to the executive’s war powers and congressional 
199 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 143. 
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authorization via the AUMF.205 When the president acts pursuant to congressional 
authorization, the president acts with maximum authority, and courts afford great 
deference. The AUMF authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force against 
the 9/11 perpetrators.206 Thus, by conducting a targeted killing of an organizational 
leader who falls within the AUMF, the administration is acting in accordance with 
AUMF statutory authority, and courts defer to the president’s decisions relevant to these 
operations.207 
While the executive branch has been successful in overcoming courtroom 
challenges to its targeted killing operations, it has been criticized for failing to adhere to 
its self-professed drone strike policies. The Obama administration has maintained that the 
AUMF authorizes drone strikes against senior operational leaders of AQ, the Taliban, and 
associated forces who are plotting imminent violent attacks against U.S. interests.208 On 
September 6, 2012, President Obama asserted that a threat has to be “serious and not 
speculative,” one in which “[w]e can’t capture the individual before they move forward 
on some sort of operational plot against the United States.”209 Reports show, however, 
that the drone program has not adhered to this policy. McClatchy newspapers did an 
assessment of strikes between 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2011. Of the up to 
482 people killed from September 2010 through September 2011, approximately six were 
top AQ leaders. Individuals from groups other than AQ were targeted in numerous 
strikes. Such individuals included unidentified “foreign fighters” and “other militants.”210 
Christopher Swift, a professor of national security affairs at Georgetown University said, 
“I have never seen nor am I aware of any rules of engagement that have been made 
public that govern the conduct of drone operations in Pakistan, or the identification of 
205 2010 U.S. DOJ Legal Memorandum disclosed in The New York Times Company v. U.S., Docket 
Nos. 13–422 (Decided June 23, 2014), 67. 
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individuals and groups other than al Qaida and the Afghan Taliban.”211 Consequently, 
the AUMF needs to be reevaluated to determine whether refinement is necessary to limit 
the executive branch’s use of drone strikes.  
In addition, U.S. drone strike operations are not limited to a traditional battlefield, 
or area of active hostilities. The Obama administration combines AUMF domestic 
authority with international legal arguments to support the legality of targeted killings 
outside of Afghanistan.212 Administration lawyers argue, “The President has authority to 
respond to the imminent threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces, arising from 
his constitutional responsibility to protect the country, the inherent right of the United 
States to national self defense under international law, Congress’s authorization of the 
use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy [the AUMF], and 
the existence of an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida under international law.”213 The U.S. 
DOJ deduces that the president may authorize drone strikes against appropriate targets 
outside of Afghanistan because the AUMF does not limit the use of force to geographic 
boundaries and because it permits the president to use all force necessary and appropriate 
to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States.214 
The executive branch also maintains that the AUMF authorizes lethal force 
against U.S. citizens abroad.215 Administration attorneys argue that such action is lawful 
when three conditions are met:  
(1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined 
that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the United States 
continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the 
operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law 
of war principles.216  
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The executive argues that in such circumstances, the government’s interest in 
protecting citizens from attack permits the use of lethal force.217 For instance, the U.S. 
DOJ reasoned that the killing of AQAP leader Anwar al-Aulaqi was within AUMF 
authority because he was an organizational leader of AQAP, which is a group associated 
with AQ, and his activities posed a continuous imminent threat of violence to the United 
States.218 The U.S. DOJ concluded that al-Aulaqi’s U.S. citizenship did not provide him 
with protection from being targeted with force otherwise authorized by the AUMF.219 
The executive branch’s use of targeted killings implicates a complicated 
balancing of interests. The precision of these strikes arguably minimizes civilian 
casualties. As such, they arguably promote compliance with international legal 
requirements to maintain proportionality in defending against armed attacks by 
minimizing the threat to civilians.220 They also reduce risk to service members, as they 
decrease the need for ground forces. Courts have strongly deferred to the executive’s 
decisions in ordering such strikes. 
On the flip side, the executive’s authority to order drone strikes also provides a 
disincentive to perform capture operations; if a drone strike is authorized under the 
AUMF, why would the executive branch risk service member lives by conducting a 
capture operation? Nonetheless, CIA Director John Brennan and other officials have 
emphasized that the Obama administration would rather capture than kill targets.221 
Further, international human rights law in the context of non-traditional battlefields 
requires the United States to capture enemies, whenever possible.222  
Yet, the Obama administration has not detailed how much risk it is willing to 
accept before authorizing a drone strike under the AUMF.223 Human Rights Watch 
217 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 6.  
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Director Kenneth Roth explains how the U.S. government’s failure to demonstrate a clear 
preference for capturing enemies rather than killing them in the context of non-traditional 
armed conflict can lead dangerous consequences; it may bolster other states to 
circumvent this requirement too. States could essentially “[s]ummarily kill suspects 
simply by announcing a ‘war’ against their group without there being a traditional armed 
conflict anywhere in the vicinity.”224 He explains that this concern is not farfetched; 
China has already utilized drones to capture a Burmese drug trafficker. Prior to capturing 
him, China considered utilizing a drone to kill the trafficker while he was in another 
country.225 
In addition to the legal controversies inherent in the U.S. drone program, targeted 
killings may evoke other critiques. Namely, drone strikes and decapitation strategies may 
not be effective at countering terrorist groups.226 By shifting to a decentralized structure, 
organizations may survive such strikes.227 In addition, drone strikes fuel anti-American 
anger, which can assist in terrorist group recruitment efforts and destabilize U.S.-backed 
governments.228 On the other hand, such strikes enable the United States to target key 
leaders within these organizations with precision; these leaders may pose particularized 
threats to U.S. interests because of their skill sets or the power they wield within the 
organization. Further, the decentralization of AQ and associated groups proffers evidence 
that, despite their organizational survival, these strikes have forced terrorist groups to 
alter their structure and operations.  
The administration relies on the AUMF in its justification for targeted killings, 
arguing that the United States is conducting a congressionally authorized armed conflict 
with AQ and associate forces, and that under constitutional and international law, the 
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nation may utilize lethal force against operatives, even if they are U.S. citizens, to protect 
the United States.229 The U.S. DOJ notes that combatants killed in times of war in a 
manner consistent with the rules of warfare constitute lawful killings. However, the 
executive branch is utilizing an exceedingly broad interpretation of the AUMF to justify 
these strikes. The AUMF’s lack of geographic and temporal boundaries is fueling this 
broad interpretation. Lawmakers need to reevaluate the AUMF with the drone program in 
mind. It needs to determine whether this program should continue under a force 
authorization, and if so, whether it should limit the executive branch’s use of this 
program. 
D. CONSIDERING SECURITY  
The AUMF language is simultaneously too broad and too narrow, and herein lies 
a vast problem. Congress’s attempt at limiting the scope of the AUMF—by including 
language limiting action to those nations, organizations, or persons who perpetrated the 
9/11 attacks or harbored those that did—has failed to narrow the statute meaningfully 
because the executive and judicial branches have interpreted this language broadly to 
include associated forces. Concurrently, the AUMF language is not broad enough to 
counter threats today—threats that originate from ISIL and like groups, groups that are 
not AQ associated forces. Since Congress passed the AUMF over 13 years ago, the threat 
environment has evolved. U.S. forces removed the Taliban regime from power in 
Afghanistan, killed Osama bin Laden, and degraded AQ.230 Some terrorist organizations 
that may pose threats to the United States today did not exist on September 11, 2001, and 
the application of AUMF authority to such threats was arguably not the intent of 
Congress upon its passage. Tailoring force authorization language to define the enemy 
more accurately may be one way to shore up the deficiencies from the slippery slopes of 
this nation’s interpretation of the AUMF. Another way to shore up these deficiencies is to 
grant the president power to identify which enemy targets require sustained operations. 
229 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 14. 
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Such measures should be considered only after a decision is made regarding whether a 
force authorization is still necessary. 
Congress needs to reexamine the AUMF and decide whether to revise it or repeal 
it. For as explained in previous sections, deficiencies do occur in how the AUMF is 
currently applied. To consider all the variables, all the cause and effects of every possible 
alternative, the executive branch must assist Congress in confirming the counterterrorism 
operations it is still conducting under AUMF authority and substantiate how these 
operations comport with current terrorist threats and defense strategy. Through this 
discussion, lawmakers can determine if the AUMF is still the best authority to mitigate 
threats, or whether an alternative approach is preferable. 
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III. DOMESTIC LEGALITY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our response will be judged by friends and foes, by history, and by 
ourselves. It must stand up to the highest level of scrutiny: It must be 
appropriate and constitutional. 
–Senator Russell Feingold231 
As he considered the AUMF joint resolution just three days after the 9/11 attacks, 
former Senator Russ Feingold predicted that Congress’s response would face a deluge of 
challenges. He was right. Moreover, the theme common to most of the AUMF challenges 
has been whether the U.S. government can prevent terrorist attacks on the United States 
while preserving the principles of the U.S. Constitution.  
In its debates regarding AUMF modification, Congress has failed to consider 
criticisms of the AUMF on domestic legality grounds. Plaintiffs and academics have 
challenged the AUMF by alleging that it violates constitutional checks and balances and 
due process protections. The executive has broadly interpreted the AUMF, stretching its 
authority to a breaking point, diminishing congressional control over the use of military 
force, and threatening constitutional checks and balances. In addition, numerous plaintiffs 
have challenged the AUMF by alleging due process violations. As these criticisms are 
central to the U.S. Constitution and the principles underlying U.S. democracy, they are 
weighed heavily in the Chapter VII analysis of the AUMF and its alternatives. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES 
Congress must weigh the preservation of the separation of powers heavily when it 
reexamines the AUMF because constitutional checks and balances—the responsibility 
and abilities of the separate branches of government to keep each other in check—are 
central to the democratic foundation of the U.S. Constitution. During the development of 
the AUMF, congressional members focused on the separation of powers between 
Congress—that has the power to declare and fund war—and the executive—that has the 
231 “Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Cong.” 
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power to wage war and defend the nation from attack. While Congress provided the 
executive branch with broad wartime authority via the AUMF, members explicitly 
determined that the War Powers Resolution (WPR) was a satisfactory limitation on the 
executive branch’s authority. 
Prior to embarking on an AUMF war powers analysis, a few assumptions and 
clarifications must be mentioned. For the purposes of this analysis, an assumption is 
made that a state of war may exist without a formal declaration. This assumption is made 
for several reasons. First, while neither the U.S. Constitution nor the AUMF define 
“war,” U.S. code defines an “act of war” as including any act occurring in the course of 
“armed conflict between military forces of any origin.”232 Congress authorized armed 
conflict against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks via the AUMF. As Senator McCain 
declared, “These were not just crimes of mass murder against the United States; they 
were acts of war. The American people know that we are at war.”233 Further, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that the AUMF implicated the executive branch’s war 
powers, so long as the executive branch exercises these powers within congressional 
limitations. Finally, each branch of government has suggested that this conflict is a war 
requiring a military response.234 Consequently, the AUMF provides the political 
branches with authorities comparable to those afforded in declared wars.235 This section 
does not address the uniform code of military justice or international law, and it is not 
intended to provide a complete review of all actions that the president and Congress may 
take in armed conflicts. Instead, it focuses on maintaining a constitutional balance of 
powers in the context of the counterterrorism activities supported by the AUMF.  
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1. Background: Executive and Congressional War Powers Authorities 
The founding fathers crafted the constitution to ensure checks and balances would 
be applied to the exercise of war powers.236 Abraham Lincoln artfully explained the 
reasoning behind this separation of powers between the legislative and executive 
branches. Shortly after commencing his term in Congress in 1847, he opposed President 
James Polk’s decision to go to war with Mexico. He argued that it was unconstitutional. 
William Herndon, Lincoln’s law partner, criticized Lincoln for this stance. In a letter to 
Herndon, Lincoln argued, “Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever 
he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and allow him to do so whenever he may 
choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose . . . and you allow him to make war 
at pleasure.” He concluded, “Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their 
people in wars . . . This, our Constitution understood to be the most oppressive of all 
kingly oppressions . . . no man should hold power of bringing this oppression upon 
us.”237  
The president has a duty to serve as the Commander in Chief of military forces, 
and Congress is allocated the power to declare war. Congress is also afforded other 
powers that influence military forces and action.238 According to James Madison’s notes, 
while the constitution authorizes the executive branch to repel sudden attacks against the 
U.S. homeland, Congress has the responsibility to decide when to authorize the use of 
force abroad.239  
As the Commander in Chief, the president is fully authorized to use military 
forces to respond to an armed attack against the United States.240 In such circumstances, 
236 Ryan C. Hendrickson, “Clinton, Bush, Congress and War Powers: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Military Strikes on Iraq and Bin Laden,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed July 
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the president has the power to respond out of necessity, when it is infeasible to obtain 
congressional consent before acting to preserve national security.241 As David 
Abramowitz explains, “the constitution is not a suicide pact, and the President has 
unchallenged authority to prevent an imminent threat to the United States.”242  
In addition, Article II of the constitution provides supplementary powers to the 
executive branch, which may be exercised during wartime.243 Some of these powers are 
regulated by statute, and others are derived from the executive branch’s “core” 
powers.244 The core powers provide the power to act in the absence of congressional 
dissent and afford a great deal of discretion.245 For instance, the president may “[d]irect 
the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and . . . 
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and 
subdue the enemy.”246  
To balance this presidential wartime authority, the founding fathers provided 
Congress with critical decision-making responsibilities in waging war.247 Congressional 
power to “declare war” provides the authority to limit the nature and scope of the 
military’s engagement in hostilities.248 Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
enumerates congressional war authorities. It states that Congress has the authority “To 
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures 
on Land and Water.” Congress also has the power “To raise and support Armies . . . To 
provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions . . . .”249 Congressional control of 
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military appropriations provides another check on the president’s war powers. Further, 
Congress may punish and define “offenses against the Law of Nations,” or determine 
what actions violate international law and make those actions illegal in the United 
States.250 In short, Congress has broad authority to craft rules and apply them to the 
country’s military.251 Figure 4 illustrates, however simply, the wartime authorities of the 
political branches: 
 
Figure 3.  Balance of War Powers 
2. The AUMF: When War Powers Collide 
When Congress passed the AUMF, it provided the executive branch with its war 
powers, which resulted in broad executive power and limited judicial recourse to 
challenge it. In essence, when Congress authorized the president to exercise wartime 
authority, congressional and executive war powers intersected. The executive branch’s 
power is at its greatest when exercising war powers within the authority of congressional 
authorization; courts afford the broadest judicial deference to the executive branch when 
the president acts in accordance with congressional authorization.252 Without this 
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authorization, the executive branch can only rely on independent powers under Article II 
to support the legality of the use of force.253 If the president does not act in accordance 
with congressional authorization, this judicial deference will not be afforded to the 
executive branch.254  
This broad executive authority and deference arguably contradicts Congress’s 
original intent in passing the AUMF. During negotiations regarding AUMF language, 
Congressional leaders made efforts to respect the separation of powers by limiting the 
delegation of war powers to the executive branch, while promoting security. In fact, 
Congress did not provide the Bush administration with the degree of authority originally 
proposed by White House representatives, indicating that it would provide the executive 
with the authority that “he needed,” but no more.255 David Abramowtiz, former chief 
counsel to the House International Relations Committee, was a member of the team that 
argued on behalf of Congress in negotiations with the Bush administration regarding 
language in the AUMF. In 2002, he published his recollections of the negotiations, 
stating: 
Beyond the black-letter rules and principles of constitutional law [the 
AUMF] constitutes part of an ongoing dialogue between the executive and 
legislative branches on the exercise of their various powers, in principle 
and in practice, and on their respective expectation as to how such powers 
will be used. That this dialogue continued even at the onset of the current 
crisis reflects well on the continuing vitality of the Founders’ vision of a 
government characterized by branches with separate and distinct 
powers.256 
Congress’s struggle to maintain its war powers is also evidenced by Senate floor 
deliberations of the AUMF. On September 14, 2001, senators explicitly discussed this 
balance of powers when considering the joint resolution that eventually established the 
AUMF. During this session, Senator Feingold steered the discussion to several of the 
same points made by Lincoln. He described Congress’s ownership of the war power, and 
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he emphasized that through the AUMF, Congress simply loaned this power to the 
executive branch during an emergency.257 After delivering a lengthy commentary on war 
powers, Feingold explained his focus, “I take pains to raise these issues because they 
matter, they go to the core of our Constitution and the brilliant separation of powers that 
guard our democracy.”258  
3. War Powers Resolution 
The executive branch has taken over wartime authorities in the past as well, often 
without any force authorization. Despite authorities enumerated to Congress in the 
Constitution, the executive branch has dedicated forces without declarations of war in 
Korea, Vietnam, and other contexts, which has caused controversy regarding the nature 
of congressional and executive war powers. Congress has the power to create laws 
necessary and proper for executing all other constitutional powers, which arguably 
applies to the execution of executive powers.259 Consequently, in 1973, Congress passed 
the WPR in an effort to limit the increasingly broad exercise of executive powers.260 The 
purpose of the law is to: 
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution . . . and insure that the 
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to 
the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated 
by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in 
hostilities.261  
The law includes several provisions aimed at preserving congressional war 
powers. It declares that the president’s constitutional Commander in Chief powers are 
limited to situations in which Congress has declared war, issued a specific statutory 
authorization, or where an attack has occurred upon the United States or its armed 
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forces.262 It requires the executive to 1) “consult” with Congress whenever possible, prior 
to and during the utilization of military force,263 2) notify Congress of any military action 
within 48 hours of engagement,264 and 3) obtain congressional support of the use of force 
within 60 days.265 If Congress does not provide such support, the executive branch is 
required to cease military action abroad.266  
The executive branch’s respect for the WPR has been lacking. Congress passed 
the WPR over President Richard Nixon’s veto. At the time, the nation was in the midst of 
the Watergate Scandal and the country was divided over the Vietnam War. Distrust of the 
executive branch likely resulted in the very restrictive view of executive branch war 
powers. Critiques of the WPR’s narrow definition of presidential war powers do not 
originate solely from the executive branch; constitutional law experts have criticized the 
WPR on similar grounds.267 As a result, most presidents have simply ignored its 
provisions, exploited loopholes in its consultation and reporting requirements, or asserted 
that it is illegal.268  
Nonetheless, accounts of AUMF consideration and passage indicate that senior 
congressional leaders considered the WPR sufficient to protect congressional interests. 
Consequently, they prioritized the need to approve the AUMF quickly, without 
certification or reporting requirements.269 Senator Levin emphasized this point while 
considering the AUMF:  
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[t]he last ‘Whereas’ clause relating to the constitutional authority of the 
President to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism 
against the United States is to be read in conjunction with the War Powers 
Resolution. That is why words in earlier drafts of this joint resolution, 
which might have been interpreted to grant a broader authority to use 
military force, were deleted and that is why the references to the War 
Powers Resolution were added. It does not recognize any greater 
presidential authority than is recognized by the War Powers Resolution 
nor does it grant any new authority to the President.270 
Despite debate regarding whether the WPR resolution has proven effective at limiting the 
presidential use of military force abroad, lawmakers considered its limitations sufficient 
to reign in executive power in applying the AUMF.271 Considering that Congress passed 
the AUMF 13 years ago, history has accumulated enough application of the AUMF for a 
study as to whether the WPR adequately preserves congressional authority in the face of 
expansive AUMF interpretations and application by the executive branch.  
4. Judicial Deference 
Judicial review of executive actions during war provides another important check 
on the balance of powers between the political branches. In Marbury v. Madison, the 
Supreme Court set forth the power of the judicial branch. The case acknowledged the 
arguably anemic nature of courts as institutions, since they do not have powers to commit 
appropriations or wage war.272 Nonetheless, it established the independence of the 
judiciary and its ability to provide a check on the other political branches, thus balancing 
its powers with those institutions.273  
In the context of judicial review of executive action dependent on the AUMF, 
however, the judiciary has consistently deferred to executive decisions.274 The U.S. 
DOJ’s white paper justifying targeted killings of U.S. citizens abroad notes that an 
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appropriate judicial forum does not exist for reviewing constitutional considerations 
pertaining to such actions, as it is “[w]ell-established that ‘[m]atters intimately related to 
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial 
intervention.’”275 An example can be found in cases involving Jose Padilla. 
Jose Padilla was alleged to have attended an AQ training camp in Afghanistan, 
traveled to Pakistan, and then returned to the United States.276 President Bush designated 
Padilla an enemy combatant in a letter to the Secretary of Defense.277 The Fourth Circuit 
decided in Padilla v. Hanft that despite his capture in the United States, Padilla could be 
detained pursuant to the AUMF because he was “armed and present in a combat zone” as 
part of the Taliban forces. As the Supreme Court considered whether to grant review of 
this decision, the government charged Padilla with conspiracy; a charge different from 
the allegations used to support his military detention. When the 4th Circuit denied the 
government’s request to authorize Padilla’s transfer from military custody, the Supreme 
Court directly authorized the transfer.278 The Supreme Court then denied Padilla’s appeal 
for its review of his detention, and concluded that the challenge no longer presented a 
controversy since Padilla had been transferred to civilian custody.279 In effect, this 
transfer mooted the appeal for a Supreme Court decision regarding executive power, 
despite the government having detained Padilla for years in solitary confinement based 
on allegations that were not prosecuted.280  
Padilla and his family sought a judicial declaration saying that Padilla’s detention 
and treatment were unconstitutional in Lebron v. Rumsfeld.281 The court explained that 
the separation of powers principles prevented it from implying any remedy in the absence 
of clear congressional intent and when special circumstances advise caution.282 
275 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 10, citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). 
276 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 33.  
277 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), at 389. 
278 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 33. 
279 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 V.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2012).  
280 Buttar, “Hedges v. Obama.” 
281 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 544. 
282 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 548, citing Bivans v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983). 
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Specifically, the court refused to imply a cause of action for enemy combatants held in 
military detention.283 As the court explained, judicial involvement would “[s]tray from 
the traditional subjects of judicial competence” because the U.S. Constitution provides 
the legislative and executive branches with authority regarding military matters, but it 
does not provide the judicial branch with any analogous responsibility.284 The court 
further hesitated out of a fear that such litigation might disrupt military operations, which 
would be especially unacceptable after Congress provided the executive branch with a 
broad delegation of wartime authority under the AUMF.285 The court further explains its 
deference: 
[S]upporting judicial deference is the Constitution’s parallel commitment 
of command responsibility in national security and military affairs to the 
President as Commander in Chief . . . judges ‘traditionally have been 
reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and 
national security affairs.’ [citation omitted] As a result, the Supreme Court 
has consistently shown ‘great deference’ to what ‘the President—the 
Commander in Chief—has determined . . . is essential to national 
security.286 
Courts in other circuits have reached similar conclusions. The 7th Circuit has held that 
even if constitutional rights, treaties, and laws prohibiting the mistreatment of detainees 
are violated, lawsuits establishing a right of action for damages “come at an uncertain 
cost in national security.”287 
When Congress reexamines the AUMF, it should look to recent rulings to 
determine if courtroom interpretations of its delegation of authority to the executive 
branch via the AUMF are within its intent. Court decisions relevant to this conflict should 
influence a future legislative approach regarding how to govern armed conflict. 
Specifically, Congress should consider the judicial deference shown to the executive 
283 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 548; Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant 
Detainees, 35. 
284 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 549. 
285 Ibid., citing Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 395 (4th Cir. 2005); Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity 
Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 35.  
286 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 549, citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). 
287 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 38.  
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branch regarding AUMF application when determining whether to repeal or modify the 
law for future conflicts.288 Congress may craft law to limit government actions 
undertaken under executive authority,289 as courts have been willing to require the 
executive branch to comply with such restrictions, where they exist.290 
5. Congress’s Balancing Act  
Criticism regarding the AUMF’s erosion of constitutional checks and balances 
need to be addressed; the fact that the executive branch has a history of stretching its 
wartime authorities beyond their bounds does not mean it should do so again. It is 
imperative that Congress’s reexamination of the AUMF and analysis of alternative 
approaches consider the constitutional balance of powers between the political branches. 
John Adams said, “Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and 
murders itself. There was never a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.”291  
The judiciary has deferred to the political branches of government in 
consideration of cases pertaining to broad AUMF authority. The executive branch has 
displayed an ability to avoid judicial review and take advantage of procedural strategy to 
remove cases from certain forums prior to courts reaching substantive decisions 
regarding the limits of executive powers. Thus, the executive branch has displayed an 
incredible acumen to exercise broad war powers with minimal checks on its power. 
Further, legislative branch members have asserted that the authority the president has 
exercised under the AUMF is not what was originally envisioned when they passed the 
law. For instance, Senator McCain has stated that the authority “[h]as grown way out of 
proportions and is no longer applicable to the conditions that prevailed that motivated the 
United States Congress to pass the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that we 
288 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 50.  
289 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 12. 
290 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 50.  
291 “Democracy or a Republic?” George Mason University, accessed July 16, 2014, 
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/wew/articles/fee/democracy.htm.  
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did in 2001.”292 Congress need not sit idle. It can and should balance executive authority; 
it should employ its lawmaking authority to provide a check on executive power.  
Since judicial involvement in the war powers context of challenging the executive 
is arguably rare, an assumption seems to have been made in literary contexts that the 
executive and legislative branches will articulate the balance of power via negotiating 
language, such as that included in the AUMF, without much regard to a constitutional 
analysis of the balance of war powers.293 As Professor Mark Tushnet has articulated, 
“[w]hatever the political process produces is what the Constitution requires (or permits, if 
you prefer).”294 As such, balance of powers considerations are addressed in Chapter VI’s 
“domestic legality criterion” section, for such considerations must be at the forefront of 
any debate Congress entertains about the AUMF discussion.  
C. CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS  
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall be 
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”295 Due process rights 
attach to U.S. citizens whether they reside in the United States or abroad.296 The primary 
inquiry policymakers need to make when determining whether the AUMF or its 
alternatives preserve due process requirements of the Constitution is whether the status 
quo and alternatives are specific to such a degree as to put individuals on notice of the 
reasons for which the executive branch may deprive them of life or liberty. In analyzing 
this issue, policymakers should look to judicial interpretations of the AUMF for guidance 
regarding how courts may interpret potential force authorization modifications.  
292 Zenko, “America’s Forever War.” 
293 Barron and Lederman, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb,” 722. 
294 Ibid.  
295 U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
296 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 5, citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) 
(plurality opinion); United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 494 US. 259, 269–70 (1990), In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 170, n.7 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 69 
                                                 
1. Notice and Evidentiary Standards 
The AUMF afforded broad authority to the executive branch to act against 
organizations and individuals, as evidenced in the congressional record of AUMF 
consideration. Senator Levin noted that the AUMF was a “truly noteworthy action” as the 
law “would authorize the use of force even before the President or the Congress knows 
with certainty which nations, organizations, or persons were involved in the September 
11 terrorist acts.”297 He expressed that its passage was a “demonstration of our faith in 
the ability of our Government to determine the facts and in the President to act upon 
them.”298 This passage provides exceptional authority, considering the executive branch 
has relied on the AUMF to support the use of lethal force against U.S. citizens abroad, as 
well as detainment.  
U.S. DOJ reasoning regarding the use of lethal force against U.S. citizens utilizes 
the AUMF for legal support. That the U.S. DOJ notes that no private interest exists that is 
greater than individuals’ interest in preserving their life299 is offset by the U.S. DOJ’s 
assertion that this private interest must be balanced against the executive branch’s goal of 
mitigating the threat of violence to other Americans; threats that arise from those 
operational leaders of AQ and associated forces that plot against the United States and its 
interests.300 The U.S. DOJ cites Hamdi and the Supreme Court’s use of the balancing test 
in Mathews v. Eldridge to analyze due process rights of those who are captured and wish 
to challenge their status as enemy combatants. According to the U.S. DOJ, the Supreme 
Court explained that the due process rights owed in a given situation are determined by 
weighing the private interest that will be impacted against the government’s interest in 
accomplishing the function involved and avoiding burdens associated with providing 
more comprehensive process.301  
297 “Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Cong.” 
298 Ibid. 
299 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 1. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid., 6, citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335 (1976)). 
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Backed by the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the U.S. DOJ applies the same 
framework for assessing the due process of a citizen challenging detention as it does in 
assessing the rights of U.S. citizens who are operational leaders of AQ or associated 
forces planning violent attacks against the United States before undertaking targeted 
killings.302 It characterizes this balancing test as being between the “uniquely 
compelling” private interest of preserving the accuracy of processes that protect a 
person’s liberty or life and the government’s interest in removing threats from enemy 
forces to protect its citizens.303 
Numerous detainees have challenged executive authority under the AUMF, and 
the Supreme Court has determined that detainees have a constitutional right to challenge 
the basis of their detentions.304 Courts have afforded the executive branch wide discretion 
in cases that consider the due process rights of detainees held under AUMF authority by 
broadly construing statutory language. They have consistently held that the AUMF 
provides details adequate to put potential detainees on notice, which satisfies due process 
requirements. Judicial precedent has established that the executive branch may detain 
persons who are a “part of” AQ, the Taliban, and affiliated groups, as well as those who 
support these entities.305  
A court’s determination regarding whether a person is part of AQ, the Taliban, or 
associated forces, “must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather 
than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to 
the organization.”306 In essence, a “conditional probability analysis” is permitted when 
considering the sufficiency and reliability of government evidence that a person is 
lawfully detained under the AUMF.307 D.C. circuit judges have invoked a “walks like a 
duck test” to determining whether individuals challenging their detention under the 
302 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 6. 
303 Ibid., 6, citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 178 (1985).  
304 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), 771. 
305 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 2. 
306 Ibid., 14; Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
307 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 10. 
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AUMF are more likely than not a member of AQ or the Taliban, which makes detention 
lawful.308  
In addition, the judiciary has afforded the executive branch wide latitude by 
applying relaxed evidentiary standards. In sum, the executive branch must provide 
evidence to justify detention under AUMF authority and to satisfy due process 
requirements. Courts relax evidentiary procedures when the executive branch 
demonstrates a need based on national security interests and shows that an undue burden 
would occur if the executive were compelled to produce more reliable evidence.309 A 
preponderance of the evidence standard applies to habeas petitions from persons detained 
pursuant to the AUMF. In other words, the executive branch must show the detainee is 
more likely than not a member of AQ, the Taliban, or associated forces.310 Further, 
reliable hearsay evidence may be admitted as evidence, and the government is arguably 
not required to provide positive evidence that detainees fit within the AUMF language at 
the actual time of capture.311  
Unsurprisingly, the application of the AUMF to persons captured in the United 
States, and the resulting evidentiary reliability standard, is still uncertain.312 Courts have 
afforded the executive branch less leeway in relaxing rules of evidence when the detainee 
challenging detention is captured in the United States. The remedies available for 
constitutional challenges based on due process may also be affected if the detainee 
involved is a U.S. citizen.  
The 2012 NDAA is also relevant to the due process analysis, as it elaborates on 
executive detention authority under the AUMF. The language is broader than that 
included in the actual AUMF, but it arguably codifies judicial interpretations of the 
AUMF language. The 2012 NDAA permits the executive branch to detain persons who 
have “substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged 
308 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 23.  
309 Ibid., 34.  
310 Ibid., 13.  
311 Ibid., 13, 23.  
312 Ibid., 35.  
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in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who 
has . . . directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.”313 This language 
differs from the AUMF in two primary ways. First, Congress explicitly added that the 
executive branch may detain individuals who have “substantially supported” the Taliban, 
AQ, and “associated forces.” Second, it authorizes the detention of individuals who have 
“directly supported” hostilities engaged in by the United States or its allies, even if they 
did not participate in the 9/11 attacks.314  
2. Challenging Authorities 
Despite the success of the executive branch in the courts, both AUMF language 
and related phrasing in the 2012 NDAA have faced due process challenges both inside 
and outside the courtroom. For instance, El Paso County in Colorado passed a resolution 
expressing its concerns about 2012 NDAA language violating constitutional due process 
requirements. The resolution aptly describes due process:  
One of our most fundamental rights as American citizens is to be free 
from unreasonable detention without due process of law, a right afforded 
to us by our Founding Fathers and guaranteed to us by over two centuries 
of sacrifice by our men and women in the Armed Forces whom we daily 
recognize and honor. . . .315 
In addition, a case filed in 2013 challenging 2012 NDAA language on due process 
grounds brought public attention to these concerns. Journalists and activists initiated the 
litigation.316 They challenged the government by arguing that their lawful activities, 
which included journalism, advocacy, and human rights work, had to be altered to avoid 
being subject to possible military detention without trial under the 2012 NDAA.317 The 
district court judge enjoined government detention under the NDAA and found that the 
statute was too vague to satisfy due process requirements to provide adequate notice 
313 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 10. 
314 Ibid., 36. 
315 El Paso County, “Colorado, Resolution to Preserve Habeas Corpus and Civil Liberties, 11–428,” 
accessed July 16, 2014, http://bcc.elpasoco.com/Documents/Resolution%20to%20Preserve%20Habeas%20 
Corpus%20and%20Civil%20Liberties%2011-428.pdf. 
316 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 36. 
317 Ibid. 
 73 
                                                 
regarding conduct to be avoided.318 As U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest explained in 
her injunction to prevent NDAA detention provisions from going into effect: 
The due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment require that an 
individual understand what conduct might subject him or her to criminal 
or civil penalties. Here, the stakes get no higher: indefinite military 
detention—potential detention during a war on terrorism that is not 
expected to end in the foreseeable future, if ever. The Constitution requires 
specificity—and that specificity is absent. . . .”319 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed, by holding that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.320 It further explained that the 2012 
NDAA did not have any bearing regarding whether citizens could be detained under the 
authority of the AUMF and found the 2012 NDAA language to be unambiguous.321 
Instead, the court held that the language of the 2012 NDAA clarified parts of the AUMF 
that had been debated.322 The Supreme Court declined the plaintiffs’ request for review.  
3. Due Process Conclusion 
It is important for Congress to keep these due process considerations in mind 
when determining whether to continue implementing the status quo or alternatives to the 
AUMF. Judicial determinations in this arena should influence Congress if it crafts new 
force authorization language. Such language must ensure that the due process 
requirements enshrined in the Fifth Amendment are clearly satisfied.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of threats facing the United States since the Founding Fathers 
drafted the constitution has since challenged constitutional notions of war powers and due 
process. As Senator Lott said during discussions on September 14, 2001 of SB 23, “I 
have never seen a better example of Members standing together, working together, 
318 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 36–7. 
319 Buttar, “Hedges v. Obama.” 




                                                 
swallowing our legalistic desires and our budgetary restraint feelings. These are difficult 
times. We have got to act decisively.” He continued, “In a perfect world, maybe we 
would do it differently—with more money, less money, more language, less language—
but the world has changed, and we are acting appropriately.”323 While Congress is still 
far from operating “in a perfect world,” it does enjoy the advantage now that it did not 
have on September 14, 2014, 13 years of experience in AUMF implementation. 
Currently, Congress can and should tailor its approach based on gained knowledge, and it 
definitely should not swallow its “legalistic desires” when it does so.  
These legalistic considerations should not be limited to the domestic realm. As 
mentioned in the constitutional balance of powers section above, Congress has the 
responsibility to define “offenses against the Law of Nations,” or more specifically, 
determine which acts violate international law and then make those acts illegal in the 
United States.324 A thoughtful and well-reasoned approach to defining and enforcing 
these laws may help protect U.S. military officials, should their actions be challenged in 
international legal forums. In addition, the legality of U.S. actions in an armed conflict 
should factor into Congress’s decision-making process when it considers force 
authorizations. As such, the international legality of U.S. policy in this regard should be 
assessed. 
323 “Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Cong.” 
324 Barron and Lederman, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb,” 734. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS 
Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the 
distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to 
answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against 
us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce 
when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of 
others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing. 
—President George W. Bush325 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This complex statement does not merely detail the collective grief and anger of 
the nation just days after 9/11, but it foreshadows the realities of a determined adversary; 
an adversary who does not respect the customs of conflict, and that, in beginning a war 
against the United States, sets the stage for the nation to respond to its threats on the 
nation’s own terms. President George W. Bush made this statement during prayer 
services at the National Cathedral on September 14, 2001, the same day Congress 
debated the AUMF. Approximately one year later, the Bush administration used this 
quote to frame the third chapter of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the chapter 
introducing the controversial Bush Doctrine.326 The Bush Doctrine set the stage for U.S. 
counterterrorism actions abroad in an effort that became known as the Global War on 
Terror.327 
Framing the nation’s global counterterrorism strategy in the context of 
international law arguably presents a no-win situation. International law as it applies to 
terrorist threats is an ill-defined legal arena with neither clear enforcement nor consistent 
325 “Transcript of President George W. Bush’s Prayer Service Remarks, National Day of Prayer and 
Remembrance for the Victims of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 at the National Cathedral, 
September 14, 2001,” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2001, http://archive.opm.gov/guidance/09-
14-01gwb.htm. 
326 National Security Strategy of the U.S.A., Office of President Bush, September 2002, 13.  
327 Ibid.; National Security Strategy of the U.S.A., Office of President Bush, March 2006; Transcript 
of President Bush’s Address to Congress, September 20, 2001, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/ 
20/gen.bush.transcript/; Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “‘Global War on Terror’ is Given New Name,” 
Washington Post, March 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/ 
AR2009032402818.html. 
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application. This ill-defined legal arena applies to the evaluation of the U.S.’s global 
counterterrorism efforts, and it is under this uneven light that U.S. global actions have 
garnered great controversy. In the realm of mitigating terrorist threats, state actors face an 
uphill battle in determining how to preserve their security while remaining faithful to 
international legal tenants. Despite this daunting balancing act, it is imperative that the 
U.S. government strives to adhere to the international norms in place. The importance of 
following international law is nowhere more evident than in the verbiage of the Obama 
administration, whose officials have repeatedly voiced their desire to garner international 
acceptance of U.S. counterterrorism actions. For example, on May 21 2014, Mary E. 
McLeod, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, emphasized 
the importance of complying with international law: “[a]s we consider the future of the 
AUMF, it will be critical to ensure that U.S. actions continue to be grounded firmly in 
international law.”328  
Still, the administration’s actions have resulted in international controversy, 
especially in its use of force in areas outside of active hostilities. Complicating matters, 
representations made by the Obama administration’s top attorneys in AUMF hearings 
and court battles regarding targeted killings run counter to McLeod’s and other like 
statements. Moreover, a closer analysis of administration statements show that despite 
focusing on different counterterrorism measures, most statements of this sort implicate a 
particularly controversial scenario under international law; that of determining when one 
state can violate another state’s sovereignty by using lethal force within the latter’s 
borders against non-state actors in self-defense.  
It is crucial that Congress appreciate the international legal constructs within 
which the United States maneuvers, if for nothing else, to administer its operations with 
the most support possible. Adherence to international law will impact whether other 
countries view U.S. actions as legitimate, and in turn, impact international support. It is 
also important from the standpoint of protecting U.S. military personnel; international or 
328 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing Before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 113th Cong., 2 (2014) (testimony of Mary E. McLeod, 
Principal Deputy Legal Advisory, U.S. Department of State). 
 78 
                                                 
foreign courts may claim prosecutorial jurisdiction based in international human rights 
law or the laws of war. As such, this chapter helps explain the controversy regarding U.S. 
actions under the AUMF from an international law context.  
The primary international law considerations relevant to Congress’s 
reexamination of the AUMF are actions against non-state actors, the right to self-defense, 
the preemptive use of force, and humanitarian law (also known as the Laws of War). 
Since these areas of international law are ill defined in their application to terrorist 
threats, the United States has an opportunity to develop a well-reasoned approach and 
contribute to the evolution of customary international law in this arena. 
B. SELF-PRESERVATION AND ATTACKS FROM NON-STATE ACTORS  
Congressional and executive policymakers have maintained that international law 
is at least a consideration in AUMF application.329 Nonetheless, how states should apply 
international law to terrorist threats is unsettled; it is difficult to comply with laws relative 
to war when the laws have not evolved to address contemporary armed conflict.  
International law is the product of treaties, conventions, judicial decisions, and 
customs that have received international acquiescence.330 These sources focus 
predominantly on armed conflict between international state actors. However, many 
terrorist threats to the United States originate from non-state actors beyond its borders. In 
such an environment, it is often perplexing to differentiate between combatants and non-
combatants, military objectives and law enforcement goals, war and peace, and 
international and non-international armed conflict.331 In sum, it is difficult for states to 
preserve their interests while adhering to international legal obligations when these 
obligations are in flux and the very nature of armed conflict has changed.  
329 Abramowitz, “The President,” 75. 
330 United States of America v. Alstötter et al. (“The Justice Case”) 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), reprinted by 
the Library of Congress, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control 
Council Law No. 10, October 1946–April 1949, vol. III, http://loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-
criminals_Vol–III.pdf at 966–67. 
331 Cornelius Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police 
Roles,” The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012, 19, http://www.dcaf.ch/ 
Publications/International-Intervention-and-the-Use-of-Force-Military-and-Police-Roles. 
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A state’s right to territorial integrity is firm under customary international law, 
and UN Charter article two, paragraph four expressly prohibits states from using force 
against each other.332 This prohibition is also a norm of customary international law.333 
Thus, the use of force in another state is only permitted under international law if it fits 
within an exception to this fundamental tenet.334 UN Charter Article 51 provides an 
exception; it recognizes the inherent right of self-defense in case of armed attack by one 
state against another state.335  
A state may exercise this right to self-defense until the UN Security Council takes 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.336 In a situation in 
which another state’s acquiescence to the presence of a group within its territory 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, it is the Security Council’s role to 
mandate the use of force under Article 42 against that acquiescing state.337  
In exercising self-defense rights, a state’s use of force is subject to a number of 
arguably vague restrictions. In general, states must: 1) refrain from actions that risk 
aggravating the situation, and consequently, endangering the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and 2) report all measures taken under Article 51 to the UN Security 
Council.338 More specifically, Article 51 and Security Council Resolution 2233 bind the 
332 UN Charter; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall; Resolution 25/2625, “Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” United Nations General Assembly, October 24, 1970, 
http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm (Declaration on Friendly Relations). 
333 Michael Bothe, “Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force,” European Journal of 
International Law 14, no. 2 (2003): 228. 
334 Ibid. 
335 UN Charter, art. 51; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 40.  
336 UN Charter, art. 51. 
337 UN Charter, art. 42; Angus Martyn, “The Right to Self-Defense under International Law-the 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September,” Law and Bills Digest Group, 2002, http://www.aph. 
gov.au/LIBRAR/Pubs/cib/2001-02/02cib08.htm. 
338 UN Charter, art. 51; Declaration on Friendly Relations. 
 80 
                                                 
use of this right to strict conditions of necessity and threat proportionality.339 In short, the 
right to use force in self-defense depends on the scope of the initial attack.340 The 
response must balance military advantage and defensive goals with collateral effects, 
such as civilian casualties.341  
Abiding by these principles can prove easier said than done in the context of 
combatting guerilla fighters and terrorists. Such groups may threaten state interests and 
cause death and destruction, but they often do not possess military forces comparable to 
state powers. Consequently, it is difficult to identify when a state’s leverage of its 
military advantage against these groups is justified. Nonetheless, state concerns regarding 
the potential of such groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction have heightened 
fears about the magnitude of terrorist threats.342  
The AUMF is revolutionary in that it authorizes the executive branch to utilize 
wartime authority against non-state actors, as well as states, but it did not specifically 
name all non-state actors and states that could be targeted.343 Utilization of the right to 
self-defense is arguably unsettled when an armed attack is not imputable to a foreign 
state.344 Nonetheless, a state’s Article 51 right to self-defense may authorize it to use 
force in another state’s territory in response to terrorist attacks.345 The use of state-
sponsored armed forces and weapons may not be necessary for an assault to qualify as an 
339 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 40; The Avalon Project, “Caroline Incident,” 
Yale Law School, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp; 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 59/565, “A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility,” Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change December 2, 2004, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf.  
340 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
1996 ICJ 226 (July 8), 514. 
341 Final report of prosecutor by committee established to review NATO bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia. Final Report of Prosecutor by Committee Established to Review NATO Bombing Campaign 
against Yugoslavia, 39 ILM 1257. 
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armed attack under Article 51, as non-state actors are capable of conducting assaults that 
are of such gravity that they amount to such an attack.346  
An example occurred on September 11, 2001, when terrorists used box-cutters, 
pepper spray, and airplanes to perpetrate an attack that not only caused devastating death 
and destruction, but also targeted U.S. financial, political, and military cores.347 Despite 
these attacks not being executed by traditional armed forces, the UN Security Council 
affirmed the United States’ right to defend itself under Article 51 in two resolutions.348 
The United States continued to rely upon this right in initiating a military response in 
Afghanistan,349 with the support of the North Atlantic Council and the Organization of 
American States.350 Although Article 51 was crafted with state-to-state conflict in mind, 
9/11 clarified that factors, such as the scale, destruction, and perception of the assault as 
being analogous to a military attack, will weigh into the determination of whether the 
right to self-defense is applicable.351  
C. MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY BY 
PREEMPTING AN IMMINENT ATTACK . . . WITH FORCE  
The right to self-defense under international law is intertwined with controversy 
regarding the preemptive use of force. According to Abramowitz, the preventive 
terrorism goal of the AUMF corresponds to international standards forbidding the use of 
force for retaliation but permitting it for prevention. He continues, stating that “reliance 
on international law as a predicate for future U.S. action was one of the few times that 
346 Nicaragua v. United States, Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27). 
347 Sean Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,” 
43 Harvard International Law Journal 41, 41–44 (2002). 
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SCOR 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 
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international law was specifically considered during the drafting of the resolution.”352 
The assertion that prevention is permitted under international law, however, is arguably 
incorrect.  
This debate of whether prevention is permitted centers on whether a state may act 
in self-defense when an attack is threatened but has not yet occurred. The U.S. DOJ is 
steadfast in claiming that the operations ordered by the president under AUMF authority 
are legal under international law by claiming an inherent right to national self-defense 
against imminent attack.353 Evaluation of whether such operations are actually lawful, 
however, is convoluted. According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, treaty terms must be given “ordinary meaning.”354 Interpreting Article 51 using 
the ordinary meaning of its terms, a threat of an attack would not equate to an actual 
attack. Thus, the threat of an attack would arguably not justify the unilateral use of force 
in self-defense.355 
Nonetheless, persuasive international legal authorities have interpreted the Article 
51 right to self-defense as supporting state action if it is required to deflect an “imminent” 
attack.356 In essence, the act of self-defense must be the “only way for the State to 
safeguard an essential interest against grave and imminent peril.”357 The necessity of the 
self-defense must be instant, overwhelming, and leave the state no choice of means or 
chance for deliberation.358 The principle behind this interpretation is that the threat of an 
attack may be so overwhelming that a state should not wait for an attack before defending 
itself.359 
352 Abramowitz, “The President,” 75. 
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Both the Bush and Obama administrations have asserted a broader interpretation 
of what constitutes an imminent threat by adapting the doctrine to apply to perceived 
terrorist threats abroad to the interests of both the United States and its allies.360 This 
argument is not new; Paul Wolfowitz and others espoused it in the early 1990s via the 
U.S. Defense Planning Guidance.361  
According to the executive branch’s most recent assertions via the U.S. DOJ, 
clear evidence that a specific attack will occur in the immediate future is not required362 
to initiate self-defense actions. The United States can “act in self-defense in 
circumstances where there is evidence of further imminent attacks by terrorist groups 
even if there is no specific evidence of where such an attack will take place or of the 
precise nature of the attack.”363 The U.S. DOJ argues that the government will only have 
a limited window of time to defend itself and that refraining from action until attack plans 
have concluded would not provide the United States adequate time to do so.364 Thus, the 
administration considers an adversary’s continual plotting of attacks against the United 
States when determining when to utilize lethal force.365 The administration argues that 
delaying action until some terrorist planning end stage could result in American 
casualties.  
The Obama administration continues to rely on the AUMF for operations; it relies 
on the AUMF to target members of enemy forces outside of Afghanistan. The executive 
branch’s use of lethal force outside of areas of active hostilities is limited to targets that it 
claims pose an imminent threat to the United States and its interests.366 For instance, the 
360 National Security Strategy of the U.S.A., Office of President Bush, September 2002, 13; Bothe, 
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and Afghanistan. 
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U.S. military takes lethal actions under AUMF authority in Yemen and Somalia. The 
administration’s attorneys argue that targeted killings may be consistent with 
international rules regarding sovereignty if conducted with the consent of the host 
state.367 However, the U.S. DOJ’s claim that the government may conduct such 
operations when the “[h]ost nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by 
the individual targeted” is misleading.368 The administration argues that even in an 
international armed conflict when a neutral state has been unable to prevent violations by 
troops of a belligerent enemy that uses another territory for operations, the other nation is 
justified in attacking belligerent enemy forces in that neutral territory.369 Thus, if terrorist 
groups, such as AQ, move their operations among countries, the United States may be 
justified in attacking enemy forces within those countries.370  
These arguments, however, do not comport with international law regarding self-
defense. The UN’s human rights panel determined that the U.S. targeted killings program 
utilizes force in another state’s territory without that state’s consent and consequently, 
violates international law preserving sovereignty.371 Morris Davis, a Howard University 
Law School professor, former Air Force attorney, and prosecutor in terrorism trials 
commented, “I’m thankful that my doctors don’t use their [the administration’s] 
definition of imminence when looking at imminent death. A head cold could be enough 
to pull the plug on you.”372  
It is also worth noting that many of the international law sources the U.S. DOJ 
cites in support of its position in a white paper providing legal justification for targeted 
killings originates from American and British scholars and military resources. This stance 
results in a one-sided interpretation of international law.  
367 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 1. 
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The UN has noted the divisions amongst member states on the appropriateness of 
the use of force to address terrorist threats.373 Nonetheless, the UN itself has maintained 
that a state is only authorized to utilize preemptive force under extreme circumstances. In 
a UN report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, the UN provides the example of a situation involving terrorists armed with 
nuclear weapons. This report emphasizes that if a state has arguments for preventative 
military action, it should present them, along with evidential support, to the UN Security 
Council for force authorization under UN Charter Chapter VII. It reasons that the interest 
and risks to be balanced in such situations favors the norm of non-intervention to 
preserve global order. Nonetheless, the UN itself acknowledges that member states have 
violated prohibitions on the use of force hundreds of times, and that a “paralysed” 
Security Council has passed very few Chapter VII resolutions.374 Nonetheless, the UN 
does not favor the reinterpretation of Article 51 to extend its reach to permitting 
preventive action.375 
D. WAR HAS LAWS? 
International humanitarian law governs both international and internal armed 
conflicts, and obligations under humanitarian law apply regardless of whether a state is 
engaged in hostilities.376 The rights afforded to those involved in conflicts are dependent 
on the type of conflict and the actors involved. Unfortunately, terrorist threats and 
responses to those threats do not fit tidily into categorizations of international and internal 
armed conflicts provided by the Geneva Conventions and related protocols. Specifically, 
the understanding of rules governing classification of prisoners of war (POWs) under the 
third Geneva Convention has been hotly debated when applied to terrorists.  
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1. Armed and Conflicted 
An armed conflict is required377 for international humanitarian laws to apply. An 
armed conflict exists during protracted armed violence between government authorities 
and organized armed groups.378 The Third Geneva Convention applies in international 
armed conflicts, or “cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”379 The Third Geneva Convention 
affords qualified combatants who are captured and detained during the duration of 
hostilities to the highest level of humanitarian legal protections. International armed 
conflicts also implicate the protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, 
while a non-international armed conflict would entitle actors to protections under 
Common Article 3 and Protocol II. Arguably, lower standards of care and protections are 
afforded to actors captured during internal armed conflicts. Calls have been made to 
better apply the standards of humanitarian law to internal conflicts. Yet, despite both a 
rise in internal armed conflicts and a decrease in the number of conflicts qualifying as 
international, an adequate humanitarian law framework is lacking for conflicts classified 
as internal.380  
To determine which legal rights must be afforded to actors in an armed conflict, 
the question of whether the conflict is international or internal must be resolved. If an 
armed conflict occurs between two or more states, it is international.381 While this 
situation may seem straightforward, determining whether a conflict is between two states 
in the context of terrorist threats is often complicated because the level of control states 
exercise over terrorist groups varies and may be difficult to establish.  
377 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision. 
378 Ibid., 28. 
379 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 2., August 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135. 
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To attribute acts of a paramilitary group to a state, it must be proved that the state 
has overall control over the group.382 For instance, in Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, the International Court of Justice considered whether the United States should 
be held responsible as a state for its support of rebels who conducted attacks against 
Nicaraguan targets. The court noted that for a state to be held responsible for such 
attacks, it must have had effective control over operations when attacks were 
committed.383 In sum, the state must pay the offender, coordinate, or supervise activities, 
and issue specific attack instructions. The court found that the U.S. military provided pay, 
instructions, supervision, and intelligence to execute tasks, and the court imputed these 
acts to the United States. It did not, however, impose responsibility because the United 
States did not provide specific instructions to carry out attacks.384 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also examined this 
issue. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the court considered whether the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia exercised control over the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina/Republika Srpska.385 The court held that for a state to be held responsible 
for an individual or non-military organized group’s actions, the state either had to issue 
specific instructions or publicly endorse the group’s actions after the fact. The actions of 
armed forces, militias, and other militarily organized groups may be imputed to the state, 
and consequently, internationalize a conflict.386 Applied in this case, if another country 
exercises requisite control over a terrorist group, the conflict could be internationalized, 
thereby requiring the United States to apply more expansive legal protections to opposing 
privileged combatants.  
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The classification of the U.S.’s counterterrorist measures as “international” versus 
“internal” is important because it affects legal responsibilities and authority. The 
administration asserts that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with 
AQ and associated forces.387 In Hamdan, the Supreme Court held that because the United 
States is battling a transnational non-state actor operating from abroad, its engagement 
constitutes an armed conflict that is not international in character because it is not a 
“clash between nations.”388 Consequently, the U.S. government argues that U.S. 
operations conducted outside of areas of active hostilities are still part of this non-
international armed conflict.389 The United States also cites the lack of geographic 
limitations on the use of force authorized by the AUMF in support of this assertion.390  
This position undermines the fundamental international norm of non-intervention, 
which aims to preserve global order. The U.S. government’s rationalization that it is 
authorized to pursue non-state actors who are members of terrorist organizations 
wherever they may be located because this conflict is not a “clash between nations” is a 
slippery slope. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, summarized 
this concern succinctly when he asked the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, 
“Does the United States really have the right to attack anyone it might characterize as a 
combatant against the United States anywhere in the world?”391  
2. The Privilege of Combat 
The protections in the Third Geneva Convention are expansive and entitle POWs 
to numerous protections, in addition to those protections offered by human rights law and 
Common Article 3. Enemy combatants may be divided into two categories, lawful and 
unlawful combatants. Under the laws of war, lawful combatants are persons who take 
387 Stewart, “Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict,” 3, citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
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direct part in an armed conflict within the laws of war, and who upon capture by enemy 
forces, qualify as POWs under the Third Geneva Convention. In contrast, an unlawful 
combatant is a civilian who takes a direct part in the hostilities and does not satisfy the 
criteria for POW status described in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.392 These 
designations entail a host of complexities.  
Lawful combatants are persons who fall into one of the following categories: 1) 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, or 2) members of other militias or 
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a party 
of the conflict.393 To qualify as a member of an organized resistance movement, 
members must: 1) be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 2) have a 
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 3) carry arms openly; and 4) conduct 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Combatants who operate 
outside of a command structure, lack a distinctive uniform, hide arms, and ignore the 
laws of war by targeting civilians or using civilians as shields, are unlawful combatants. 
Accordingly, unlawful combatants do not have to be treated in accordance with POW 
standards under the Geneva Conventions. If any doubt arises as to whether a person 
benefits from “combatant status,” the person must be treated as a POW under the Third 
Geneva Convention until a “competent tribunal” decides the issue.  
In an asymmetric conflict in which a few combatants can kill many innocent 
civilians, a deliberate application of the laws of war and law enforcement mechanisms is 
required. Experts have argued over the proper application of the Geneva Conventions, as 
well as whether terrorists should be treated as criminals as opposed to enemy combatants. 
The executive branch has deemed members of AQ and its associated forces as unlawful 
combatants, in part because they are non-state actors who target civilians and arguably 
attempt to blend into the civilian population to evade target or capture. In sum, they do 
not adhere to the customs of war.394 Further, while a firm definition of terrorism does not 
392 William Haynes, “Enemy Combatants—Council on Foreign Relations,” accessed August 25, 2014, 
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exist, international institutions have declared that the deliberate murder of innocents is 
never justifiable, even in the name of self-determination or national liberation.395 
Consequently, the executive branch has determined that alleged terrorists do not have 
POW rights under the Third Geneva Convention.396 In addition, while the Obama 
administration has prosecuted terrorist suspects in domestic criminal courts, this has not 
always been the case. The law of war permits measures that criminal law procedures do 
not afford, such as the detention of enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities 
without charge.397 On the flip side, enemy combatants must be released after the 
cessation of hostilities. The importance of whether a member of AQ or its associated 
forces is deemed a lawful or unlawful combatant, or a criminal defendant, likely has more 
to do with due process protections and military proceedings than the conditions of 
detention. While military tribunals may be an acceptable means to try unlawful 
combatants, lawful combatants are arguably entitled to more substantive procedural 
protections.398 
Since AQ and associated forces target civilians, the United States is not required 
to afford them full POW protections. Even if a terrorist actor or group does not fall within 
categories affording protections to POWs under the Third Geneva Convention, other 
legal securities may provide protection. For instance, any person who is not considered a 
POW arguably has rights under the Geneva Civilian Convention.399 In addition, the core 
of Additional Protocol II is customary international law.400 Finally, Common Article 3 
395 Resolution 1556, “Peace and Security—Terrorist Acts,” United Nations Security Council, October 
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should be applied as widely as possible to provide protection as a sort of a catch-all 
doctrine.401  
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to low intensity and open 
armed confrontations between relatively organized armed forces or groups that occur in a 
state’s territory.402 It applies to “parties to the conflict.”403 The obligation to apply 
Article 3 is absolute for both parties and independent of the obligation of the other.404 It 
also protects persons who no longer take part in the hostilities.405 Like Protocol II, 
Article 3 protects persons who did not directly participate in, or who have ceased to take 
part in hostilities.406 It reflects “elementary considerations of humanity” applicable under 
customary law to any armed conflict or internal strife.407 Article 3 assures that detainees 
have rights “in all circumstances’ and “at any time and in any place whatsoever,” whether 
the detainee is a POW, an unprivileged belligerent, terrorist, or noncombatant.408 Article 
3 preserves the rights of all detainees to be treated humanely, and it prohibits violence to 
life and person, cruel treatment and torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, including 
humiliating and degrading treatment.409 It also preserves rights to minimum due process. 
Similarly, Protocol II prohibits violence to the life, health, and physical or mental well-
being of persons, outrages upon personal dignity, and threats to commit such acts.410  
Even if an incident does not constitute an armed conflict, individuals, regardless 
of their enemy-status designations, are protected by non-derogable human rights. For 
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instance, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment is preserved in numerous international treaties, and the prohibition on torture 
is jus cogens, or a preemptory norm of international law.411 In addition, due process 
rights are granted in numerous human rights treaties.412 Human rights protections apply 
during both peacetime and times of armed conflict.413 Human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention Against Torture and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, are applicable to state 
acts in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory, even if the state does not 
exercise ultimate sovereignty over the area.414  
The U.S. government asserts that its operations under the AUMF comprise part of 
an internal armed conflict. Therefore, the heightened protections afforded to enemy 
combatants in the Third Geneva Convention do not apply. While this designation may be 
advantageous to the United States as it decides what protections to afford detainees, this 
line of thinking could set a reciprocal precedent for the future treatment of U.S. service 
members detained by others. While U.S. law prohibits war crimes, it does not codify 
many laws of war.415 Congress should codify a well-reasoned approach that both respects 
international law while recognizing that armed conflicts has changed. Doing so will 
clarify obligations for the U.S. military, provide a defense in the event that the United 
States is challenged in an international forum, and potentially, contribute to the 
development of international law.  
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E. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In consideration of the AUMF discussion, or if it is decided that the AUMF does 
indeed need to be modified or repealed, whatever remains standing in the current 
AUMF’s place must consider international legality. It is specifically important to 
consider international perception in the AUMF discussion. According to the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States will place a greater emphasis on building 
partnership capacities, especially in fragile states where threats may proliferate.416 
International reception will inevitably impact defense strategies connected to building 
these partnership capacities. If the United States is seen as stretching international law too 
far, it could be viewed negatively by both allied governments and opponents, as well as 
non-governmental organizations.417 If this limits international support of U.S. efforts, or 
bolsters opponents’ recruiting efforts, U.S. security will be undermined. 
International reception will be more welcoming and constructive if Congress’s 
global counterterrorism policies are shown to be legitimate under international law and if 
the executive power is checked against the abuse of international legal constructs. At its 
best, the United States can contribute to shaping customary international law as it pertains 
to armed, non-state actors acting across borders.418 However, if the U.S. approach 
diverges too much from international legal precedent, the United States could arguably 
lose an opportunity to influence development.  
While it may benefit the U.S. government to phrase and interpret force 
authorizations broadly in ways that provide leverage and flexibility, exploiting 
ambiguities in international law may not always be advantageous. Gray areas of 
international law made even more nebulous by the stretching and manipulations of the 
United States may ultimately set precedence that will enable other groups to exploit 
ambiguities similarly.419 What is advantageous to the United States now may be 
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disastrous for the United States later. It can be imagined that broad interpretations of laws 
pertinent to drone strikes are advantageous to the United States when it is the one 
commanding such strikes, and perhaps less so should enemy groups evolve 
technologically to use drones against the United States. In essence, other countries may 
also take liberties with their interpretations of international law and respect for human 
rights, and the U.S. exploitation of these legal ambiguities will degrade its leverage in 
future international efforts to curb such actions when utilized against the United States. 
As Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations argues, other countries will adopt 
U.S. legal justifications and hypocrisy could set “precedent that other countries will 
emulate.”420 
F. CONCLUSION 
To recap, the UN remains steadfast in adhering to limited interpretations of the 
right to self-defense, yet deadlocked in its consideration of force authorizations. It argues 
that additional protections are needed for combatants in non-international armed conflict, 
but it has not agreed upon these terms. Moreover, the United States faces evolving 
terrorist threats from armed, non-state actors. So, what should the U.S. do? 
Despite a lack of consensus on these issues, proportionality and necessity in threat 
response are required,421 and respecting human rights and the rule of law is of 
fundamental importance, even in response to terrorism.422 As Congress reexamines the 
AUMF, the status quo and alternatives should be analyzed in the context of these 
international legal norms. It is the hope that by doing so, the U.S. will craft policy that is 
both effective and legitimate. In turn, the United States will contribute to the development 
of international law that can be applied to contemporary armed conflict.  
420 Landay, “Obama’s Drone War Kills.”  
421 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force.” 
422 Resolution 59/191, “Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism,” United Nations General Assembly, March 10, 2005, http://www.un.org/en/ga/ 
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/59/191&Lang=E. 
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V. PRECEDENT-SETTING CONSIDERATIONS 
Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and 
evenhandedness. 
—Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts423 
Congress must consider the precedent it will set in several key areas as it 
reexamines the AUMF and decides which alternative to implement. First, Congress must 
consider the preservation of government flexibility in the type of force to be used for 
countering terrorist threats, namely, the ability of the U.S. government to use both 
military force and law enforcement resources to mitigate terrorist threats. The ability to 
transition between these types of forces—military and law enforcement—is referred to as 
“versatile use of force.” Second, Congress will set precedent when it comes to 
government transparency regarding force authorizations. Finally, reassessment of 
Congress’s chosen approach is crucial, as this affects accountability. While each of these 
precedent considerations relate to one another because of their influence on U.S. 
counterterrorism policy, they encompass considerations independent of each other.  
A. VERSATILE USE OF FORCE: CAPITALIZING ON MILITARY AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT TOOLS IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM 
OPERATIONS 
Military force is not always the most advantageous course of action in mitigating 
threats; sometimes law enforcement operations prove more successful in threat 
mitigation. To address the dynamic security environment, it will behoove the United 
States to be agile in how it postures its assets, including its military forces, to ensure that 
it can address a broad spectrum of conflict.424 Adapting to any point on this broad 
spectrum will allow the United States to address unorthodox threats, such as those 
conflicts that originate from groups utilizing asymmetric approaches, or conflicts specific 
423 Chief Justice John Roberts, “Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings,” 
Washington Post, September 13, 2005.  
424 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” III, VII.  
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to more technologically advanced states.425 Ultimately, in any prolonged 
counterterrorism military action, the military will aim to shift its actions from “large scale 
prolonged stability operations” towards preparations for a variety of smaller, more 
tailored, better balanced, or more sustained operations.426 Thus, review of the AUMF and 
potential alternatives must consider whether the option permits the use of different types 
of force to promote counterterrorism efforts, rather than pure reliance on military force. 
Permitting the versatile use of force will promote U.S. objectives to rebalance and sustain 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted shortcomings in 
countering an enemy that conceals itself within a civilian population. The military’s role 
in counterterrorism efforts should be examined to determine a more advantageous 
approach, considering the evolving nature of terrorist threats. As former Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates observed, “[w]hat is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a 
prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign . . . In the long-term effort against terrorist 
networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a 
role. But we also understand that over the long term we cannot kill or capture our way to 
victory.”427  
The focus of international law on armed conflict between state actors complicates 
these challenges, as laws of war become difficult to apply when military forces try to 
counter threats disguised within civilian populations. Counterstrategies must be tailored 
to the specific threat faced while considering the intricacies of possible applicable legal 
constructs.428 As counterterrorism expert Audrey Kurth Cronin explains, terrorism 
exploits “[t]he vulnerable seam between domestic law and foreign war . . . .”429 Thus, in 
425 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” VII.  
426 Ibid.  
427 Geraint Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, The Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 
121.  
428 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,.” 13. 
429 Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, 25.  
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responding to terrorist threats, state policies should include concepts from both criminal 
justice and warfare models, in varying degrees, dependent on each state’s institutional 
frameworks.430 In further developing U.S. counterterrorism policy, it is important to 
utilize force and precision by leveraging both the criminal justice and war fighting 
models.431 
The DOD has declared its commitment to finding creative and effective ways to 
protect U.S. interests, including identifying new “presence paradigms.”432 According to 
the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States plans to help its partners 
counter terrorist threats, so that these threats may be mitigated long before they find their 
way to the U.S. homeland.433 One way to mitigate threats is to utilize a layered approach 
to counterterrorism that incorporates law enforcement mechanisms.  
1. Maximum v. Minimum Force 
In examining the varying degrees of force used to counter terrorist threats, 
maximum force usually describes the military combat function, and minimum force 
refers to a policing role more focused on criminal justice.434 It comes as no surprise that 
states usually use maximum force in relation to war strategy. Military personnel often 
have the training to operate in hostile environments and are prepared to endure 
considerable risk. The military may be utilized in counterterrorism measures to provide 
state security, as well as to bolster support to civilian entities.435 In addition, militaries 
have considerable technology to counter terrorist threats, which makes them a logical and 
desirable counterterrorism asset abroad.436  
430 Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, 25. 
431 Ibid., xi.  
432 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” VI.  
433 Ibid., 11.  
434 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2007), 64.  




                                                 
However, when battling a threat that does not abide by international humanitarian 
law and is difficult to distinguish from the civilian population, overreliance on maximum 
military force presents shortcomings. Use of maximum force often results in civilian lives 
lost and lost support of local citizens.437 Proportionality in threat response remains an 
obligation under international and constitutional law.438 Maximum force response often 
incites criticism as being disproportionate and indiscriminate due to issues in gathering 
accurate intelligence and launching precise military measures.439 Use of military power 
in counterterrorism operations may also cause negative strategic and political effects, as 
the civilian population may grow resentful of the military, and terrorist groups can 
capitalize upon this resentment for recruitment efforts.440 In sum, relying on maximum 
military force in countering terrorist threats may have destabilizing effects that result in 
escalated tension.441 Consequently, maximum force efforts should be integrated within a 
counterterrorism strategy that also addresses the resentment and grievances that terrorist 
groups exploit.442 
In contrast, the use of minimum force may be preferable in certain situations, as 
community policing by military overseas may be necessary. Minimum force utilizes 
caution and focuses on making arrests, with the goal of gaining the trust and support of 
the local population.443 The U.S. government’s promotion of law enforcement resources 
can also improve the policing capabilities of local governments—thereby bolstering their 
ability to govern and impeding the ability of terrorist groups to flourish.  
Many states employ maximum and minimum force in counterterrorism strategy 
along a continuum.444 However, the United States has not proven adept at using force in 
437 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 5. 
438 Ibid. 
439 Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, 71.  
440 Ibid., xv.  
441 Ibid., 80, 85. 
442 Ibid., 12. 
443 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 14. 
444 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 63. 
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a versatile way that capitalizes on maximum and minimum force and the gamut in 
between. The primary domestic legal framework that has discouraged the development of 
versatile use of force in U.S. military operations abroad is arguably the Posse Comitatus 
Act of 1876. This act prohibits the military from performing domestic police functions in 
most circumstances, which keeps the boundaries between armed forces and policing 
distinct.445 This act is valuable in that it prevents military and policing roles from 
blurring in a domestic setting. Military personnel are prohibited domestically from 
investigating crimes and conducting law enforcement activities in most situations.446 The 
National Guard has been deployed in exceptional circumstances domestically, during 
riots and after natural disasters, to establish public order, under the command of the 
respective state and not under the command of the federal government.447 Ultimately, 
however, boundaries between law enforcement and U.S. military efforts are strictly 
observed. Due to these restrictions, police and military roles are kept distinct, with 
personnel from each entity being trained almost exclusively in the force customarily 
utilized for that institution. Thus, police are primarily trained in the use of minimum force 
and associated criminal justice laws, while the military is trained in the use of maximum 
force and the laws of war.  
In terms of countering overseas threats, the deployment of military combat troops 
has historically been prioritized over personnel utilizing minimum force. Recently, forms 
of combat less reliant on personnel have been increasingly utilized, including drone 
strikes and long-range fire.448 Nonetheless, the irregularities of terrorist threats has 
resulted in pressure being imposed on military personnel to become involved in policing, 
a skill set in which they are not well versed or trained.449 In addition, the federal 
government lacks a mechanism for deploying police officers abroad.450 As such, there 
445 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 25; 18 U.S.C. § 1385. 
446 Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, 13.  
447 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 27. 
448 Ibid., x.  
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid., 26, 29. 
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exists a demand for skilled law enforcement personnel abroad, as well as a scarcity of 
such resources in the U.S. military.  
2. The Evolving U.S. Approach to Military and Law Enforcement 
Efforts Abroad 
Generally, U.S. military and police are not versatile in their use of force.451 Up 
until the release of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States had arguably 
failed to set forth an overarching strategy to counter terrorist threats that adequately 
addresses the versatile use of force. Through this review, the United States has adapted its 
defense strategy to include counterterrorism methods that are both dynamic and promote 
the versatile use of force. Versatile use of other types of force, such as intermediary 
police/military force and special force operations, may prove similarly beneficial as a 
counterterrorism strategy, and as such, must be accounted for in a new AUMF approach.  
Historically, the United States has relied on maximum military force. The killing 
of 18 U.S. rangers in Somali in 1993 bolstered the perceived need to utilize maximum 
force in U.S. military operations to avoid that sort of tragedy. The resulting Powell-
Weinberger doctrine made military involvement dependent on “political objective, 
decisive victory, an exit option, and threats to vital U.S. interests.”452  
After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush declared a War on Terror, and the 
administration relied predominantly on the use of maximum military force. This was not 
necessarily the approach near the commencement of action in Afghanistan; in late 2001, 
the United States relied more on Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) than on maximum military force. Often, small units of Special Forces would 
deploy, identify targets, and direct airstrikes. In response to a worsening security 
situation, the U.S. government eventually increased its use of maximum military force, 
including “kill or capture” operations.453 This use of force was hindered, however, 
because terrorists and insurgents were difficult to distinguish from the general population, 
451 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 5.14. 
452 Ibid., 29–30. 
453 Ibid. 
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which resulted in civilian casualties.454 Looking back, excessive reliance on military 
force was arguably counterproductive, as it led to civilian casualties and stagnant local 
support.455 British Foreign Secretary David Miliband later condemned U.S. 
counterterrorism policy by declaring that it relied too heavily on a military strategy.456  
Force needs to be calibrated to comply with the proportionality requirements of 
international law and the U.S. constitution, as well as to win the hearts and minds of 
populations.457 In 2009, the United States adopted the COIN (counterinsurgency) 
strategy in Afghanistan.458 This strategy increased the focus on protecting the local 
population, preserving the rule of law, and bolstering local security forces.459 Under 
COIN, U.S. soldiers were more often expected to switch between roles encompassing 
combat roles, fostering trust with the local population, and coordinating law enforcement 
related activities.460 This transition has been a difficult one, as the majority of U.S. forces 
are not generally trained to perform police functions or utilize versatile force. 
Since instituting the COIN strategy, the executive branch has hinted at the need to 
rely on methods besides maximum military force to counter terrorist threats, but it has not 
wholeheartedly endorsed this approach (at least publicly). The counterterrorism strategy 
set forth by President Obama in his 2013 speech at the National Defense Institute 
incorporates a more comprehensive approach to counterterrorism efforts, but most of the 
policies set forth still focus on the use of maximum force measures. As President Obama 
acknowledges, “the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to 
have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy—because for all the focus on the 
use of force, force alone cannot make us safe.”461 The President hints at the use of 
454 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 60.  
455 Ibid., Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, 4.  
456 Ibid., 1. 
457 Ibid., 16. 
458 Ibid., 1. 
459 Ibid., 4; Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 30.  
460 Friesendorf, “International Intervention and the Use of Force,” 65.  
461 Obama, “National Defense University.”  
 103 
                                                 
minimum or versatile force when he notes, “[o]ur best counterterrorism cooperation 
results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of 
terrorists.462  
3. Conclusion 
Relying on military firepower when a high risk of casualties is possible may 
violate international law and lead to local resentment (to put it mildly) that bolsters 
terrorist group recruitment, and ultimately, undermines U.S. security. As Farea al-
Muslimi, a journalist from Yemen stated, “AQAP recruits and retains power through its 
ideology, which relies in large part on the Yemeni people believing that America is at 
war with them.”463 Other senior U.S. military officials have also warned that excessive 
reliance on maximum, military force may galvanize groups that threaten the United 
States.464  
The use of maximum military force may also further destabilize fragile 
governments, increase international scrutiny, and result in reduced international 
cooperation.465 For instance, Germany limited its intelligence exchanges with the United 
States after German Islamists in Waziristan were killed by U.S. drone strikes.466 This 
action was a response to public outcry over the U.S. government’s actions and the 
possibility that the intelligence Germany shares with the United States could result in the 
deaths of German citizens.467 
As Daskal and Vladeck argue, congressional force authorization may increase the 
likelihood that the U.S. government would use military force, especially if the force 
authorization mirrors the AUMF in lacking temporal, geographic, and group-specific 
462 Obama, “National Defense University.” 
463 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 139. 
464 Ibid., 139–40. 
465 Ibid., 140. 
466 Ibid.; Holger Stark, “Drone Killing Debate: Germany Limits Information Exchange with U.S. 
Intelligence,” Speigel Online, May 17, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/drone-killing-
debate-germany-limits-information-exchange-with-us-intelligence-a-762873.html. 
467 Stark, “Drone Killing Debate.” 
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boundaries. This thesis does not analyze military strategy. However, in battling enemies 
that flout international laws of war and hide amongst civilian populations, the United 
States must reevaluate its approach to mitigate these contemporary threats while doing its 
utmost to respect international law. Moreover, Congress should be receptive to examining 
balanced options as it looks to revise the AUMF. The ability to operate on a continuum of 
law enforcement and military force can prove beneficial in countering terrorist threats. 
Targeted special operations or law enforcement approaches that prioritize arresting the 
enemy may prove more fruitful than utilizing military force because the local population 
may feel more protected with law and order. The local population may be more willing to 
cooperate with counterterrorism fact gathering if risks to the population are eradicated 
with minimal civilian losses.  
B. PROMOTING GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY  
Congress must ensure that it sets a positive precedent in promoting government 
transparency, which has been lacking in the application of the AUMF. A lack of 
transparency impedes the ability of Congress and the public to provide effective oversight 
of the AUMF and associated counterterrorism measures.468  
This lack of transparency has manifested itself in the years since Congress passed 
the AUMF. The executive branch has shown reluctance in clarifying its legal rationales 
for a variety of security measures implicating AUMF authority. For instance, the U.S. 
DOJ White Paper providing legal justification for the targeted killings of U.S. citizens 
was only leaked after much public wrangling, and the administration provided the full 
legal reasoning only after a court ordered its disclosure. Another example occurred in 
Parhat v. Gates, in which the executive branch refused to provide any of the underlying 
reporting forming the basis of its assertion that Parhat was an enemy combatant.  
In addition, the executive branch has refused to disclose publicly what groups 
qualify as associated forces, or groups that it may use lethal force against under the 
468 The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. 
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AUMF. The list of such groups is classified.469 The executive branch claims that 
disclosing this information would result in an upsurge in recruitment.470 The 
administration’s secrecy regarding which individuals it is targeting under AUMF 
authority makes it difficult for Congress and the public to determine whether those 
targeted are “combatants” under international law.471 This lack of transparency may be 
interpreted as a violation of due process.  
Further, courts considering issues pertaining to the AUMF and executive wartime 
powers have deferred to executive claims of secrecy, despite the need to review the 
constitutionality of executive action.472 Evidence rules are relaxed in support of detention 
of persons based on the AUMF. Nonetheless, plaintiffs are required to provide evidence 
despite its unavailability and executive secrecy.473 Consequently, the courts have taken a 
backseat in providing a constitutional check on the executive branch. In habeas cases 
challenging the legality of detentions, courts have generally permitted a “presumption of 
regularity” to apply to government intelligence documents. According to Judge Tatel’s 
dissent in Latif v. Obama, this presumption, which authenticates documents as true or 
trustworthy, is usually applied to government documents “familiar, transparent, generally 
understood as reliable, or accessible.”474 As such, Judge Tatel argued that this 
presumption should not apply to intelligence documents “[p]roduced in the fog of war by 
a clandestine method that we know almost nothing about.” He continued, saying such a 
presumption may come, “[p]erilously close to suggesting that whatever the government 
says must be treated as true. . . .”475 
469 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 125. 
470 Ibid., 123. 
471 The Law of Armed Conflict, The Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. 
472 Buttar, “Hedges v. Obama.” 
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474 Elsea and Garcia, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees, 22; Latif v. Obama, 
666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 677 F.3d 1175 (reissued), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
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The executive branch has shrouded actions taken under AUMF authority in 
secrecy. This lack of government transparency threatens the preservation of constitutional 
principles and renders appropriate debate about force authorizations impossible. As the 
Constitution Project aptly describes, “When national security decisions are said to rest on 
secret information not widely shared with Congress, the temptation to defer to the 
President only increases.”476 Consequently, Congress must ensure the promotion of 
positive precedent in the realm of government transparency when it considers 
alternatives.  
C. POLICY REASSESSMENT AND AVOIDING CONFIRMATION BIAS  
Confirmation bias references the tendency to seek or interpret information in 
ways partial to an individual’s existing belief, expectation, or decision.477 This bias 
manifests via preferential treatment of information supporting existing opinions, an 
overreliance on positive confirmatory events, and a tendency to ignore contradictory 
evidence.478 This bias is arguably perpetuated and worsened due to the psychological 
effects of terrorism. As Associate Professor of Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst 
University and retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Kristan J. Wheaton explains, 
“[t]he more important the decisions” the stronger the impact of confirmation bias.479 
Terrorism can create an enduring apprehension, that when combined with 
confirmation bias, contributes to the rationalization of ill advised policy based on a 
perception of risk not rooted in reasonable probabilities.480 Terrorists seek to provoke a 
476 Constitution Project Staff, “Deciding to Use Force Abroad,” 3.  
477 Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” Review 
of General Psychology, Tufts University 2, no. 2 (1998): 175.  
478 Ibid., 178–79. 
479 Timothy Coleman, “Gaming for Clarity Recognizes Intelligence Biases,” HS Today, March 11, 
2014, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/gaming-for-clarity-recognizes-
intelligence-biases/099f52d9db046e88b0c9bb1e77a81e50.html. 
480 James N. Breckenridge and Philip Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of 
Mass-Mediated Fear, Terrorism and Fear,” in The Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. 
Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo (Oxford UK: Oxford University 
Press 2007), ch. 9, 125–226.  
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disproportionate, collective sense of fear that can spread rapidly through society.481 
Consequently, terrorism has an exceedingly calamitous influence on psychological 
functions, in comparison with other disasters.482 It can completely disrupt the way a 
society and the individuals that comprise it function and relate.483 According to experts 
on the psychology of terrorist strategy James Breckenridge and Philip Zimbardo, 
heuristics and biased responses can exacerbate fear throughout a society.484 Emotions can 
bias judgments, frame perceptions, and even impact policy making.485  
Fully informed debate is necessary to promote political accountability and prevent 
confirmation bias. Congress’s force authorization via the AUMF should have signified its 
commencement of exercising its war power.486 Instead, Congress passed a broad 
statutory authorization and has remained passive since. The statute, in effect, fails to 
afford an opportunity for review and accountability. The United States has relied on the 
same law authorizing military force against perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks to support 
counterterrorism measures for 13 years, despite the evolution of terrorist threats facing 
the nation and arguably waning public support for some counterterrorism measures.487  
While continued reliance on the AUMF is not solely sourced in confirmation bias, 
it may arguably be a contributing factor. Policy rationalization has been described as a 
way that confirmation bias manifests itself in government actions.488 As Barbara 
Tuchman argued in The March of Folly, “[o]nce a policy has been adopted and 
481 Adrienne Stith Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, “Understanding the 
Psychological Consequences of Traumatic Events, Disasters, and Terrorism,” in Preparing for the 
Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy, ed. Adrienne Stith Butler, Allison M. 
Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank (Washington, DC: National Academies Press 2003), ch. 2, 34, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221643/pdf/TOC.pdf.  
482 Ibid., 45.  
483 Ibid., 47.  
484 Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of Mass-Mediated 
Fear, Terrorism and Fear,” 2.  
485 Ibid., 8, citing Marcus, 2000, 2003. 
486 Constitution Project Staff, “Deciding to Use Force Abroad,” 7.  
487 AUMF. 
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implemented, all subsequent activity becomes an effort to justify it.”489 For instance, 
terrorism can strengthen the public’s support for militant counterterrorism measures, as 
well as policies restricting civil liberties in the name of increased security.490 While 
support for such measures may later wane, justification of continued implementation may 
continue.  
Counterterrorism efforts should not be static; the United States should reassess its 
approach when the threat environment changes or the receptiveness of local governments 
to counterterrorism measures evolves.491 Unrecognized biases may lead to a self-
perpetuating cycle of ill-advised decisions and policy.492 Since terrorists seek to exploit 
fear and apprehension on a grand scale, homeland security professionals need to 
understand the psychological impacts this approach may have on decision making to 
avoid creating policy based on emotion and perpetuating such policy due to biases that 
promote adherence to preconceived notions.493 As Jeh Johnson has expressed, great value 
exists in challenging weaknesses in a decision-makers logic chain, as “group think . . . is 
dangerous, because it makes us lazy and complacent in our thinking, and can lead to bad 
results.”494 Congress must ensure that the self-perpetuation of ill advised policy does not 
manifest in such an important decision as the U.S. government’s use of military force. It 
must ensure that the approach it implements provides an opportunity for regular 
reassessment.  
489 Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Random House 
Trade Paperback ed., 2014, original copyright Random House Publishing 1984), 245. 
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VI. METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING THE AUMF AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
We will be principled and selective when using military force and do so 
only when necessary and in accordance with all applicable law, as well as 
with U.S. interests and values. 
—2014 Quadrennial Defense Review495 
The U.S. government’s principled use of force, its respect of laws, and its 
balancing of U.S. values goes to the heart of this thesis. The goal of this particular chapter 
is to set forth a principled and selective approach that Congress can use when it reviews 
the AUMF and proposed alternatives. To be described in Chapter VIII, academics, 
politicians, and legal experts have offered or endorsed several alternatives to the AUMF. 
While this thesis recommends an alternative, the ultimate goal is to provide lawmakers 
with a methodology for evaluating and comparing all approaches. By establishing a set of 
criteria to evaluate the status quo and its alternatives, Congress will be better equipped to 
determine the most advantageous approach. This thesis uses four criteria for its analysis. 
These criteria can be used to determine if each approach 1) adheres to domestic law, 2) 
protects security, 3) respects international law, and 4) promotes positive precedent and 
avoids setting negative precedent. Each option is evaluated to determine whether it 
satisfactorily meets or does not meet the standards established in each criterion. These 
criteria have been developed using the information, critiques, and literature set forth in 
Chapters I through V. Their inherent importance should be familiar but is worth repeating 
under the discussion of methodology for evaluating the AUMF and its alternatives.  
The effectiveness of the AUMF and its alternatives should be balanced with 
constitutional considerations.496 An inverse relationship often exists between the 
preservation of security and that of constitutional protections.497 Hence, Congress must 
consider narrowly tailored approaches to mitigating threats while respecting the legal 
495 “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” 11. 
496 Ibid., 13. 
497 Stephanie Blum, “Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Plan for a More Moderate and 
Sustainable Solution” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 142. 
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protection of personal liberty. The most advantageous approach is the one that best 
balances these two elements. Consequently, the criteria focusing on security and domestic 
legality are weighed heavily in this analysis.  
A. DOMESTIC LEGALITY 
The domestic legality criterion comprises several crucial considerations. It is the 
first criterion analyzed in this methodology for two reasons. First, if the approach fails to 
adhere to domestic law, it is unfeasible to expect that courts and the public will permit 
continued application of the approach. Second, this criterion focuses on the preservation 
of constitutional principles that form the foundation of the U.S. legal system and promote 
the preservation of liberty.  
In the context of the AUMF, domestic legality considers two crucial elements: 1) 
constitutional checks and balances, and 2) due process protections. Of course, the U.S. 
government has asserted that constitutional protections must be weighed against the 
executive branch’s responsibility to mitigate threats of violence to Americans. 
Consequently, the application of this criterion intersects with concepts incorporated into 
the security criterion section. Nonetheless, approaches are evaluated based on how well 
they preserve the separation of powers and due process principles into their legal 
architecture. As President Obama stated, “Unless we discipline our thinking, our 
definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or 
continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts 
between nation states.”498  
With respect to checks and balances, Congress must ask whether the proposed 
approach preserves constitutional separation of war powers between Congress and the 
executive branch. Constitutional checks and balances are central to the democratic 
foundation of the U.S. Constitution, as they protect against the accumulation of influence 
in one branch and minimize the abuse of power by government officials.499 At the same 
time, debate between competing political representatives may lead to reduced expediency 
498 Obama, “National Defense University.” 
499 Blum, “Preventive Detention in the War on Terror,” 145. 
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in defending the country. As such, Congress must protect its war authorities, and it must 
not infringe on the executive branch’s constitutional powers to defend the country when 
it is infeasible for the president to seek authorization prior to utilizing force. War powers 
between the political branches have been discussed in literature pertaining to the AUMF 
and in court decisions examining the statute. Despite the need for an independent 
judiciary to provide a check on the executive branch’s exercise of authority, the courts 
have shown a great deal of judicial deference to executive action under the AUMF. Thus, 
it is up to Congress to limit the executive branch’s exercise of wartime authority. As 
such, this criterion focuses on an approach’s likelihood that it will ensure that the 
executive branch does not erode the war powers of Congress.  
The due process inquiry must address whether an approach will satisfy Fifth 
Amendment requirements by providing potential detainees and targets with adequate 
notice regarding what actions will result in the deprivation of their liberties. Evidentiary 
standards are also considered because the judiciary has determined that relaxed 
evidentiary standards apply to the government when its actions are authorized by the 
AUMF. The AUMF has been utilized to support the detention and use of lethal force 
against U.S. citizens. Thus, Congress must consider an alternative approach’s adherence 
to Fifth Amendment protections aimed at preventing persons from being deprived of 
liberty without due process of law.  
B. SECURITY 
According to the Obama administration, the AUMF has served as an effective 
authority to support counterterrorism operations around the world. Thus, Congress must 
consider whether proposed AUMF alternatives will preserve U.S. security. The security 
criterion focuses on whether a proposed approach is 1) narrowly tailored to mitigate 
current threats, 2) likely to maintain flexibility necessary for the executive branch to 
address a dynamic threat environment, 3) likely to promote the identification of threats 
based on a risk and probability analysis, and 4) likely to impact current counterterrorism 
operations, including the use of force against associated forces, enemy combatant 
detention, the use of military force in Afghanistan, and targeted killings. 
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When applying this criterion, Congress must consider criticisms regarding 
counterterrorism operations authorized under broad AUMF language. The executive 
branch’s use of counterterrorism measures as supported by the AUMF implicates a 
complicated balancing of interests, and courts have strongly deferred to executive 
judgment in ordering these operations. As President Obama commented, “To say a 
military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every 
instance.”500 This statement is true. Although the executive branch has benefited from 
broad interpretations of its authority and from nebulous definitions of associated forces 
and imminent attack, policymakers and academics have debated the effectiveness of 
some of these far-reaching interpretations and how they translate to counterterrorism 
measures. For instance, policymakers have argued whether U.S. drone strikes and 
organizational decapitation strategies actually increase security. Some believe these 
measures benefit terrorist recruitment and merely force groups to revise their 
organizational structures. Although Congress must consider current strategy and 
counterterrorism measures supported by the AUMF, Congress cannot simply assume that 
all these measures are effective in mitigating current terrorist threats.  
C. INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY 
Under this criterion, Congress should compare the status quo and alternative 
approaches based on the likelihood that they would respect the identifiable norms of 
international law in several key capacities, including 1) self-preservation in the face of 
attacks from non-state actors residing abroad, 2) preemptive use of force, and 3) the laws 
of war. Common themes found in each of these categories are whether alternative 
approaches conform to international legal norms pertaining to proportionality and 
necessity in self-defense, whether they respect territorial sovereignty and the norm of 
non-intervention, and if enemy combatant protections are afforded to enemy forces 
depending on whether the conflict is considered internal or international in nature. By 
incorporating international legality into its evaluation of alternative approaches, Congress 
can do its utmost to ensure that it protects U.S. interests while pursuing an approach 
500 Obama, “National Defense University.” 
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accepted as credible by the international community. By doing so, Congress can 
contribute to the development of international legal norms as they apply to contemporary 
armed conflicts.  
D. PRECEDENT  
Congress’s approach to force authorization will set precedent in several important 
areas, including the weaning off U.S. military force and its replacement with a more 
normative law enforcement authority, a goal that may be accomplished through the 
“versatile use of force.” Precedent will also be set on issues of transparency and 
opportunities for reassessment. All three of these precedent-setting opportunities relate to 
one another, although they are addressed separately within this criterion.  
As demonstrated in Chapter V, military force is not always the most advantageous 
recourse in mitigating threats. Sometimes, law enforcement tools prove more successful 
in threat mitigation. U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted difficulties 
in countering a threat that conceals itself in a civilian population. Overreliance on 
military force can result in civilian casualties and increased terrorist group recruitment. In 
addition, it is anticipated that the United States will undertake a layered approach to 
countering terrorist threats. Therefore, it needs to be agile in how it postures and utilizes 
assets. Congress should examine how each approach affects the executive branch’s 
ability to promote the versatile use of force. 
Regarding transparency and accountability, the more the executive branch is held 
accountable to Congress and the judiciary in its exercise of authority, the more likely it 
will be mindful of and conscientiously balance the preservation of constitutional 
principles with U.S. security interests.501 The extent to and manner with which the 
executive branch should accomplish such balance is difficult to ascertain, for political 
branches tend to hedge towards secrecy when dealing with matters related to security. 
Consequently, this factor is weighed with an awareness of the tension between 
government transparency and the preservation of security. Regardless of the extent and 
501 Blum, “Preventive Detention in the War on Terror,” 144. 
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manner, greater transparency will promote debate and reassessment of congressional and 
executive action.  
On a broader level, Congress must continuously reevaluate force authorizations. 
Reevaluation must be promoted to prevent dogged loyalty to an established policy, for 
blind loyalty in a policy is by definition no longer objective decision making. Blind 
loyalty invites tunnel vision in this nation’s leaders and fosters a desire for information 
consistent with policy, rather than for objective information. If reevaluation is not built 
into an approach and understood by this country’s leaders as a necessary part of the 
policymaking process, then policy rationalization at the highest levels will occur. Ill 
advised policies must not be perpetuated simply to justify past decisions. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Congressional members did not have much time to reflect on the AUMF before 
they approved it in 2001. Congress debated the AUMF only three days after the 9/11 
attacks and immediately prior to being rushed to a memorial service for the victims of the 
9/11 attacks. Before Congress commenced deliberating this momentous vote, Senator 
Daschle set forth logistics of getting to the 9/11 prayer and remembrance service to be 
held that day, “we want to get on the buses just as quickly as possible after this vote [on 
the AUMF]. For those who are going to be attending the memorial service, they will be 
right down in front of the steps. So we can accommodate all Senators by quickly going, 
as soon as the vote has been completed, to the buses for transportation to the National 
Cathedral.”502 Senators considered the AUMF in the face of a national crisis. The 
circumstances surrounding AUMF passage forestalled extensive deliberation regarding 
the full extent of potential repercussions pertinent to the passage of the AUMF. 
Now, 13 years later, Congress is afforded the luxury of time and hindsight for 
thoughtful analysis of the U.S. government’s use of force moving forward. The primary 
goal of this thesis is to convince Congressional decision makers to consider and apply the 
criteria in this chapter to the AUMF discussion. However, Congress decides to act on the 
AUMF, it goes without saying that evaluations of its effectiveness and possible 
502 “Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Cong.” 
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modifications or use of alternatives will be subject to perceptions about current terrorist 
threat level information.503 Nonetheless, analysis of the repeal or modification of the 
AUMF deserves more in-depth analysis than it has thus far received, and the above 
criteria should play a central role in establishing a framework for a comprehensive 
analysis aimed at predicting potential consequences of AUMF modification. By 
examining each approach from the perspective of whether it is likely to preserve 
domestic legality, security, international legality, and promote positive precedent, 
lawmakers will have a framework with which to determine the most advantageous 
approach for mitigating terrorist threats while preserving democratic principles. 
503 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization,” 2056. 
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VII. COUNTERING EVOLVING TERRORIST THREATS: 
EVALUATING CONTINUED AUMF APPLICATION AND 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES  
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and the scope of 
this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James 
Madison’s warning that ‘No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst 
of continual warfare.’ Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total 
defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some 
human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. What we 
can do—and must do—is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, 
and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while 
maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that 
strategy, we have to make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned 
wisdom. 
—President Barack Obama504 
Members of Congress have criticized the continued application of the AUMF and 
called for its repeal or modification. Even the president has acknowledged that the 
AUMF must be altered, saying in 2012 that he intends “[t]o engage Congress about the 
existing [AUMF], to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping 
America on a perpetual wartime footing.”505 The AUMF has been the subject of 
numerous academic articles, but relatively few have evaluated it substantively in terms of 
continued application.  
Academics, politicians, and legal experts have offered or endorsed several 
alternative approaches to the AUMF. Proposals generally argue for the expansion or 
narrowing of the authorization. However, among these proposals two leading approaches 
have emerged. Both deliver substantive detail in their proposals and thoughtful analysis 
of counterarguments, while maintaining very divergent views on how Congress should 
proceed.  
The leading approach argues that Congress should repeal or sunset the AUMF and 
enact a new law delegating force authorization to the executive branch to enable it to 
504 Obama, “National Defense University.” 
505 Ibid. 
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designate groups as targets through a robust administrative process (“General Criteria 
Plus Listing Approach”). The second proposal advocates that Congress should repeal the 
AUMF and issue no new force authorization, though it recommends examination of the 
threat posed by AQAP. Instead, the U.S. government should rely on law enforcement and 
the president’s Article II powers to mitigate terrorist threats (“Article II Approach”). This 
thesis recommends an alternative approach that involves sunsetting the AUMF, statutory 
modifications, the issuance of a new force authorization narrowly tailored to achieve 
security goals, if necessary, and exploration of law enforcement authorities (“Tailored 
Approach”). This chapter compares and evaluates the status quo AUMF, the two leading 
approaches, and the alternative approach proposed by the author using the methodology 
described in Chapter VI, whose cornerstones are domestic legality, security, international 
legality, and precedent considerations.  
A. THE STATUS QUO APPROACH—CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF THE 
AUMF 
1. Description 
A single sentence comprises the force authorization against those who perpetrated 
the 9/11 attacks, 60 words. These words have been described in detail in prior chapters. 
National security journalist Gregory D. Johnson’s depiction of the AUMF as “the most 
dangerous sentence in U.S. history”506 is apt. From the use of military forces, to drone 
strikes, to preventive detention, both the Bush and Obama administrations have relied on 
this sentence to support a variety of counterterrorism measures, without regard to 
geographic or temporal boundaries.  
No one would ever know that the Bush and Obama administrations counted on 
this sentence based on the May 21, 2014 testimony of the Obama administration’s top 
lawyers before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Mary E. McLeod, 
Department of State Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, and Stephen W. Preston, 
506 Gregory D. Johnsen, “60 Words and a War without End: The Most Dangerous Sentence in U.S. 
History,” BuzzFeed, January 16, 2014, http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60-words-and-a-war-
without-end-the-untold-story-of-the-most. 
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Department of Defense General Counsel, claimed that the President does not need 
congressional authorization to attack terrorists abroad.507 
In an effort to pinpoint whether any counterterrorism measures would be affected 
if Congress repeals the AUMF, senators hammered the witnesses with inquiries regarding 
whether the president relies upon AUMF authority. According to the witnesses, repealing 
the AUMF will not adversely affect the executive branch’s use of counterterrorism 
measures in most cases. This assertion directly contradicts representations made by 
Obama administration officials at a senate hearing in 2013.508 
As such, what remains are two positions at odds with each other, the AUMF as 
the source of the executive branch’s use of such measures—as cited in recent history and 
judicial doctrine—and the aforementioned witness’ argument that the source of the 
executive branch’s use of such measures stems from the powers inherent in the 
presidency. 
As these two positions are at odds with each other, clarification is required. As 
discussed in Chapter III, the executive branch has relied extensively upon the AUMF to 
support its detention authority, and published court opinions cite this law in 
authorizations to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities. If the AUMF is 
repealed, the administration’s detention authority arguably ceases to exist in a variety of 
contexts. In addition, the U.S. DOJ relied upon AUMF authority in its legal reasoning 
supporting the legality of targeted killings of U.S. citizens abroad. The law was cited 
extensively in the recent dismissal of a lawsuit challenging the targeted killing of U.S. 
citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi. As Jeh Johnson explained in a 2012 speech, “[i]n the conflict 
against al Qaeda and associated forces, the bedrock of the military’s domestic legal 
authority continues to be the Authorization for the use of Military Force . . . .”509 
507 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan; Eli Lake, “Obama 
Administration Channels Cheney, Claims Unlimited War Powers,” The Daily Beast, May 21, 2014, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/21/obama-admin-channels-cheney-claims-unlimited-war-
powers.html. 
508 Zenko, “America’s Forever War.” 
509 Johnson, “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration.” 
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When it comes to reliance upon the AUMF, the executive branch has boxed itself 
in; the truth is that when challenged in court, both the Bush and Obama administrations 
have relied upon AUMF authority to support a variety of counterterrorism measures. As 
Senator Kaine said at the May 21st hearing, Congress needs to evaluate continued 
application of the AUMF, and “if there is an effort to refine [the AUMF], we have to 
refine around . . . concerns.” Congress and the executive branch must work together to 
frankly identify and evaluate such concerns to conduct an effective appraisal of continued 
AUMF application. An analysis follows of what should be pertinent in that discussion. 
2. Analysis 
a. Domestic Legality 
In applying Domestic Legality to this assessment of continued application of the 
AUMF, the discussion returns to considerations analyzed in Chapter III. While the 
AUMF has weathered extensive judicial review, it fails to protect constitutional 
principles preserving checks and balances and the due process of law. The executive 
branch has stretched interpretations of AUMF language to a breaking point, and courts, 
which have afforded the executive branch great deference, have broadly interpreted 
AUMF language. The executive branch’s application of the AUMF to groups not 
envisioned by Congress as falling within its authorization makes suspect further 
executive action taken under the AUMF.  
The executive branch’s broad application of the AUMF is eroding congressional 
war powers. Fundamentally, Congress has the power to declare war and the executive 
branch has the power to wage it. Historically, the interpretation of these constitutional 
powers has allowed that the president is fully authorized to use military force to respond 
to armed attacks against the United States. However, the executive branch has since used 
the AUMF to target members of groups that did not exist on September 11, 2001. 
Targeting these groups runs contrary to the AUMF’s 9/11 nexus language, the same 
language through which Congress sought to limit the force authorization’s scope. Further, 
the executive branch has not demonstrated how such actions fall within its Article II 
powers. It is unclear whether these groups pose threats of such an imminent nature that it 
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would be infeasible for the president to obtain congressional consent prior to using lethal 
force against them. Thus, while the AUMF itself would likely be deemed legal if 
challenged in court, continued stretching of its language to cover groups with nebulous 
ties to AQ does not support its domestic legality from the perspective of putting potential 
targets on notice that their liberty may be deprived under the Fifth Amendment.  
When Congress passed the AUMF, its war powers collided with those of the 
president, which provided the president with a peak level of authority. This authority 
resulted in courts exercising great judicial deference to the executive branch and limited 
recourse in challenging executive action. This collision of war powers itself is not a 
blunder. The primary purpose of a force authorization is to provide the president with 
more wartime authority. However, the AUMF is too broad in that it does not specifically 
name nations or groups—it gives this power, indeed, responsibility to the president—
thereby, eroding Congress’s power to declare war. When combined with exceptionally 
broad executive interpretations of an already expansive statute and judicial deference, 
constitutional checks and balances are effectively annulled. 
Although Congress hastily deemed the WPR sufficient to reign in executive 
power in applying the AUMF, the statute has proven ineffective at limiting the 
presidential use of military force abroad. The vague statutory phrasing of requirements 
imposed upon the executive branch does not provide much in the way of limiting the 
executive use of military force. Specifically, the statute does not address how the 
executive branch must “consult” with Congress, if possible, prior to the use of military 
force. The statute also does not describe what constitutes an imminent threat to the United 
States. Congress’s reliance on the WPR to provide a check on the executive branch’s use 
of force under the AUMF needs to be revised. 
The same AUMF attributes that transgress checks and balances threaten the 
preservation of due process rights. Due process rights have long been one of the first 
constitutional protections sacrificed in the name of security. While Congressman 
Abraham Lincoln took a stand against the executive branch’s excessive extension of war 
powers, Lincoln as president felt it necessary to rescind basic constitutional due process 
protections during the U.S. civil war to preserve security. He defended his decision to 
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Congress by asking whether when an insurrection had undermined the “whole of the laws 
. . . are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?”510 
Courts have held that the AUMF itself satisfies due process requirements by 
providing details adequate to put potential detainees on notice. Nonetheless, the secrecy 
with which the executive branch has classified which groups qualify as associated forces 
runs contrary to the due process protections the constitutional framers aimed to preserve. 
Such secrecy fails to adhere to the due process principle requiring fair notice since the 
executive branch refuses to pinpoint exactly which groups qualify as the enemy in this 
armed conflict.511 
Also troubling are relaxed evidentiary standards applied to the designation, 
detention, and targeting of enemy combatants—including U.S. citizens—during war. 
Some courts have even invoked a “walks like a duck test” to determine whether 
individuals challenging their detention under the AUMF are more likely than not a 
member of AQ or the Taliban. Thus, the AUMF in and of itself is legal, but broad 
interpretations of its scope, combined with its lack of notice about those targeted, as well 
as the low evidentiary standards applied to the executive branch’s justification of actions 
that result in the deprivation of liberty, ultimately degrade constitutional protections of 
due process. 
While the AUMF, 9/11 nexus, and WPR implications seemingly preserved the 
constitutional balance of powers and due process, broad application and interpretation 
since passage of the AUMF have eroded these constitutional principles. When the AUMF 
was passed, only Representative Barbara Lee voted against it, warning, “[a]s we act, we 
must not become the evil we deplore.”512 Her reasoning needs to be revisited, as the 
510 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (San Jose, CA: 
Simon & Schuster, 2006), 355. 
511 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 142. 
512 John Knefel, “A Baffling Hearing on Endless War,” Rolling Stone, May 21, 2014, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/a-baffling-hearing-on-endless-war-20140521. 
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continued application of the AUMF to emerging terrorist threats is not legally sound. 
Consequently, the AUMF does not satisfy the domestic legality criterion.  
b. Security 
In evaluating the AUMF and its effects on security, it is worth mentioning again 
that the AUMF has proven effective in degrading the capabilities of AQ and the Afghan 
Taliban. It also bears repeating that core AQ may still pose a threat to the United States, 
although the group’s capabilities are questionable. In addition, the court’s broad AUMF 
interpretations support its applicability to the primary AQ affiliate that threatens the U.S. 
homeland: AQAP.513 The AUMF provides the president with broad and flexible authority 
to mitigate threats from these groups. If Congress repeals or sunsets the AUMF, the 
president’s authority to conduct sustained operations against them would cease.  
Despite the AUMF’s effectiveness at countering these groups, dire concerns have 
been raised about the AUMF, which have been covered in this thesis thus far. As Michael 
B. Mukasey testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 21, 2014, 
“Events since September 11, 2001, including success of two administrations in 
combating both al Qaeda and the Taliban, have made the AUMF not only obsolete, but 
dangerously so; future events—including the current administration’s decision to cease 
the war in Afghanistan by mid-December 2014—threaten to make it even more 
irrelevant.”514 Core AQ’s relocation to Pakistan has left the continuing use of force 
against the Afghan Taliban under AUMF authority in doubt.515 
The AUMF is quickly becoming obsolete because of its explicit nexus to the 9/11 
attacks 13 years ago. The decentralization of AQ has resulted in the proliferation of 
terrorist groups that did not exist on 9/11 but may threaten the United States today, and 
the AUMF’s coverage of such groups is wearing thin. Mukasey articulated this concept 
well, noting that it has become “increasingly difficult to identify [groups] with any 
513 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 2.  
514 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan (testimony of Michael B. 
Mukasev, former Attorney General of the United States).  
515 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 3. 
 125 
                                                 
certainty as ‘affiliates’ or ‘supporters’ of al Qaeda, and we find ourselves going through 
increasingly fanciful contortions in order to fit them within the definitions of the AUMF 
so as to permit action to be taken against them.”516 Even entities affiliated with AQ may 
nonetheless operate with a substantial degree of independence.517 
Efforts to link groups to AQ aside, Congress must consider another question 
crucial to security - how does the executive factor risk and probability into its analysis of 
which groups it can target under the AUMF? This analysis impacts the U.S. 
government’s ability to narrowly tailor counterterrorism measures to mitigate terrorist 
threats to the United States. Considering Congress delegated the responsibility to the 
executive branch to authorize force against specific groups within AUMF parameters, it 
would benefit Congress to know how this designation occurs as it reevaluates the AUMF. 
The executive branch refuses to specify what constitutes an imminent threat. Currently, it 
will not disclose what groups it has determined constitute AQ associated forces, much 
less the reasoning supporting these decisions. As such, the extent to which the executive 
branch weighs both the intent and the capability of potential threats is unclear.  
While this broad designation of authority is beneficial in that it provides the 
executive branch with agility in decision-making, the actual threat analysis utilized by the 
executive branch may affect U.S. security. For instance, if the executive branch is 
utilizing military force against groups that it has determined pose a threat to the interests 
of U.S. allies, and the group is not capable of threatening U.S. interests or the U.S. 
homeland, U.S. counterterrorism measures may breed resentment and instability and little 
to no decipherable security benefit. If the executive branch is only targeting groups under 
the AUMF that intend to attack the U.S. homeland and have the capability to do so, the 
executive branch has a better argument that it is narrowly tailoring its security measures, 
and as a result, passes legal muster. While acknowledging that valid security concerns 
indeed exist with releasing too much threat information, the fact that the AUMF does not 
have a mechanism for ensuring some modicum of transparency in this process may 
ultimately hinder security efforts. 
516 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan. 
517 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 4. 
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Despite uncertainty regarding how the executive branch decides whether to use 
military force against certain groups under the AUMF, it is clear that the president 
currently relies on AUMF authority for counterterrorism operations. As already 
described, repealing or amending the AUMF will adversely affect the executive branch’s 
domestic authority to continue using certain counterterrorism measures. Specifically, 
detention of enemy combatants and targeted killings under the AUMF would have to 
cease. 
Recent events in Iraq also factor into the application of the security criterion. On 
May 21, 2014, Obama administration officials publicly acknowledged that the 2002 
Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq (AUMF of 2002) is obsolete and 
supported its repeal.518 The AUMF of 2002 provided domestic legal support for 
American operations in Iraq, which commenced in early 2003.519 U.S. troops completed 
their withdrawal from the country in late 2011.520 On June 10, 2014, fighters from ISIL 
seized Mosul.521 The security situation in the country has continued to devolve. President 
Obama responded by ordering military forces to strike ISIL targets in Iraq. Such events 
may ultimately discourage AUMF repeal or revision, at least in the near term, because of 
the risk that security could further disintegrate. 
The president’s use of airstrikes in Iraq against ISIL has again brought checks and 
balances and security to the forefront of discussion. Constitutional law experts have 
debated whether the president is authorizing military force in Iraq under the AUMF of 
2002, under his Article II powers, or under other authority.522 Regardless, the AUMF 
against the perpetrators of 9/11 does not authorize force against ISIL because AQ severed 
ties with the former affiliate. While the AUMF of 2002 remains on the books, members 
518 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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of Congress have argued that President Obama must obtain new congressional 
authorization for the current Iraq air strikes.523 While some members of Congress have 
demonstrated an interest in proposing legislation to authorize continuing operations 
against ISIL,524 others have expressed a reluctance to get involved.525 
To summarize, the AUMF has increased U.S. security by enabling the executive 
branch to degrade AQ, the Taliban, and associated forces. The broad authority provided 
in the AUMF, the flexibility it affords the executive branch, and the broad application of 
the statute to groups like core AQ, and arguably, AQAP make continued AUMF 
application a viable option under this criterion. However, the AUMF’s language does not 
apply to ISIL, and its application to groups that did not exist on 9/11 is questionable and 
erodes checks and balances by effectively permitting the executive branch to identify 
targeted groups within very broad, questionable AUMF parameters. Although the AUMF 
has proven effective at promoting U.S. security in the past, it no longer satisfies the 
security criterion.  
c. International Legality 
Chapter IV has already discussed the general issue of international law 
considerations as applied to the current AUMF; this section, which applies international 
legality to the course of action that would maintain the AUMF as it is, obviously covers 
similar ground. Although the two discussions greatly overlap, it is worth recasting it in a 
different light in the spirit of forecasting and assessment.  
As detailed earlier, the Bush and Obama administrations have invoked self-
defense authorities under international law, along with the AUMF, to support 
counterterrorism measures abroad aimed at protecting interests of the United States and 
its allies. Unfortunately, the executive branch’s presumptive public statements declaring 
523 Niels Lesniewski, “Tim Kaine: Obama Needs Congress to OK Iraq Air Strikes,” Iraq News, 
August 12, 2014, http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/obama-congress-air-strikes-iraq-kaine/?dcz=. 
524 Brett Logiurato, “Key Democratic Senator Wants Obama to Bomb ISIS in Syria after Journalist’s 
Brutal Killing,” Business Insider, September 2, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-nelson-isis-
legislation-syria-airstrikes-obama-2014-9. 
525 Jake Sherman and John Bresnahan, “Hill Leaders Duck ISIL,” Politico, September 8, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/congress-isil-110727.html. 
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that these measures fall within an international legal right to self-defense under Article 51 
of the UN Charter are flawed. Preemptive U.S. actions conducted outside of the area of 
active hostilities under AUMF authority conflict with the norm of non-intervention. In 
addition, the U.S.’s categorization of an armed conflict abroad as internal, presumably to 
avoid the broader humanitarian law protections otherwise afforded when categorized as 
“international armed conflicts,” is incongruent with its self-defense assertions and could 
ultimately hinder the development of contemporary international law in this arena. While 
the United States faces an uphill battle in preserving its interests while adhering to 
international obligations, it is crucial that the United States develop policy in accordance 
with the general norms of non-intervention, respect for state sovereignty whenever 
possible, and the preservation of the highest humanitarian standards. 
The language of Article 51 permits self-defense only in the event of an armed 
attack by one state against another state. As such, counterterrorism measures against 
states that have not conducted an armed attack on the United States are not permitted 
under a technical reading of Article 51. A narrow interpretation of the right to self-
defense would preclude AUMF counterterrorism measures against many groups linked to 
AQ that have not directly attacked the U.S. homeland and whose actions are not 
imputable to a state actor. Seen in this light, international law has yet to evolve to address 
contemporary armed conflict. 
Congress should afford a more moderate interpretation of international law to 
U.S. policy. As Geoffrey S. Corn and Eric Talbot Jenson argue in “Untying the Gordian 
Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on 
Terror,”  
If . . . the ultimate purpose of the drafters of the Geneva Conventions was 
to prevent ‘law avoidance’ by developing de facto law triggers—a purpose 
consistent with the humanitarian foundation of the treaties—then the 
myopic focus on the geographic nature of an armed conflict in the context 
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of transnational counterterrorist combat operations serves to frustrate that 
purpose.526 
The fundamental norms of international law should be respected, but lawmakers 
may also utilize shifts in the international legal landscape since 9/11 to best preserve U.S. 
security through an approach acceptable to the international community. This approach is 
now possible because international institutions, such as the UN, adjusted their narrow 
reading of Article 51 after the 9/11 attacks, as evidenced by their endorsement of the 
U.S.’ use of force against the non-state actors who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks and those 
who harbored them. 
Central to this shift—and to the conflict between U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
under the AUMF and international law—is the idea that a state can deploy force abroad 
to prevent imminent attack from a non-state actor. Specifically at issue is the definition of 
an “imminent threat,” one that might justify self-defense and the resulting violation of 
another state’s sovereignty under international law. Dominant interpretations of this right 
agree that peril must be grave and immediate, leaving the state no chance for deliberation 
before defending itself.527 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy assumes a broader interpretation of what 
constitutes an imminent threat, and this definition results in uncertainty regarding 
whether the U.S. government’s response to threats are necessary and proportional to the 
dangers presented by terrorists. According to the U.S. DOJ, clear evidence that a specific 
attack will occur in the immediate future is not required to invoke the international right 
of self-defense.528 Instead, a group’s continual plotting of attacks against the U.S. 
homeland, U.S. allies, or their interests justifies actions taken under the AUMF. The 
Obama administration continues to rely on this reasoning to conduct operations outside 
areas of active hostilities. For instance, the U.S. military takes such actions under AUMF 
526 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 5, quoting Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, 
“Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on 
Terror,” Temple Law Review 81 (2008): 799.  
527 Resolution 42/159, “Measures to Prevent International Terrorism”; Caroline Incident; “A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” 
528 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 6–7. 
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authority in Yemen and Somalia. It is unclear, however, how such operations protect the 
United States from a grave, instant, and overwhelming peril, as required by international 
law. Granted these targets may threaten U.S. interests, but open source information fails 
to substantiate that these threats are imminent enough to flout the norm of non-
intervention under international law, and it does not demonstrate that the U.S. response is 
really necessary and proportional to the threat posed.  
Disagreement has also occurred in the international realm regarding how to apply 
the laws of war to terrorist actors. As described in Chapter IV, armed conflict with 
terrorist groups does not fit nicely into Geneva Convention categorizations of 
international and internal armed conflict. The classification of AUMF counterterrorism 
efforts as international versus internal is important because it affects legal 
responsibilities. The protections afforded to qualified combatants captured in internal 
conflicts are lower than those detained in international conflicts.  
The United States categorizes its conflict with AQ, the Taliban, and associated 
forces as an internal armed conflict because it is not a “clash between nations.”529 The 
United States cites the AUMF’s lack of geographic limitations to support this claim.530 
This enables the United States to afford detainees only those protections applied in 
internal armed conflicts. In addition, the U.S. government argues that because this 
conflict is not an international armed conflict, it may conduct operations outside of areas 
of active hostilities.531 
This perspective on international law affords the U.S. government a great deal of 
discretion in conducting counterterrorism operations under the AUMF, but it also, in 
effect, negates international legal norms related to non-intervention and protection of 
state sovereignty. In addition, it has led many international human rights groups to 
criticize the lower detainee protections afforded in this armed conflict under the AUMF. 
As Zeke Johnson, the director of Amnesty International’s security and human rights 
529 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006). 
530 U.S. DOJ, “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation,” 3. 
531 Ibid. 
 131 
                                                 
program asserted, the AUMF is a “[c]entral pillar of the U.S. government’s 
fundamentally flawed ‘global war’ theory that weakens humans rights protections for all 
of us.” He further explains, “Armed groups should be countered through the criminal 
justice system in compliance with human right standards.”532 While countering armed 
groups through the criminal justice system may not always be feasible in the context of 
armed conflict, every effort should be made to preserve such a system to provide 
legitimacy and reduce resentment. Adherence to international norms may impact 
international support for U.S. counterterrorism policy, as well as support from U.S. allies.  
In sum, the United States is in a tough spot because international law does not 
adequately address how states may mitigate terrorist threats from non-state actors. 
Consequently, it is justified in utilizing a moderate reading of international law to protect 
its security. However, the Bush and Obama administrations’ overbroad interpretations of 
what constitutes an imminent threat results in violations of the international norm of non-
intervention. While the AUMF’s initial passage and utilization met international legality 
standards, keeping the AUMF will continue to strain its application’s tenuous harmony 
with international law. As such, the AUMF does not satisfy the international legality 
criterion.  
d. Precedent 
The AUMF has had a precedent-setting influence in the realm of the versatile use 
of force, government transparency, and opportunity for statutory reassessment of the 
policy. The most troubling precedent setting concerns that have arisen, and are likely to 
proliferate in both current AUMF application and possible continued application, concern 
the latter two considerations.  
The AUMF has afforded the executive branch expansive discretion and flexibility 
regarding the use of force for counterterrorist threats anywhere in the globe. The lack of 
geographic and temporal limitations in the authorization ensures that the president has the 
authority needed to be agile in where and how it postures military assets. In addition, the 
AUMF arguably permits the use of different types of force, as demonstrated in the U.S. 
532 Knefel, “A Baffling Hearing on Endless War.”  
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government’s transition from use of maximum force to more counterinsurgency-based 
operations in Afghanistan. However, how AUMF application translates to addressing a 
broad spectrum of conflict is questionable.  
It may be argued that by authorizing the president’s use of military force to 
counter terrorist threats, the president will opt to utilize maximum military force 
exclusively. Moreover, such force may not be the most effective in contemporary 
conflicts where enemies may hide amongst civilians. The AUMF’s lack of temporal 
boundaries has also enabled the use of military force in other countries for extended 
engagements. As Gates observed, in this conflict “[w]e cannot kill or capture our way to 
victory.”533 
In sum, the AUMF does afford the executive branch with a great deal of 
flexibility and discretion in employing varying degrees of force abroad. However, the 
statutory authorization for military force and its lack of an end date promote the sustained 
use of maximum military force in other countries, while this approach may not be the 
most advantageous to countering terrorist targets. Continued application of the AUMF 
will continue to allow this broad discretion, and possibly pave the way for even greater 
use and abuse of force powers.  
As an extension of the analysis of precedence on this option, some revision to the 
status quo is urged to head off the direst pitfalls of continued utilization of the AUMF. 
First, Congress should consider denoting a termination date for the AUMF, and second, it 
must refine statutory authority for the use of a law enforcement mechanism abroad for 
future terrorist conflicts. These addenda will aid the U.S. government by allowing it to 
adjust to asymmetrical terrorist warfare, all the while promoting adherence to the 
proportionality and necessity requirements of international law. 
Congress’s failure to include an end date in the AUMF has effectively abrogated 
opportunities for reassessment. Thus, it is 13 years later, and Congress has still not 
amended the AUMF. The lack of reassessment impedes accountability in ensuring that 
533 Hughs, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies, 121. 
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the policy underlying the AUMF is still sound. The lack of an AUMF sunset permits the 
self-perpetuation of policy that may be informed by groupthink and fear, rather than 
logic. The decision to go to war is arguably one of the most important a country can 
make, and its continued decision to stay at war should be treated as just as important.  
Continuing the status quo also exacerbates issues of transparency. Currently, the 
public cannot even debate the versatile use of force if the executive branch refuses to 
disclose the groups with which the nation is at war. Most disconcerting is the secrecy 
regarding which terrorist groups the executive branch classifies as “associated forces.”534 
The public should be afforded the opportunity to debate the groups against which the 
U.S. military uses lethal force.535 Recently, Obama administration attorneys refused even 
to discuss what groups they currently deem covered by AUMF authority.536 
In addition, the executive branch has refused to provide numerous other details 
regarding its operations abroad under the AUMF. For instance, the legal reasoning 
supporting the targeted killings of U.S. citizens abroad was only released after it was 
leaked to the media, and the administration provided its full justification only after a rare 
court order to do so. As the AUMF provides such broad authority to the executive branch 
to make wartime decisions, courts have been reluctant to force the executive branch to 
disclose information. This judicial deference is especially concerning when it effectively 
permits the executive branch to shroud evidence supporting preventive detention in 
secrecy from those challenging their detentions. This lack of government transparency 
threatens the preservation of constitutional principles, including those preserving checks 
and balances and due process rights. 
While the AUMF permits flexibility in the versatile use of force, it fails to set 
positive precedent in the areas of government transparency and accountability. As such, it 
does not satisfy the precedent criterion. 
534 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 142. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Knefel, “A Baffling Hearing on Endless War.”  
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e. Conclusion 
Batting 0 for 4, the AUMF does not satisfy any of the criteria set forth in this 
thesis. The AUMF should no longer serve as the principal authority supporting 
counterterrorism measures because it does not narrowly tailor force authorization to a 
threat in a manner that preserves constitutional principles. Gideon Welles, Secretary of 
the Navy during Lincoln’s presidency, understood the complex balancing of powers 
between faithful execution of the constitution and security. His commentary on another 
armed conflict that defied traditional norms of warfare at the time—the U.S. Civil War —
seems particularly relevant to the situation at hand, “government will, doubtless, be 
stronger after the conflict is over than it ever has been, and there will be less liberty.”537 
In addition, the AUMF stretches the boundaries of international law in a way that 
will likely result in lost credibility amongst the international community and a lost 
opportunity to shape international law that to date is unclear. Finally, although the law 
may permit the use of versatile force, it sets negative precedent when it comes to 
accountability and the transparent use of force. As such, Congress should work towards 
repealing the AUMF, and it should modify its provisions in the meantime in the manner 
mentioned above. 
B. THE GENERAL CRITERIA PLUS LISTING APPROACH—
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
1. Description 
The leading alternative approach—the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach—
was crafted by Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew C. Waxman, and Benjamin 
Wittes of Stanford’s Hoover Institution. It is outlined in a national security and law essay 
titled “A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats.”538 In this 
approach, Congress provides statutory criteria for the executive use of force against 
537 Goodwin, Team of Rivals, 355. 
538 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework.” 
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terrorist threats.539 The executive branch must then identify groups covered by that force 
authorization through a robust administrative process.540 Proponents suggest modifying 
the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation process for this 
purpose. This process entails the Secretary of State consulting with other departments and 
notifying Congress prior to designating groups as terrorist organizations.541 This 
designation results in certain statutory repercussions for these groups.542 
In essence, this approach will serve as an AUMF expansion aimed at providing 
the executive branch with the means to address emerging terrorist threats—threats that 
the AUMF arguably does not cover. Proponents of this approach argue that it limits the 
current overbroad executive power while preserving the flexibility for the president to 
mitigate evolving threats.543 They also argue that this system promotes transparency by 
standardizing a process through which force is authorized against terrorist groups and 
their members.544 
2. Analysis 
a. Domestic Legality  
The General Criteria Plus Listing Approach presents significant checks and 
balances and due process challenges. Congress’s delegation of authority to the president 
to identify and authorize military force will erode congressional power to declare war all 
the while expanding executive war powers. It also may appear to place the United States 
on a permanent war footing and diminish the potential for continued congressional 
involvement in force authorizations after it develops the listing criteria. Nonetheless, it 
does preserve Congress’s role to some degree because of the control it would have over 
the crafting of statutory criteria. 
539 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 10. 
540 Ibid.  
541 Ibid.  
542 Ibid.  
543 Ibid.  
544 Ibid.  
 136 
                                                 
This approach diminishes checks and balances by essentially delegating the 
congressional power to declare war on non-state actors to the executive branch. 
Proponents counter this point by arguing that Congress often affords the president great 
discretion in deciding against whom to use force.545 This point is well taken, as the 
AUMF effectively does allow this discretion. However, the fact that Congress has a 
history of providing the executive branch with such discretion does not mean it should 
continue to do so. They further articulate that Congress reserves its authority by 
specifying the criteria for the use of force, as well as the administrative reporting and 
temporal limitations on the listing process.546 They argue that this process “best cabins 
presidential power while at the same time giving the president the flexibility he needs to 
address emerging threats.”547 
To delegate future force authorizations to the executive branch via statute—as 
opposed to affording the executive branch discretion within an authorization issued by 
Congress—negates the separation of war powers in the U.S. Constitution.548 In essence, 
this delegation of authority to the president bypasses Congress’s constitutional power to 
declare war. As critiques Daskal and Vladeck explain, the Founding Fathers understood 
that military force authorization should not be “an ex ante delegation to the President to 
make unreviewable decisions to go to war a some future date against some as-yet-
unidentified entity . . . The proposal to delegate such force authorizations to the President 
threatens the carefully calibrated balance of powers enmeshed within the Constitution, 
essentially asking Congress to surrender one of its most important functions to the 
Executive.”549 
The statutory criteria in this approach would need to preserve checks and balances 
specifically, as well as due process protections. Such specificity can mitigate the risk of 
545 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 10. 
546 Ibid., 10–11.  
547 Ibid., 10.  
548 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 138. 
549 Ibid. 
 137 
                                                 
the executive branch acting counter to congressional intent. It also may provide notice to 
potential targets for due process purposes.  
The proponents of this approach provide an example of such specificity, asserting 
that Congress might “authorize force against ‘an organization with sufficient capability 
and planning that it presents an imminent threat to the United States.’”550 Utilizing such 
language would help Congress retain some control over the definitions used by the 
executive branch in authorizing military force against terrorist groups. However, this 
approach would likely suffer from a shortcoming already discussed in relation to the 
AUMF; the executive branch will likely assert broad interpretations of what constitutes 
an imminent threat, and an extension of executive authority may result. In addition, this 
sort of vague language may not provide adequate notice for due process purposes. 
This approach is especially concerning because of the deference courts will be 
obligated to afford to the executive branch and the due process concerns raised. Since this 
approach involves a broad Congressional delegation of authority to the president, the 
president’s war powers will be at their peak. Thus, if the President’s actions are 
challenged in court, the President will be able to justify them using both Congressional 
and executive war powers. As shown through litigation pertinent to AUMF challenges, 
courts will strongly defer, or even refuse to review, executive action in such 
circumstances. This deference will extend to executive action depriving enemy 
combatants of liberty and due process of the law. Courts will hesitate to question the 
decisions of the Commander in Chief making security decisions in a time of war under 
congressional authorization.  
Not only will this approach result in Congress delegating its war powers to the 
executive branch to authorize military force, but the executive branch’s actions will be 
virtually incontestable. When combined with the erosion of evidentiary due process 
standards and judicial deference to the executive in times of war, this delegation of 
authority is especially troubling. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall argued, 
“grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem 
550 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 11. 
 138 
                                                 
too extravagant to endure.”551 The proponents of this approach claim that the executive 
branch needs to be able to respond quickly to emerging terrorist threats, and that waiting 
for Congress to issue a force authorization may undermine security. However, 
mechanisms for dealing with urgency are built into the constitution; namely, the 
president’s Article II defense authority. When such a situation arises, urgency should be 
addressed within the current structure of this nation’s constitution, not by risking due 
process and the preservation of checks and balances. The General Criteria Plus Listing 
Approach does not do so, and therefore, it does not satisfy the domestic legality criterion. 
b. Security 
Proponents of this approach argue that it provides the president with the most 
flexibility to mitigate terrorist threats.552 Congressional delegation of authority to the 
executive branch to determine what threats justify the use of military force would likely 
improve the president’s agility in responding to threats. The executive branch—the 
branch most privy to threat information—could act swiftly and likely with minimal 
oversight in authorizing such force. While the president already maintains the authority to 
use force in self-defense, this approach would allow the executive branch to conduct 
sustained operations against terrorist groups without seeking congressional approval.  
On the other hand, if Congress issues another force authorization—especially an 
open-ended one—counterterrorism could be undermined in several ways. First, excessive 
reliance on military force and targeted killings can increase resentment towards the 
United States.553 In a world in which terrorist group members blend with the civilian 
population, in which not every member can be killed, in which groups have proven 
resilient in the face of decapitation strategies, this resentment against the United States 
can ultimately undermine U.S. security. Terrorist groups capitalize on resentment to 
bolster recruitment efforts and foster goodwill amongst civilian populations. In addition, 
unwarranted dependence on military force can further destabilize fragile governments 
551 Goodwin, Goodwin, Team of Rivals, 355. 
552 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 10. 
553 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 140. 
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and foster international criticism, and both may ultimately result in decreased 
international cooperation.554 
Nonetheless, due to the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach’s preservation of 
presidential powers and flexibility to mitigate threats, this approach satisfies the security 
criterion. 
c. International Legality 
The proponents of this approach rightly assert that a new congressional force 
authorization articulating the “U.S. view of international law” could contribute to the 
development of customary international law.555 It is unclear exactly how this proposal 
will be perceived from an international law standpoint because the precise parameters for 
the utilization of force by the executive have not been set forth. It is likely, however, that 
this designation of authority to the executive branch would result in increased use of 
force abroad due to the minimal congressional involvement in the force approval process, 
and this use of force may violate the international legal norm of non-intervention by 
overextending a preemptive approach to threat mitigation.  
In actuality, it seems this approach is concerned with mitigating threats before 
they reach a level at which the president would need to defend the country from an 
imminent attack, which implicates preemptive use of force issues. The argument that the 
president’s Article II authority is insufficient to preserve U.S. security and that this 
authorization is needed to protect the country does not bode well for its international 
legality. U.S. and international law already contain provisions for the use of force in self-
defense, so it seems the only reason this delegation of authority would be needed is for 
sustained operations against threats. Thus, it seems this approach will likely run afoul of 
the international norm of nonintervention, the requirements preserving necessity, and 
depending on the precise implementation of the particular operation, proportionality in 
armed responses.  
554 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 140. 
555 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 7. 
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As evidenced in the AUMF analysis, just because the executive branch labels 
something as international law compliant does not make it so. The U.S. government’s 
perception of international law, as corroborated through interpretations of the AUMF, is 
problematic. Consequently, Congress’s delegation of authority would have to mirror the 
international use of force rules closely to be accepted by the international community. 
Considering the international community has failed to address how to handle terrorist 
threats adequately in a way that satisfies most nations, if the United States proposes a 
balanced approach that respects international law yet alters it to address terrorist threats 
in a well-reasoned and rational way, it could help shape international law for the better. 
If, however, it continues to stretch international law, especially regarding the preemptive 
use of force, its legitimacy may suffer. 
Proponents of this approach acknowledge that the U.S. government’s 
interpretations of international law relevant to self-defense and the laws of war are 
broader than the interpretations of other countries, including this nation’s allies. To 
mitigate the negative reception to U.S. armed actions under this approach, international 
legal authorities must be adhered to and presidential power constrained. As proponents 
argue, “[f]rom a diplomatic and international legal-policy standpoint it is important that 
the United States government as a whole make clear that this is not an open-ended 
“global war on terror” but a cabined application of traditional self-defense to the new 
realities of non-state threats.”556 The General Criteria Plus Listing Approach’s 
satisfaction of the international legality criterion is unclear because the approach does not 
include a specific force authorization proposal, nor has a robust administrative process 
for designating targeted groups been established. However, due to the preemptive use of 
force concerns inherent in this approach, it is doubtful that it satisfies the international 
legality criterion. 
d. Precedent 
This approach provides the executive branch with the flexibility to order 
counterterrorism operations, but it may discourage the use of minimum force, or law 
556 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 11. 
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enforcement. Although the creators of this approach do not assert that all terrorist threats 
should be mitigated using military force, their proposed designation of force 
authorization authority may make it easier for the executive branch to authorize and use 
military force quickly. Since 9/11, this concern has been historically justified. Indeed, this 
seems to be the point. If the executive branch is afforded this authority, the president will 
likely take advantage of it.  
Proponents argue that the approach will render the process by which the executive 
branch authorizes force against terrorist organizations more transparent and 
standardized.557 It could be the case, if Congress adopts the robust consultive procedures 
proposed.558 For instance, proponents argue in favor of reporting and auditing procedures 
with which the president has to provide detailed information to Congress to justify why 
groups have been included on the force authorization list.559 
The General Criteria Plus Listing Approach is also critiqued for its potential to 
codify an everlasting war by creating a self-perpetuating use of force with minimal 
opportunities for reassessment. Proponents assert that this is not the case because 
Congress can, and should place specific limitations on the executive branch. It also 
proposes a review and renewal process to avoid the immense political incentive not to de-
list groups.560 If Congress were to craft very specific statutory criteria, this proposal 
might set positive precedent in the areas of transparency and accountability. 
Consequently, it satisfies the precedent criterion. 
e. Conclusion 
The General Criteria Plus Listing Approach satisfies the security and precedent 
criteria, but it fails to adequately address concerns central to the domestic and 
international legality criteria. As such, Congress should not adopt the open-ended listing 
approach. If it does, Congress must be very specific in crafting language that delegates 
557 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 10.  
558 Ibid., 11.  
559 Ibid.  
560 Ibid., 12.  
 142 
                                                 
authority to the executive branch, and it must maintain strict temporal limits on this 
authorization. While the AUMF should be modified or repealed, it should not be replaced 
with congressional authorization permitting the executive branch to alone determine the 
groups against which the nation will obligate U.S. force. When Congress provides the 
president with force authorization, the president’s war powers are at their greatest; courts 
show great deference to the president’s actions and refrain from becoming involved in 
analyzing military matters. Therefore, the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach would 
not only impinge on constitutional checks and balances by providing the executive 
branch with congressional powers essentially to declare war against specific groups, but 
it would provide the president with expansive authority, virtually unassailable in court.  
C. THE ARTICLE II APPROACH—LEANING ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
1. Description 
Jennifer Daskal and Stephen I. Vladeck of American University Washington 
College of Law have proposed another alternative (Article II Approach). Their refinement 
of this approach can be found in several articles. The most recent article was published in 
2014 in Harvard’s National Security Journal and is titled “After the AUMF.”561 
The Article II Approach calls upon Congress to reject an open-ended war by 
repealing or sunsetting the AUMF.562 Proponents argue that law enforcement should be 
utilized as the primary tool to mitigate terrorist threats. In the event that civilian law 
enforcement tools prove ill suited to accomplish this task, the president can take 
immediate military action to defend the country under Article II.563 If a terrorist 
organization poses a significant and sustained threat to the U.S. homeland or persons, 
then Congress should utilize its war powers to craft a narrow and specific force 
authorization.564 In their more recent articles, they recommend that Congress consider 
three options: a more transparent AUMF, an Afghanistan-based AUMF sunset, or 
561 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF.” 
562 Daskal and Vladeck. “Don’t Expand.” 
563 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 136. 
564 Ibid., 138. 
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repealing the current AUMF and replacing it with an AQAP specific force 
authorization.565 
Daskal and Vladeck base this approach on the premise that war should be finite, 
and it should be used only as a last resort.566 They use a fundamental premise Jeh 
Johnson set forth in late 2012, in which “Peace must be regarded as the norm toward 
which the human race continually strives.”567 Given this premise, they argue that a new 
statute replacing the AUMF is unnecessary and counterproductive because it will 
perpetuate a permanent wartime footing.  
2. Analysis 
a. Domestic Legality 
This approach is the most legally justifiable because it preserves constitutional 
checks and balances, and it relies on law enforcement for operations, a realm in which 
due process of law protections are enforced by institutional mechanisms. In contrast to 
the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach, Article II Approach supporters argue that law 
enforcement techniques and intelligence gathering mechanisms have improved over the 
past decade and should be utilized as the first line of defense against terrorist threats.568 
This approach does not restrict the use of military force because the president can utilize 
force in self-defense under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, without Congressional 
approval, if other means will not stop an attack.569 
If the executive seeks a force authorization, then the burden must be on the 
executive to demonstrate that these current authorities are inadequate.570 Congress should 
only grant such authority after extensive debate and careful calibration to ensure that the 
565 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 141–45. 
566 Ibid., 118; Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF Draft,” 3.  
567 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 118. 
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authorization is narrowly tailored to an identifiable terrorist organization.571 Proponents 
for this approach argue that until the political branches publicly identify a group that 
poses a threat that requires military force to quell, “[t]he many other counterterrorism 
tools at the government’s disposal—including law enforcement, intelligence-gathering, 
capacity-building, and, when necessary, self-defense capabilities—provide a much more 
strategically sound (and legally justifiable) means of addressing the terrorist threat.”572 
Though this approach is the most legally sound concept because it seeks a basic 
application and preservation of constitutional frameworks, the Bush administration’s 
expansive interpretations of Article II authorities, which were recently echoed by Obama 
administration officials, calls into question whether this approach will best preserve the 
separation of war powers between Congress and the executive branch. Daskal and 
Vladeck make a crucial statement in After the AUMF: 
Nor do we think, as the Hoover proposal authors suggest, that this 
approach merely will result in an expansive view of self-defense that itself 
provides an outlet for the inevitable uses of force that would be 
legitimized through a new authorization. [citation omitted] Rather, we 
think that self-defense—properly defined [emphasis added]—provides a 
critical, and necessary, means of safeguarding the nation against those 
truly dangerous and imminent threats that cannot reasonably be dealt with 
using alternative means, without also authorizing the broad-scale use of 
force against all members of a threatening group or their close associates. 
[citation omitted]”573 
The key idea is that the use of properly defined self-defense authority is required 
for this proposal to, in practice, be the most legally sound. The problem is that this 
approach does not include adequate mechanisms to delineate self-defense authority. 
Proponents argue that should a response require extended force engagement, the 
president must obtain a statutory force authorization from Congress in accordance with 
the War Powers Resolution.574 Further, should such a situation arise, Congress should 
use its war powers to issue a force authorization narrowly tailored to the threat at hand. 
571 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 119. 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid., 131. 
574 Ibid., 137. 
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However, Congress relied on the WPR to provide a check on executive authority in 
executing the AUMF. It proved unsuccessful in limiting the expansion of executive 
action taken under the AUMF, and its dearth of definitions result in half-hearted 
compliance. 
The risk of expansive Article II interpretation affects analysis from the due 
process angle as well. Again, this proposal is ideal on paper when it comes to the 
protection of due process because it relies on the use of law enforcement mechanisms as 
the chief means to countering terrorist threats. Due process protections are already built 
into law enforcement and criminal justice mechanisms; the reliance on law enforcement 
will serve to protect due process rights much more effectively than reliance on military 
force. In practice, however, this approach could result in broad reliance on Article II 
authorities. The president may not be inclined to identify groups targeted publicly, which 
detracts from notice requirements. In addition, executive action under Article II 
authorities may include the use of lethal force to protect the country. Since this approach 
would not provide the executive branch with long-term detention authority (at least 
initially), it may inadvertently incentivize targeting killing over detention, a potential 
outcome that directly negates constitutional due process protections.575 Again, this is not 
due to the language on the face of the proposal. Rather, this is based on the potential 
repercussions that could occur if future administrations utilize interpretations of Article II 
authorities similar to those asserted by both the Bush and Obama administrations.576 
An important consideration, however, is that should the president take action 
under Article II authority, courts will be less likely to defer to the president’s decisions 
than if Congress issued a new force authorization, because, unlike the General Criteria 
Plus Listing Approach, the president’s powers will not be at their maximum. Without a 
575 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 6. 
576 Obama administration officials recently suggested that all U.S. counterterrorism measures abroad 
fall within the president’s authority to defend the country from an “imminent attack,” a phrase that remains 
nebulous. In a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on May 21, 2014, administration attorneys 
asserted that the president could utilize military force against imminent threats. While not news, several 
convoluted responses on the part of the administration’s attorneys were surprising. They minimized 
Congress’s role in the authorization of the use of military force. The attorneys refused to distinguish the 
difference between the president’s inherent self-defense authority under Article II and the actual AUMF. 
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new force authorization, the president will have to rely solely on Article II powers to 
justify actions, which will, in effect, provide more preservation of constitutional checks 
and balances because courts will be less likely to defer to executive action and more 
likely to review and critique it. In sum, more recourse to challenge executive action will 
arguably be available. 
However, a drawback to this approach does exist. Namely, the president’s actions 
have more legitimacy when based on both congressional authorization and Article II 
powers.577 The General Criteria Plus Listing Approach proponents argue:  
Article II actions leave the president without overt political support of 
Congress, which can later snipe at his decisions, or take actions to 
undermine them. We saw this happen, for example, in response to many of 
the Bush administration’s unilateral assertions of authority, and also to 
some degree in response to President Obama’s unilateral assertion of 
authority in Libya. This is a problem that grows with reliance on Article II 
over time.578 
This congressional feedback, however, is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it 
encourages the separation of powers and the preservation of war authority between 
political branches. The president is only supposed to use military force under Article II to 
protect the country from an imminent attack. If Congress does not think that the executive 
branch’s use of military force is authorized under Article II, and it does not deem a threat 
worthy of a force authorization, it should foster debate and inquiry. Congressional 
gridlock and shortcomings aside, legislators are under incredible pressure to preserve 
U.S. security. While this type of interaction may be cumbersome, it goes to the heart of 
preserving constitutional checks and balances, and it should be protected. The Article II 
approach goes a long way towards preserving these principles. Thus, it satisfies the 
domestic legality criterion. 
577 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 6. 
578 Ibid.  
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b. Security 
Proponents of this approach assert that law enforcement tools have proven 
effective in mitigating terrorist threats for several reasons. First, the U.S. DOJ has 
successfully prosecuted over 500 terrorists in the past 10 years in civilian courts, 
including several dozen apprehended abroad who were members of AQ or its 
affiliates.579 Second, these arrests and prosecutions within the context of a civilian 
criminal justice system have resulted in improved intelligence gathering because some 
defendants will cooperate with prosecutors in exchange for plea deals.580 In addition, 
proponents of this approach cite improvements to law enforcement since the 9/11 attacks 
that have improved its capability to deter terrorist threats. Namely, statutory reforms have 
improved the ability of law enforcement and intelligence officials to cooperate in efforts 
to prevent terrorism.581 
Critiques of this approach allege that law enforcement and intelligence tools do 
not provide the capacity needed to capture individuals or mitigate threats in some 
circumstances.582 In addition, these tools are insufficient for long-term operations to 
dismantle organizations.583 This insufficiency can lead to an increased risk of threats 
developing in areas in which local governments cannot or will not alleviate these threats 
themselves.584 
Further, critics assert that if a threat to the U.S. homeland or persons emerges that 
originates abroad, Congress will not be able to authorize force quickly enough to mitigate 
the threat.585 Proponents of the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach argue that 
“Congress probably cannot or will not, on a continuing basis, authorize force quickly or 
robustly enough to meet the threat, which is ever-morphing in terms of group identity and 
579 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 130. 
580 Ibid., 130–31. 
581 Ibid., 131. 
582 Chesney et al., “A National Security and Law Essay–A Statutory Framework,” 5. 
583 Ibid.  
584 Ibid.  
585 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 138. 
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in terms of geographic locale.”586 Considering the speed with which Congress passed the 
AUMF in 2001, this critique is untenable (athough Congress may avoid issuing 
authorizations for political reasons). Further, while Congress crafts an approach, the 
President may respond under Article II authority.587 In effect, the General Criteria Plus 
Listing Approach aims to mitigate new, emerging threats before they pose an imminent 
threat to the U.S. homeland or interests. Thus, the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach 
would likely not offer much added security when it comes to preventing imminent 
threats, but it would better enable the executive branch to preserve U.S. security by 
preempting those threats from developing to a point at which they would be considered 
imminent at all.  
The Article II approach has especially important implications in the realm of 
current counterterrorism measures. The repeal of the AUMF will remove domestic legal 
authority for detaining enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. It will also signal the 
cessation of hostilities. In other words, the authority to detain enemy combatants under 
international law will also end. Consequently, the U.S. government will need to release 
Guantanamo detainees, and some of these detainees may be ineligible for prosecution due 
to evidentiary issues or the scope of criminal laws at their time of capture.588 
The Obama administration certainly seems aware of this situation, considering the 
recent exchange of five Taliban detainees for the last American prisoner of war, Sgt. 
Bowe Bergdahl. President Obama explained, “This is what happens at the end of wars.” 
He continued, “That was true for George Washington; that was true for Abraham 
Lincoln; that was true for FDR; that’s been true of every combat situation—that at some 
point, you make sure that you try to get your folks back. And that’s the right thing to 
do.”589 Some disagreement may still exist, however, amongst the military and members 
of Congress as to whether the war is truly over. As Duke University professor and former 
586 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” citing Chesney et al., 10. 
587 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 138. 
588 Ibid., 143. 
589 Zachary A. Goldfarb and Juliet Eilperin, “Obama: ‘No Apologies’ for Bergdahl Release,” 
Washington Post, June 5, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-no-apologies-for-
bergdahl-release-deal/2014/06/05/a4c15fca-ec2a-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html. 
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National Security Council special advisor for the Bush administration explained, “The 
deal the president struck is a deal you strike when the war’s over.” He continued, “The 
military, they’re thinking about, ‘We’re still fighting this war.” For them the war’s very 
much still on, and the question of will we win or not is up for grabs.”590 Consequently, 
the implementation of the Article II approach will require careful consideration of a 
process for dealing with this loss of detention authority.  
The repeal of the AUMF will also remove domestic legal authority for operations 
against AQ, AQAP, the Taliban, and associated forces. Some may argue that a force 
authorization is still needed against these groups. The Article II Approach allows a new 
force authorization to be formed addressing AQAP, should the facts warrant. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. military’s authority for continued operations against these groups 
would cease upon the repeal of the AUMF. In addition, authority supporting the targeted 
killings of members of these groups would terminate. Consequently, this approach would 
terminate legal authority for a variety of counterterrorism measures. Thus, while this 
approach satisfies the security criterion, its support of security is not as strong as the 
General Criteria Plus Listing Approach. 
c. International Legality 
The international legality analysis for the Article II Approach is similar in nature 
to the domestic legality analysis in that the Article II Approach conforms to international 
law as proposed. However, concerns emerge with regard to how the approach is actually 
implemented by the executive branch. Specifically, the risk of the executive branch’s 
broad use of force under Article II could implicate both international legal norms of non-
intervention, and proportionality and necessity in threat response.  
The Article II Approach’s assertion that the president has the authority under 
Article 51 of the UN charter to utilize force consistent with necessity and proportionality 
requirements to defend the country in response to an armed attack comports with 
international law.591 However, the assertion that the president can utilize lethal force 
590 Goldfarb and Eilperin, “Obama. “ 
591 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 136–37. 
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against a terrorist organization “poised to carry out a lethal attack on the U.S. homeland 
or U.S. persons at some point in the near future . . .”592 is arguable. Like the other 
approaches, the definition of what constitutes an “imminent attack” in this situation is 
crucial to a determination of whether the president’s use of lethal force in another state’s 
territory is justified under international law. This approach does not promote the 
executive’s legal justification of action against imminent threats.  
Nonetheless, the Article II Approach’s regard for international law and 
fundamental tenant of avoiding armed conflict will prove more palatable from an 
international law perspective than both the status quo approach and the General Criteria 
Plus Listing Approach. Potential shortcomings in conforming to international law do not 
lie in the proposal itself, but in the potential for the executive branch’s overbroad reading 
of Article II and international self-defense authorities. Thus, the proposal itself satisfies 
the international legality criterion. 
d. Precedent 
The Article II Approach succeeds in preserving positive precedent in the areas of 
the versatile use of force, transparency, and accountability. In terms of the versatile use of 
force, the Article II Approach promotes the use of a minimum force through law 
enforcement that is lacking in other popular proposals. At the same time, the approach 
acknowledges that maximum military force may be necessary in certain circumstances.  
The Article II Approach also preserves transparency and accountability in 
decision making regarding this transition from reliance on law enforcement to military 
forces because it advocates that all such decisions be conducted by Congress and open to 
public debate. Such debate promotes accountability and the opportunity for reassessing 
lawmakers’ decisions. In addition, the proponents of this approach articulate that should a 
force authorization become necessary to mitigate threats from AQAP, such authorization 
must be narrowly tailored to meet the threat, which implies that such an authorization 
would have temporal limits that promote future congressional reassessment of the 
592 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 137. 
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authorization. As this approach promotes positive precedent in these three areas, it 
satisfies the precedent criterion. 
e. Conclusion 
This approach satisfies all the criteria, although its performance under the security 
criterion is weaker than the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach. The Article II 
Approach provides a solid alternative to the AUMF that effectively balances 
constitutional protections and security considerations. However, the strong protection of 
constitutional protections and respect for international law does result in some potential 
adverse affect on security, as the opportunity to preempt the emergence of terrorist threats 
abroad is not accounted for in this approach as it is in the General Criteria Plus Listing 
Approach. In addition, the primary weakness from domestic and international legality 
perspectives arises not from the approach itself, but from the potential for expansive 
executive interpretations of its authority under Article II. Contemplating these 
considerations, elements of the Article II Approach are utilized in the Tailored Approach 
that follows.  
D. THE TAILORED APPROACH  
1. Description  
The Tailored Approach provides a more comprehensive proposal for Congress. It 
is aimed at sustaining a force authorization paradigm that respects constitutional 
principles without sacrificing security. This proposal adapts several components of the 
approaches previously discussed. It also modifies recent recommendations made by 
Harold Hongju Koh, Yale Law School Sterling Professor of International Law, at a 
Senate hearing on May 21, 2014 and the Constitution Project, to which he has 
contributed.  
The Tailored Approach moves for the following alterations: 1) an AUMF sunset 
and interim modifications, 2) an overhaul of the WPR, and 3) a narrowly tailored force 
authorization(s), if necessary, against AQAP and ISIL. The approach also recommends 
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that Congress examine the potential gains—and drawbacks—of using non-military assets 
to counter terrorist threats.  
a. Riding into the Sunset 
Congress should amend the AUMF to include a sunset clause that coincides with 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, and it should ensure that the 2012 
NDAA provisions linking to AUMF authority are no longer operative after this sunset 
date. At its heart, the AUMF was a specific instrument created for attaining a specific, if 
difficult to define end. As such, several legal experts and members of Congress have 
advocated for the sunset or repeal of the AUMF.593 Adding a sunset clause to the AUMF 
is a crucial first step that Congress must take to regain its constitutional war powers, 
preserve democratic principles, and appropriately prioritize threats to U.S. security. A 
sunset would effectively end force authorization against AQ and associated forces, which 
should provide finality to the original mission of the AUMF. In addition, unlike a more 
abrupt repeal of the statute, a sunset date affords Congress the time to transition current 
operations instead of a going cold turkey approach, so to speak. During the interim, 
Congress must begin to shift, eliminate, or reconsider the use of military force, detention, 
and other counterterrorism measures currently supported by the AUMF. 
Prior to the AUMF’s sunset, Congress must make AUMF application more 
transparent by requiring the executive branch to disclose information regarding its past 
use of the AUMF. This approach has value, both in terms of transparency, and in terms of 
reestablishing balance in the public’s eye of working constitutional checks and balances. 
In addition, Congress should require the president to notify it when he subsequently 
invokes the AUMF. Example language for such a requirement can be found in the House 
resolution introduced by Congresswoman Barbara Lee on May 8, 2014.594 Finally, 
Congress should make AUMF application more transparent by requiring the president to 
disclose determinations regarding what groups qualify as “associated forces.” Daskal and 
593 “Text of H.R. 4608: War Authorization Review and Determination Act (Introduced Version),” 
GovTrack.us, May 8, 2014, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4608/text; Daskal and Vladeck, 
“After the AUMF,” 137. 
594 War Authorization Review and Determination Act, H.R. 4608, (May 8, 2014). 
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Vladeck provide details regarding this requirement in their Article II Approach, and it is 
worth repeating that such a practice is sound and responsible governance.  
With all this information, Congress will be better able to craft and implement 
transition procedures for counterterrorism operations currently supported by AUMF 
authority. In light of constitutional concerns regarding the associated forces designation, 
Congress should consider more specifically delineating which groups qualify as 
associated forces. The executive’s report will assist Congress in determining whether 
specific delineation of associated forces is advantageous for AUMF application, prior to 
its sunset.  
b. Renovation of the WPR 
The Tailored Approach differs most substantially from the other alternatives in its 
combination of force authorization options with amendments to the WPR. If the AUMF 
and its kin are meant for a specific end with an inherently understood expiration date, the 
WPR is the broader, more unyielding foundation applied to specific force authorizations. 
It is the author’s opinion that simply implementing an AUMF alternative focused solely 
on force authorization will fail to provide a sustained system that will set positive 
precedent and ensure the preservation of constitutional principles, security, and 
international law. As such, several sweeping WPR changes are recommended. 
This thesis recommends an approach to WPR overhaul similar to the one 
proposed by the Constitution Project595 in 2005, with modifications. This approach 
obligates the political branches to perform several actions: 1) the president must justify 
the use of force to Congress via an Attorney General opinion, threat assessment 
information, and estimates of anticipated costs, prior to initiating the use of force, 2) 
Congress must develop procedures for the expedited consideration of force 
authorizations, and 3) Congress should craft a requirement stating that force initiation can 
595 The Constitution Project is based at Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute, and it 
conducts bipartisan analysis and education on constitutional law and governance issues. It created the War 
Powers Initiative to examine how the U.S. government should make the decision to use U.S. military force 
abroad. Constitution Project Staff, “Deciding to Use Force Abroad,” vii–viii.  
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only be authorized via a narrowly tailored statute or formal declaration.596 In addition, 
Congress should codify laws of war that have domestic implications (i.e., procedures for 
the detention and trying of enemy combatants), condition force authorization with respect 
to international law, and require the president to justify and report on its use of force 
under Article II authorities within specified timeframes.  
The WPR currently perpetuates the problem of Congressional inaction and the 
president’s usurpation of wartime authority. As discussed in Chapter III, the WPR has 
failed to facilitate effective checks and balances between the executive and legislative 
branches.597 The consulting and reporting mechanisms in the WPR have been ineffective 
or ignored, and the meaning of “hostilities” debated. The Constitution Project provides a 
succinct summary of the WPR’s shortcomings: 
The WPR has failed for multiple reasons. It defines the President’s 
defensive war powers too narrowly; its consultation and reporting 
provisions leave loopholes that presidents have exploited; its never-used 
provision for two-house veto of a use of force is probably unconstitutional 
. . . and the sixty-day clock at its heart has been misconstrued to give the 
President a sixty-day “free pass” to use force without congressional 
authorization and to allow Congress to do nothing.598 
While Congress cannot impose upon the president’s tactical command of U.S. 
military forces, it may legislate limits on the use of military force, and it controls the 
purse strings of the U.S. armed forces.599 With this power, Congress can, and should, 
overhaul the WPR to preserve constitutional principles and promote the deliberation of 
force authorizations.600  
596 Constitution Project Staff, “Deciding to Use Force Abroad,” vii–viii. 
597 Ibid., 31.  
598 Ibid., 32.  
599 Ibid., 2. 
600 Congressional interest does exist in amending or replacing the WPR. Members introduced five 
separate bills in the 113th Congress about reforming the WPR, presumably due in part to frustration over 




                                                 
c. Assess the Necessity of a Narrowly Tailored Force Authorization against 
AQAP Based on the Organization’s Intent and Capability 
Congress should seek information from the executive branch about the threat 
from AQAP and conduct its own investigation. It should then conduct a risk-based 
analysis of AQAP threat information to determine the group’s current intent and ability to 
attack the United States. If Congress determines that AQAP poses a threat that requires 
force authorization, then it should craft an authorization narrowly tailored to that threat.  
The scope of this authorization must be clear, its terms unambiguous. These terms 
should address the range of resources dedicated to the armed conflict. The authorization 
should also include temporal limits—such as a sunset clause—based on estimates 
regarding conflict duration and cost. By providing this level of detail in its force 
authorization, Congress may avoid allocating excessive authorization to the executive 
branch.  
d. Assess the Necessity of a Narrowly Tailored Force Authorization against 
ISIL Based on the Organization’s Intent and Capability 
Similarly, Congress must continue to assess the threat ISIL poses to the United 
States and determine whether a force authorization is needed. Currently, the U.S. military 
is waging airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq, and it will likely wage airstrikes against ISIL in 
Syria.601 It was unclear until recently what authority the executive branch was relying 
upon to wage these airstrikes, although initial reports indicated that the administration 
might have been asserting Article II powers.602 Recently, however, Obama 
administration officials asserted that the AUMF provides necessary legal authority to 
wage sustained operations against ISIL. Regardless, existing legal justifications for U.S. 
military action against ISIL prove problematic.  
601 Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, “U.S. Weighs Direct Military Action Against ISIS in Syria,” 
The New York Times, August 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/obama-
adviser-says-military-action-possible-against-isis.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version= 
LedeSum&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news; “Statement by the 
President on ISIL,” President Barack Obama, September 10, 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/10-remarcks-president-barack-obama-address-nation. 
602 Ilya Somin, “Assessing Possible Legal Justifications for U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS,” Washington 
Post, August 8, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/08/assessing-
possible-legal-justifications-for-us-airstrikes-against-isis/. 
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Three primary legal arguments exist for supporting sustained operations against 
ISIL. First, the president could utilize the AUMF of 2002 for legal support. However, the 
administration publicly supported repeal of this statute on May 21, 2014 - just weeks 
before ISIL overtook Mosul. In addition, comments made by the president indicate that 
he intends to act beyond this authority, as he has emphasized the humanitarian need to 
prevent the genocide of the Yazidi minority.603 Further, the administration seems to be 
moving towards conducting airstrikes outside of Iraq, in Syria. Consequently, the 
authority provided by the AUMF of 2002 would be inadequate for sustained operations 
against ISIL. 
Second, the Obama administration could argue that the executive branch’s Article 
II authority to defend the United States from armed attack justifies military action. This 
justification is problematic because the actual or imminent threat to the nation posed by 
ISIL is unclear. President Obama recently stated that ISIL poses a threat to “American 
citizens, personnel and facilities” in the region, and that “[t]hese terrorists could pose a 
growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States.”604 Such language, 
indicating that ISIL “could” pose a threat beyond the region, arguably falls short of 
demonstrating that the group’s capabilities are of such a nature that sustained operations 
are justified under Article II. In addition, ISIL controls a significant amount of territory, 
and as such, such continued operations may be needed to deter ISIL. A force 
authorization from Congress would be necessary to conduct such sustained operations. 
Finally, just prior to the thirteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, administration 
officials laid out a legal argument asserting that the AUMF provides the executive branch 
with the authority to use sustained military force against ISIL.605 According to White 
House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, the AUMF applies to ISIL: 
It is the view of . . . the Obama administration that the 2001 AUMF 
continues to apply to ISIL because of their decade-long relationship with 
al-Qaida, their continuing ties to al-Qaida; because . . . they have 
603 Somin, “Assessing Possible Legal Justifications for U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS.” 
604 “Statement by the President on ISIL.” 
605 Dennis, “Here’s Obama’s Legal Justification for ISIS War.” 
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continued to employ the kinds of heinous tactics that they previously 
employed when their name was al-Qaida in Iraq. And finally, because they 
continue to have the same kind of ambition—aspiration that they 
articulated under their previous name.606 
The Obama administration maintains this argument despite the fact that ISIL did 
not exist on September 11, 2001 and in the face of the public spilt between ISIL and AQ. 
Simply put, the executive branch’s reasoning for applying the AUMF to ISIL is weak, at 
best. This justification is not grounded in AUMF language, and it reaches well-beyond 
judicial interpretations of AUMF application. In addition, the support for this reasoning is 
flawed. ISIL did not have a decade long relationship with AQ; the group formed in 2006 
and disaffiliated from AQ in early 2014. This disaffiliation was due, in part, due to 
disagreement over the heinous tactics ISIL employed. Further, while ISIL’s “aspiration” 
must be considered, military action against ISIL must also be justified based on the 
group’s capabilities.  
In sum, the Obama administration’s legal justifications for conducting sustained 
operations against ISIL are limited, and Congress must examine whether it needs to issue 
a force authorization against the group. While ISIL’s explicit threats aimed at the United 
States show its intent to harm the nation, Congress will need to focus its analysis on the 
group’s capabilities. It must evaluate the threat ISIL poses to U.S. interests and persons in 
the region, as well as U.S. allies, and it must consider whether the group could perpetrate 
an attack on the U.S. homeland. The Obama administration asserts that the group’s 
execution of James Foley constitutes a terrorist attack against the United States, and ISIL 
could “pivot” to attacks similar to those carried out by AQ on 9/11.607 Its ability to pivot 
at this time, however, is uncertain. As White House Deputy National Security Advisor 
Ben Rhodes explained, “To date, we have not seen them focus on that type of planning, 
but that doesn’t mean we’re not going to be very mindful that they could quickly aim to 
pivot to attacks against Western targets outside of the region . . . If they show the intent 
606 Dennis, “Here’s Obama’s Legal Justification for ISIS War.” 
607 Joel Gehrke, “White House: ISIS Could ‘Pivot’ to 9/11 Style Attack,” National Review Online, 
August 22, 2014, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/386084/white-house-isis-could-pivot-911-style-
attack-joel-gehrke. 
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or they show plotting against the United States, we’ll be prepared to deal with that as 
necessary.”608  
e. Review of Law Enforcement Authorities 
Obama administration representatives have recently asserted that the president has 
adequate legal authority to mitigate terrorist threats without an AUMF. As Koh 
explained, “Substantial legal authorities for both targeting and incapacitation of terrorists 
were available to the Executive branch before the 2001 AUMF. These authorities have 
been significantly strengthened since then, and would remain in its absence.”609 It is 
unclear precisely what authorities the president may be relying on to conduct non-
military counterterrorism operations abroad. Congress may surmise that this authority 
originates from the president’s Article II powers. However, it is likely that the executive 
branch is authorizing non-military counterterrorism measures abroad—utilizing certain 
civilian resources rather than military resources—to mitigate terrorist threats.  
The authorities supporting such action should be identified and reviewed to 
determine how they can best be leveraged to mitigate terrorist threats and how they fit 
within the methodology applied in this thesis. For instance, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) agents may make arrests if they have reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person has committed a felony under domestic law.610 Domestic law prohibits the 
provision of material support to foreign terrorist organizations.611 Moreover, statutory 
authority provides for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over this offense.612 
Consequently, domestic law may already provide for the utilization of law enforcement 
abroad to mitigate terrorist threats. Whatever actions are taken thereunder should be 
analyzed in the context of force authorization with a healthy dose of skepticism. Such 
authority could be used to support the proportional use of force and to promote law 
608 Gehrke, “White House: ISIS Could ‘Pivot’ to 9/11 Style Attack.” 
609 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan (statement of Harold Hongju 
Koh, Sterling Professor of International Law at the Yale Law School).  
610 18 U.S.C. section 3052. 
611 18 U.S.C. section 2339B. 
612 Ibid. 
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enforcement actions. Nonetheless, it is necessary to be wary of that which can be called 
by another name: civilian involvement—FBI, law enforcement—must not be a guise for 
military practices, especially if conducted for the purpose of shirking military force 
responsibilities.  
2. Analysis  
a. Domestic Legality 
The Tailored Approach will promote constitutional checks and balances by 
clarifying and then repealing the obsolete and overbroad AUMF. Through WPR changes, 
it will demand Congressional consideration of force authorization and use, which will 
help protect constitutional principles of checks and balances and due process. Finally, 
Congress will better fulfill its responsibilities for deciding when to go to war by 
implementing a narrowly tailored force authorization, if necessary, against AQAP or 
ISIL. Tailoring such authorizations will also help preserve constitutional separation of 
powers and due process protections.  
The AUMF’s sunset with the end of hostilities in Afghanistan would result in the 
executive branch no longer exercising authority under the overbroad AUMF. It would 
preserve democratic principles by ending an obsolete law that arguably threatened due 
process rights, as described in the status quo analysis earlier in this chapter. Similarly, 
Congress’s clear statement in any future force authorization, such as one directed at 
AQAP, will prevent the executive branch from exceeding congressional intent by 
exploiting language ambiguities in the authorization. Temporal limits will encourage 
Congress to act if it wants to continue authorization, rather than complacently permitting 
continued military operations. In effect, the executive branch can go about its 
counterterrorism measures in a framework that institutionally fosters more precision than 
when conducted under the gray nebula under which it is currently authorized, and under 
which it may have previously strayed. 
WPR changes will also promote congressional action. Under the proposed 
changes, the president would be required to seek congressional force authorization before 
 160 
deploying U.S. forces, unless the president is acting under his Article II powers. The 
changes also require collective threat evaluation and decision-making. 
The first component of this approach—that promotes information sharing from 
the executive branch to Congress—is crucial. The executive branch’s disclosure of an 
Attorney General opinion is a key part of this equation, as it will show the justification 
for entering the conflict and the authorities under which the executive branch may take 
action. This justification must be provided prior to the initiation of force, unless the 
executive branch is acting under Article II authority. If the president is acting under 
Article II authority, Congress must set a specific timeframe within which to acquire the 
opinion. While the executive branch may try to evade this requirement, congressional 
pressure to disclose such reasoning may be persuasive, from a political standpoint. The 
public’s recent demands for disclosure of the legal reasoning supporting the U.S.’ 
targeted killing program punctuate this point.  
In the WPR revision, Congress should spell out what information must be 
contained in this legal memorandum. It is recommended that Congress require the 
Attorney General to include: 1) laws supporting force deployment, 2) the specific threat 
the president seeks to mitigate, 3) domestic legal ramifications of the force authorization, 
and 4) international legal authorities supporting such action. This memorandum should be 
submitted to Congress prior to the initiation of force, unless the president is acting under 
Article II authority. If the president is employing Article II authority to defend the nation 
from an imminent threat, the memorandum must provide the definition of “imminent” 
under which it is acting, and justify why the threat justifies self-defense action.  
As noted by the Constitution Project, this memorandum will not ensure that the 
executive branch is acting in accordance with constitutional or international law 
principles, but it will force the executive branch to justify its actions under both. Since 
this justification will be provided to Congress, as well as to the public, it will provide an 
opportunity for constituents to voice their concerns to their representatives, and it will 
provide their representatives with the opportunity to protest. These Attorney General 
opinions will also help Congress track the evolution of the legal justification for armed 
conflict; if Congress identifies domestic legal ramifications that it would like to address 
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legislatively, it may do so. All these effects will enhance the preservation of 
constitutional principles, while affording Congress the opportunity to evaluate threats. 
The WPR changes should also include the codification of law of war authorities 
in statute. The domestic impacts of executive actions relevant to armed conflict are 
difficult to predict, and the judiciary is then left with the unenviable task of reviewing 
executive decisions in a time of war without correlated legislative guidance. For instance, 
in the context of the AUMF, numerous courts had to address laws of war issues 
pertaining to enemy combatant detention and evidentiary issues, with little statutory 
guidance from Congress. Congress’s codification of laws of war as they apply 
domestically will promote due process protections by putting individuals on notice of the 
domestic legal standards applicable in times of armed conflict.  
Finally, it bears mentioning that a great deal of time in the consideration of the 
AUMF discussion is spent determining how best to prevent the executive branch from 
interpreting self-defense powers too broadly, and thereby, negating the constitutional 
separation of war powers. To limit the executive branch’s defense powers by codifying 
what constitutes an “imminent threat” arguably runs contrary to the Constitution and 
might have unintended consequences that could reduce the Commander in Chief’s ability 
to respond quickly to threats. Thus, no such recommendation is made in this thesis.  
Nonetheless, implementing the recommended changes to the WPR will help 
address this issue because these changes promote congressional consultation in the 
context of force initiation and sustainment. Should Congress determine that continuing 
Article II operations are ill advised, Congress may consider utilizing its appropriation 
powers to prevent the continued funding of operations. In addition, Congress may 
consider seeking a judicial decision, should the political branches reach a standstill in 
addressing the issue. Hopefully, a reasonable decision will not elude the courts regarding 
whether a specific initiation of force by the executive branch is constitutionally sound. 
Finally, domestic principles may be better preserved if law enforcement tools are 
utilized to mitigate terrorist threats because law enforcement processes have established 
due process procedures in place. This approach admittedly may open up a whole new can 
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of worms, for it is unclear how such authorities would affect the constitutional 
separations of power. Some of the difficulty in predicting this impact lies in the 
ambiguity regarding exactly what authorities the executive branch is utilizing to mitigate 
terrorist threats abroad. These threats should be identified so that Congress may 
determine whether the executive branch’s deployment of law enforcement authorities 
abroad could implicate constitutional checks and balances issues.  
The Tailored Approach will promote public debate between the political branches 
regarding the scope of armed conflict force authorizations. It also promotes checks and 
balances by requiring the exchange of information and legal justification for executive 
and congressional decision-making. These aspects ensure that the Tailored Approach 
satisfies the domestic legality criterion. 
b. Security  
The executive branch had scheduled the withdrawal of military forces from 
Afghanistan for the end of 2014, but recent events in Afghanistan and the region have 
brought this date into doubt. Nonetheless, Congress’s prediction of a withdrawal date and 
sunsetting of the AUMF accordingly will enable the military to transition forces from the 
area and determine if additional legal authorities are needed to mitigate threats in the 
region.613  
Some may argue that sunsetting the AUMF will leave gaps in threat mitigation 
authority. It is true that the AUMF’s repeal will reduce executive authority in certain 
regards. This option may limit the executive’s flexibility in utilizing military force, 
which, in turn, may impede the president’s ability to respond to dynamic threats. Again, 
when the AUMF sunsets, the executive’s ability to utilize force for sustained operations 
against AQAP as an associated force ceases.  
This argument does not warrant the abandonment of the Tailored Approach, far 
from it. This approach does nothing to preclude the president from using Article II 
authority to respond to imminent threats or to repel sudden attacks, nor does it hinder the 
613 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 142. 
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president’s authority to request authorization for sustained operations. In fact, this 
approach will promote security because force initiation decisions will be evaluated and 
debated by more than one institution. An added opportunity will be provided to evaluate 
the threat and determine the most advantageous ways to mitigate it. For example, if 
Congress implements the Tailored Approach, it will have a great deal more information 
to consider. In addition, a narrowly tailored authorization will prevent excessive force 
authorization. In addition, if the circumstances of a threat are so exigent and dire as to 
require swift and mighty action, the executive branch, again, is unimpeded in utilizing its 
Article II authority.  
An important consideration arises, however, when it comes to continued 
detention. This approach would require the release of Guantanamo detainees within a 
reasonable time after the AUMF’s sunset, and it would remove the authority for military 
detention prior to prosecution.614 Some members of Congress may argue that this 
approach would hurt U.S. security, as some of these detainees may still be dangerous. 
Nonetheless, if the cessation of hostilities has occurred, the United States is obligated to 
return detainees. To extend an armed conflict based primarily on the premise that to 
release detainees would be dangerous arguably runs contrary to both domestic and 
international law. As Daskal and Vladeck explain, “Wars justify detention of enemy 
armed forces. Detention cannot and should not justify war; that would be a perverse 
example of the tail wagging the dog.”615 
While it may not promote the same level of executive branch flexibility as the 
General Criteria Plus Listing Approach, the Tailored Approach promotes a positive 
balancing of constitutional considerations with security protections. It does not inhibit the 
executive branch’s ability to protect the nation from imminent attack; it promotes a 
transition period from AUMF reliance, and it encourages Congress to consider force 
authorizations narrowly tailored to AQAP and ISIL immediately. As such, this approach 
satisfies the security criterion. 
614 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 144. 
615 Ibid., 143. 
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c. International Legality  
A sunset provision in the current AUMF would show the international community 
that the United States is willing to comply with international law by ceasing armed 
conflict after mitigating a threat. It will provide assurance to the international community 
that the country is willing to put an end to armed conflict, even against an asymmetrical 
adversary, when the conflict can no longer be justified based on self-defense. In addition, 
the enactment of a narrowly tailored force authorization against AQAP, which has 
attempted to attack the U.S. homeland on multiple occasions, will help justify necessity 
and preserve proportionality in threat response.  
Congress may punish and define “offenses against the Law of Nations.” In other 
words, Congress may determine what actions violate international law and make those 
actions illegal in the United States.616 The U.S. government has been accused of 
misinterpreting and misapplying international law by applying broader notions of 
targetability and imminence than what is permitted in the international community. To 
enhance legitimacy, Congress should codify relevant “offences against the Law of 
Nations.” Specifically, it should interpret and codify the laws of war because they have 
domestic implications when it comes to detention and the use of military tribunals.617 A 
codification of laws will promote adherence to them, and a reasonable interpretation and 
application of international law will enhance the legitimacy of U.S. counterterrorism 
actions. 
The Tailored Approach aims to promote necessity and proportionality in force 
authorization. It also encourages Congress to consider international law explicitly in 
legislative efforts aimed at clarifying international legal obligations in armed conflicts. 
By doing so, it satisfies the international legality criterion. 
616 Barron and Lederman, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb,” 734. 
617 Constitution Project Staff, “Deciding to Use Force Abroad,” 41.  
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d. Precedent  
The Tailored Approach addresses each of the considerations described in the 
precedent discussion in Chapter V. First, the evaluation of law enforcement authorities 
that may be utilized to mitigate threats abroad, such as those afforded the FBI, brings the 
issue of terrorist threat mitigation via both law enforcement and military authorities to the 
forefront.  
In addition, the Tailored Approach promotes government transparency and 
accountability. Including sunset clauses in future force authorizations will force Congress 
to analyze unforeseen or unintended consequences of force authorizations, rather than 
remain complacent after issuing a force authorization. The Tailored Approach’s emphasis 
on the need for Congress to provide precise statements of authority in future force 
authorizations will also promote political accountability. Additionally, changes to the 
WPR encourage public debate about future force authorizations. The reporting 
mechanisms will increase government transparency and encourage a collective decision-
making process that promotes political accountability. Consequently, the Tailored 
Approach satisfies the precedent criterion. 
3. Recommendation  
A variety of ideas for AUMF modification have been presented. Some expand 
military force authorization while others drastically narrow or eliminate it. However, 
Congress does not have to adopt one of these approaches wholesale; in fact, it is 
unrealistic, based on the spirits of compromise and adversarial democracy, that any such 
modification to the AUMF will cement into code as they appear now, verbatim in their 
gestating forms. Instead, the most optimal AUMF modification should combine a more 
holistic approach to force authorization with the elements of the aforementioned 
approaches that best address the criteria laid out in this thesis. The Tailored Approach 
proposed by the author is an attempt to do so.  
Congress should implement the Tailored Approach to force authorization. A 
variety of statutory approaches may be utilized—different elements combined in different 
ways—but the Tailored Approach’s holistic considerations not only shores up weak and 
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out-of-date legal authority, but it strengthens legal doctrine that will apply to future force 
authorizations. The Tailored Approach combines elements from and modifications of 
other proposals to balance security and constitutional protections, all the while 
maintaining respect for international legal frameworks and precedent setting concerns. As 
Justice Kennedy states in his majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, “The political 
branches, consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the 
Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional 
values while protecting the nation from terrorism.”618 In sum, the Tailored Approach 
protects and promotes such genuine debate, while protecting the independent 
responsibilities of the executive branch and Congress.  
618 Daskal and Vladeck, “After the AUMF,” 146. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION—
AND INACTION 
There must be some of us who say, “Let’s step back for a moment and 
think through the implications of our actions today—let us more fully 
understand the consequences.” 
–Representative Barbara Lee619 
Congress passed the AUMF a few short days after the 9/11 attacks to counter its 
perpetrators. Since then, it has served as the legal foundation for the use of force against 
terrorist organizations. Over a decade later, the U.S. government still relies on the AUMF 
as the primary domestic authority supporting counterterrorism measures, despite changes 
to the threat environment. AQ has decentralized and been degraded, and the president has 
expressed his desire to remove U.S. forces from Afghanistan within the next year. New 
threats have emerged that have nebulous or non-existent ties to the perpetrators of the 
9/11 attacks. Thus, the AUMF is not the most appropriate legal mechanism to counter 
terrorist threats today. 
Most sources agree that the AUMF resulted from a compromise between 
Congress and the executive branch. The Bush administration initially requested 
congressional authorization to use force to pre-empt future terrorist acts or aggression 
against the Unites States. Members of Congress—both democrats and republicans—
rejected this request for expansive authority.  
Despite these efforts, the AUMF has been broadly interpreted and applied. As 
former Congressman Paul McHale recently explained, “Through a combination of 
evolving defense policies, spanning many years and multiple presidential administrations, 
the United States is now capable of going to war without the consent of the governed. 
The implications of that reality are deeply troubling for our democracy and ultimately our 
national character.”620 Since 9/11, the executive branch has been criticized for 
619 Bill Hogan, “Alone on the Hill,” Mother Jones, September 20, 2001, http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2001/09/alone-hill. 
620 Noonan, “A More Sensible Set of War Powers.”  
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overstepping its wartime authority in applying the AUMF; this thesis has certainly 
partaken in this criticism to a certain degree. However, Congress is an enabler; it created 
and perpetuated conditions that led to the executive branch’s broadening interpretation 
and application of AUMF authority. Congress must cease its passivity. This nation cannot 
afford to have Congress take the easy way out when it comes to deciding whether to 
initiate and perpetuate war. By issuing broad force authorizations, or delegating authority 
to the executive branch, Congress effectively removes itself from the decision-making 
process, and thereby, escapes most political liability in the process.  
In considering AUMF modification, Congress should consider a new approach to 
force authorization; one that pushes Congress past its inaction to challenge the president 
if need be. Congress must fulfill its responsibility to represent the governed rather than 
take a backseat to the president, while driving the nation to war, however righteous or 
misled. A new approach is needed, and it needs to be one that motivates, or forces, the 
political branches to work together to form a collective judgment regarding the use of 
military forces.  
In determining the most advantageous approach, Congress must first perform its 
due diligence and examine all available information, and identify all potential 
consequences of its actions. This thesis provides a compilation of resources and 
considerations that Congress may build off to fully appreciate the implications of 
modifying the AUMF. 
Primary among these considerations is determining exactly how the threat 
environment has changed since Congress passed the AUMF. Congress must determine 
whether repeal or sunset of the AUMF will have adverse repercussions in countering 
current terrorist threats, and it must plan accordingly to phase-out certain affected 
operations. Open source information indicates that the primary threats to the United 
States currently originate with AQAP and ISIL. Consequently, consultation between 
Congress and the executive branch regarding these groups to determine both their intent 
and capability to attack the United States is necessary.  
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These security considerations must be balanced with constitutional protections, or 
domestic legality. Individuals and academics have alleged via numerous forums that the 
AUMF offends constitutional checks and balances provisions and due process 
protections. Several factors combine to create major concerns in this arena. Namely, the 
president’s war powers are at their peak when the president operates within a 
congressional force authorization. The president is currently operating within such an 
authorization via the AUMF, and this authorization is broad. When a president operates 
with peak war powers, the judiciary affords the executive branch incredible levels of 
deference in all matters pertaining to armed conflict. When this peak power is combined 
with the decreased due process procedures applicable during armed conflict—that enable 
the president to detain individuals without charge and relaxes the evidentiary standards 
the executive branch must meet when such detention is challenged—serious 
constitutional concerns arise. In sum, this situation results in an inordinate concentration 
of power with the executive branch.  
Checks on force utilization exist on the international level as well. While the 
application of international law to terrorist threats and the states that face them is 
unsettled, several preemptory norms in international law should be considered during the 
congressional decision-making process, namely, the norm against non-intervention, the 
self-defense requirement of necessity and proportionality, and laws of war protections for 
combatants. Consideration of these norms will increase U.S. credibility in the world 
community, and it will provide the United States with a well-reasoned defense, should its 
military or service members be challenged for such acts in international forums. Further, 
Congress has the opportunity to help shape international law. It should take advantage of 
this opportunity by developing policies and laws that are mindful of changes in 
contemporary armed conflict, yet respectful of international law.  
Finally, congressional consideration of how its actions will affect precedent in 
several key areas is necessary. First, Congress should consider the promotion of 
alternative methods of threat mitigation, such as law enforcement authorities or the 
versatile use of force. Second, transparency must be considered because it promotes full 
debate regarding force authorizations. A lack of transparency impedes Congress’s ability 
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to oversee force authorizations effectively. Transparency promotes accountability, 
specifically, the threat of political accountability. Such accountability will decrease the 
likelihood that lawmakers will fall victim to the tendency to rationalize policy based on 
an unsubstantiated perception of risk.  
All these considerations should be incorporated into the methodology Congress 
uses to evaluate the AUMF and alternatives: domestic legality, security, international 
legality, and precedent. Application of these criteria will help ensure that Congress will 
identify a sustainable approach. Such an approach must address the holistic issue of force 
authorization, and specifically, establish political accountability between the executive 
and legislative branches, by way of continued consultation and cooperation.  
Politicians, academics, and legal experts have endorsed several AUMF 
alternatives. Two leading proposals have emerged. The General Criteria Plus Listing 
Approach delegates force authorization to the executive branch through a robust 
administrative process. The Article II Approach eliminates force authorization altogether. 
Application of the criteria developed in this thesis to these approaches reveals that each 
has specific strengths and shortcomings. 
In applying the criteria to the General Criteria Plus Listing Approach, it becomes 
apparent that implementing this approach—that arguably expands force authorization 
authority—is ill advised because the criticisms hurled at the AUMF will undoubtedly 
apply to an expanded approach as well. In fact, expanding the delegation of force 
authorization authority to the executive branch will exacerbate these issues. Again, when 
the president acts in accordance with a congressional delegation of authority, the 
president’s war powers are at their peak. The president’s decisions in this context have 
proven virtually unassailable in court. Thus, a congressional delegation of authority to the 
executive branch to determine which groups should be targeted with military force will 
provide the executive branch with incredible authority, even if a robust administrative 
process is implemented. While Congress would arguably be able to adjust this process via 
legislation, Congress has shown from its passivity in amending the AUMF that it is 
unlikely to act unless it is under a specific obligation to do so, as decisions made by 
Congress regarding waging war carry a great deal of political accountability. 
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On the other hand, an approach that fails to safeguard against the possibility of the 
executive branch stretching its Article II powers to a breaking point is not desirable 
either. At first, the Article II Approach seems to provide a viable alternative to the status 
quo. On its face, it satisfies the criteria in this thesis. The Title II Approach resorts back to 
constitutional principles centered on the president’s authority to protect the nation from 
attack and Congress’s authority to authorize force. It precludes neither force authorization 
if a situation warrants, nor prevents the executive branch from defending the country. In 
addition, if the president acts solely under Article II authority—without a congressional 
authorization—it is more likely that the judicial branch would entertain challenges to 
these acts because the president would not be acting with peak powers. Nonetheless, the 
risk for broadened assertions of executive power could hinder the satisfaction of the 
thesis criteria in practice.  
This thesis proposes an alternative approach that capitalizes on the strengths of 
current proposals and minimizes their shortcomings: the Tailored Approach. This 
approach will accomplish the president’s goal of “refining, then repealing” the AUMF, 
while establishing a sustainable approach for future force authorizations. It calls upon 
Congress to sunset the AUMF, effectively ending the U.S. war against AQ and the 
Taliban. The sunsetting of the AUMF, rather than its immediate repeal, provides time to 
transition out of Afghanistan. Clarification of AUMF terms in the interim promotes 
transparency and accountability.  
In addition, it recommends that Congress consult with the executive branch in the 
consideration of force authorizations against AQAP and ISIL. Debate regarding the 
issuance of such force authorizations should not be limited to the intent of these groups; it 
should focus on the capability of these groups to successfully target the United States. 
Any force authorization issued against these groups must be narrowly tailored to the 
threat. It also must include a temporal limitation to force Congress to reassess the 
authorization prior to a specific date to promote continued transparency in considering 
the force authorization and accountability for continued assessment.  
Further, the Tailored Approach promotes sustainable change in several ways. 
First, it proposes an overhaul of the WPR. Recommended changes aim to preserve 
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constitutional protections and promote informed debate between the political branches 
regarding force authorization. These changes would also require the executive branch to 
justify its actions legally under both domestic and international law via an analysis that 
would be made public and provided to Congress. In addition, the approach’s 
recommended review of law enforcement authorities will help Congress keep apprised of 
potential executive action under these authorities, and it may provide Congress with 
potential alternatives to military force. In sum, the Tailored Approach provides the most 
satisfactory alternative to the AUMF because it best satisfies the criteria set forth in this 
thesis while providing a mechanism for sustainable change.  
While this thesis ultimately recommends the Tailored Approach, its greatest value 
is the methodology with which it is possible to evaluate the status quo and its alternatives. 
Congress may ultimately implement bits and pieces of the Tailored Approach or the other 
approaches as it deems fit. More crucial is that Congress makes AUMF modification 
decisions based on a well-reasoned methodology, in an effort to predict all reasonable 
consequences of its actions. The effects of the AUMF are widespread and sometimes 
difficult to pinpoint. By applying the criteria of domestic legality, security, international 
legality, and precedent when evaluating the AUMF and alternative approaches, Congress 
will be able to identify the most advantageous course of action.  
Congress cannot rely upon the executive branch to change the AUMF and end the 
conflict against AQ and the Taliban. Congress must fulfill its responsibilities by 
exercising its war powers in accordance with the constitution. As Koh states, this war has 
“[b]ecome so protracted that it has come to feel like a ‘Forever War.’ It has changed the 
nature of our foreign policy, consumed our new Millenium, and made it hard to 
remember what the world looked like before September 11.”621 After 13 years, it is time 
for Congress to end this “forever war” and find more appropriate ways to mitigate 
terrorist threats.  
621 Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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